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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to reach some conclusions about the possibility of the South 
African democracy to endure. It does so through entering into the so-called 
preconditions for democracy field, concretely, by the observation of the changes in 
and the composition of the South African middle class as a feature of democratic 
consolidation. 
Middle classes are regarded as an important political actor in democratisation and 
it is difficult to fmd a stable democracy without a well-developed and large middle 
class. Actually, the democratisation movements have mostly been led by middle 
classes. Moreover, the size of the middle class in a particular society is also indicative 
of the level of income inequality, which is another important indicator for the success 
of democratisation. 
From a theoretical perspective, the study presents the different existing 
approaches to democratisation in general, and to middle class democracy in particular. 
Then, it focuses on a case study: South Africa. The variables for the research then are, 
"middle class" as an independent variable; and "democratic consolidation" as a 
dependent variable. The hypothesis that links them therefore is as follows: 
The larger the middle class, the greater the chance for the consolidation of 
democracy. 
From an empirical perspective the research tests the above hypothesis by making 
use of extensive quantitative data. Both variables are then operationalised and their 
tendencies of growth are measured, presented and explained. Middle class is 
operationalised in terms of occupation. Consolidated democracy is operationalised in 
terms of political tolerance and trust in the institutions. Political tolerance refers to 
the procedural part of democracy, whereas trust relates to the substantive dimension 
of democracy. 
The major fin<iings arrived at are that, on one hand the middle class in South 
Africa is increasing in size and incorporating previously excluded sectors - mainly 
Blacks - but, on the other hand, democracy seems to be consolidating from a 
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procedural point of view - increase in political tolerance -, but not from a substantive 
one - decrease in trust in the institutions. Consequently, the original hypothesis is 
reformulated as follows: 
An increase in the middle class in the first years of democracy indicates that 
democracy is consolidating "procedlfrally ". 
Against the background of these fmdings, room is left for further research that 
will provide information about whether a democracy can consolidate only 
procedurally or whether the substantive dimension of democracy is essential for 
successful consolidation. Further research will also confirm whether or not the recent 
increase in trust during 1999 signifies a real turning-point or whether it is due to other 
reasons. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie studie poog om tot 'n aantal gevolgtrekkings te kom oor die 
waarskynlikheid dat die Suid-Afrikaanse demokrasie in stand sal bly. Dit is benader 
deur 'n ondersoek na die voorvereistes vir demokrasie en, konkreet, deur die 
waarneming van veranderings in die samestelling van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
middelstand as 'n verskynsel van demokratiese konsolidasie. 
Die middelstand word as 'n belangrike politieke rolspeler in demokratisering 
beskou en dit is moeilik om 'n voorbeeld van 'n stabiele demokrasie waar daar nie 'n 
groot middel~tand is nie, te vind. In werklikheid is demokratiese bewegings meestal 
deur die middelstand gelei. Verder is die omvang van die middelstand binne 'n 
besondere gemeenskap ook aanduidend van die vlak van inkomste-ongelykheid, wat 
'n verdere belangrike aanduider vir die sukses van demokratisering is. 
Vanuit 'n teoretiese perspektief hied die studie die verskillende bestaande 
benaderings tot demokratisering in die algemeen, en tot middelstand-demokrasie in 
besonder, aan. Dan verskuif die aandag na 'n gevallestudie van Suid-Afrika. Die 
veranderlikes vir die navorsing is "middelstand" as onafhanklike veranderlike en 
"demokratiese konsolidering" as afhanklike veranderlike. Die hipotese waardeur hulle 
in verband gestel word, is as volg: 
Hoe grater die middelstand, hoe grater die waarskynlikheid vir die 
konsolidasie van demokrasie. 
Vanuit 'n empiriese perspektief toets die navorsing die bogenoemde hipotese 
deur gebruik te maak van uitgebreide kwantitatiewe data. Albei veranderlikes word 
ge-operasionaliseer en hul groeitendense word gemeet, aangebied en verduidelik. 
Middelstand word in terme van beroep ge-operasionaliseer. Gekonsolideerde 
demokrasie word in terme van politieke verdraagsaamheid en vertroue in instellings 
ge-operasionaliseer. Politieke verdraagsaamheid bon verband met die prosedurele 
aspek van demokrasie, terwyl vertroue verband bon met die substantiewe dimensie 
van demokrasie. 
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Die vemaamste bevindings waartoe gekom is, is, aan die een kant, dat die 
middelstand in Suid-Afrika besig is om uit te brei en voorheen uitgeslote sektore -
veral Swartes - te inkorporeer en, aan die ander kant, dat demokrasie besig is om 
vanuit 'n prosedurele oogpunt - toename in politieke verdraagsaamheid - te 
konsolideer, maar nie vanuit 'n substantiewe oogpunt - afname van vertroue in die 
instellings - nie. Gevolglik word die oorspronklike hipotese soos volg herformuleer: 
'n Toename in die middelstand gedurende die eerste }are van demokrasie dui 
aan dat die demokrasie besig is om ''prosedureel" te konsolideer. 
Teen die agtergrond van die bevindings is daar ruimte vir verdere navorsing 
wat inligting sal verskaf aangaande die moontlikheid daarvan dat 'n demokrasie net 
maar prosedureel kan konsolideer, en of die substantiewe dimensie essensieel is vir 
suksesvolle konsolidasie. Verdere navorsing sou ook kon bepaal of die voorafgaande 
toename in vertroue gedurende 1999 'n werklike ommekeer aandui, en of dit aan 
ander redes toegeskryf moet word. 
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Chapter 1. Consolidated democracy and middle class: An overview 
1.1 Introduction 
This Chapter aims to introduce the reader to the aims and the structure of this 
research. Firstly, the general determinants of the democratic process are outlined. The 
Chapter describes when the first regimes became democracies and how this was 
achieved. Examples are used to demonstrate that some of these political regimes 
remained democratic while others did not, and that even the same country goes 
through different democratisation processes, some of which are successful - they 
stabilise - and others are not. The general problems facing a political regime m 
becoming democratic and stabilising are presented to the reader. 
After this, the different approaches to the so-called preconditions of democracy 
and critiques of these approaches are introduced. Special emphasis is placed on the 
"relation" between democracy and social structure/inequality. 
This is followed by the statement of the problem, the methodology to be used in 
this study, the delimitation and limitations of the research and the contribution to the 
discipline. Finally, the reader finds the Chapter outline. 
1.2 Democratisation: Its background 
Political history shows that, generally, democracy does not occur in "isolation" 
but at the same time in several areas. These democratisation processes have been 
named "waves" (Huntington, 1991a) or "swings" (Pastor, 1989a) of democracy. Each 
wave is a group of political changes happening close together in time in different 
countries. What defines a democratic or anti-democratic wave is that "during a certain 
stretch of historical time the changes in governments are preponderantly of one or the 
other kind" (Markoff, 1996: 10). 
The emergence of modern democracy at the national level of government 
appeared first in the United States in the early nineteenth century, with the extension 
of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population. During the following 
century democratic regimes gradually emerged in Western and Northern Europe, the 
British controlled territories, and in a few countries in Latin America (Markoff, 1996: 
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11). 
In 1910 from two to eight states could have been called democracies, depending 
on how strict the definition was. From about 1910 until 1920 there was great progress 
in democratic claims by government: Parliamentary reforms in Europe, extension of 
suffrage to women in several countries and emulation in weaker countries of the 
constitutional forms of victorious democratic powers. This democratic trend appeared 
to be irreversible (see, for instance, Bryce, 1921). However, and to the contrary, the 
year of 1920 was the "crest" of democratic development among the independent 
nations of the world. In the following two decades, the 1920s and 1930s, fascist 
movements, authoritarian monarchs and anti-democratic militaries banished 
democratic forces from the political stage in much of Europe and Latin America. 
Democracy was extinguished in Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, the Baltic States, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Brazil and Japan. As Huntington (1984: 196) 
wrote: "The war fought to make the world safe for democracy seemed instead to have 
brought its progress to an abrupt halt and to have unleashed social movements from 
the right to the left intent on destroying it". The undemocratic German state 
conquered most of the rest of democratic Europe during World War II (Huntington, 
1991a: 12-13). 
The aftermath of W oild War II, on the other hand, saw the multiplication of 
democratic regimes. Democracy was instituted in West Germany, Austria, Italy and 
Japan and there was an attempt to do so in South Korea. Coincidentally, the process 
of decolonisation got underway with newly independent countries usually adopting, at 
first, the political forms of the imperial powers. In at least some cases, such as India, 
Israel, Ceylon and the Philippines, the form of democracy was accompanied by the 
substance also - not merely elections. From the 1960s the trend was mixed. The 
number of democratic regimes seemed to expand in the 1950s and early 1960s to 
shrink again in the middle-late 1960s and early 1970s (Markoff, 1996: 77-79). 
The military defeat of the fascist powers, in the 1940s and 1950s, resulted in a 
diffusion of the political systems of the victors - either a democratic or a communist 
model. Democracy, for instance, was established in Western Germany, Japan, Italy 
and Austria. Yalta-produced Berlin Wall was meant to "freeze" the division of the 
world (Huntington, 1984: 197). 
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Latin America followed the multicontinental trends in the 1940s and the 1950s 
and several important countries embraced democracy. The Brazilian military ended 
the authoritarian regime of Getulio Vargas, who had ruled since 1930. Venezuela 
made its first genuine attempt at democratic government in its history in 1945 
(Lamounier, 1989: 124-5). In 1956-7 Colombia terminated its extraordinary Violencia 
with a series of pacts that adhered to formal democracy (Tickner, 1998: 61-65; 
Richani, 1997: 38). 
The 1960s also saw the end of ideologies (Bell, 1968) and the "overload of 
democracies" (see, for instance, Habermas, 1976). It was also a time when cultural 
explanations of political differences were attempted (i.e. the anti-democratic culture in 
Latin America deriving from medieval Spain and Portugal). Some argued that 
democracy depended on unusual cultural characteristics and areas like Asia and Latin 
America were infertile soil for the growth of democracy. Others saw the patterns of 
economic development in the most recently industrialising countries as inimical to 
democracy and debated the earlier perception of social scientists who saw 
development as a stimulus to democratisation1 • 
By the 1960s and the 1970s most of Latin America was under the sway of very 
different kinds of anti-democratic forces. Mexico had long been ruled by "Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional" (PRI hereafter), whose official slogan of "effective 
suffrage" was contradicted by the reality of its elections. The application of force and 
fraud was so pervasive that no opposition party had ever been permitted to win a state 
governorship in Mexico, let alone seriously aspire to the presidency (Klesner, 1997: 
703-5). On the other hand, even the more economically developed countries of South 
America seemed to be falling under undemocratic regimes controlled by the army. 
The most shocking case was Chile, with a long and deep democratic tradition that 
came to and end in a coup in 1973- although an analysis of the United States' policy 
toward Latin America at that time could help to explain this (Valenzuela, 1989: 182-
6; Leonard, 1996: 195-200). Uruguay, proud of a tradition of peace and democracy 
that led to its being known as the "Switzerland of Latin America", had also a 
breakdown of democracy - perhaps not so abrupt or immediate as Chile, but similar 
1 O'Donnell's (1973) Modernisation and bureaucratic-authoritarianism was a pioneering work in this 
regard. 
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in barbarity (torture, etc.) (Gillespie & Gonzalez, 1989: 214-220). By the mid-1970s 
only three Latin American countries, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela could 
fairly apply the label "democratic" to their politics (Diamond & Linz, 1989: 2-9). 
In Africa initial hopes for postcolonial democracy crumbled as one country after 
another threw out its initial democratic constitution, often derived from some 
European models. Some African governments declared that the rule of one party was 
more appropriate for their circumstances, that a great leader of the independence 
struggle should be "President for Life" or that military rule was essential for progress. 
The army of the largest independent African country, Nigeria, overturned its 
democratic constitution in 1966 (Diamond, 1989: 43-45). The European power with 
the most significant remaining African colonies, Portugal, was a non-democratic state 
itself. Portugal did nothing to encourage democracy in Angola or Mozambique; 
moreover, "it fought a protracted war against socialist revolutionaries who hardly 
looked themselves like sources of democracy .... The most industrialised country of 
the continent, South Africa, rigidly insisted on the permanent exclusion of the great 
majority of its citizens from any democratic participation" (Markoff, 1996: 7). 
The Communist East seemed remarkably successful in repressing dissent and 
controlling opinion through the state mass media and the direct backing of the 
Russian army, such as occurred with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
for instance (Eidlin, 1984: 89-90). Communist parties had been able to fight the 
United States to a deadlock in Korea. And the Caribbean island of Cuba (with Soviet 
missiles in its territory) demonstrated that a determined revolutionary government of 
even a very small country could stand up to the wealth and power of the United States 
(Swan, 1988: 391-407). 
In retrospect the entire debate between those who emphasised economic 
explanations and those who favoured cultural ones was profoundly ironic, as the 
Chilean and Argentinean coups well proved. In the mid-1970s democracy once again 
began to gain strength while scholars, not yet noticing, continued to elaborate and 
debate their cultural and structural accounts of the anti-democratic character of many 
countries. Events cast doubt on many of their conclusions (Markoff, 1996: 9-10). 
The late 1970s and early 1980s again witnessed the expansion of democracy. In 
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1974 the "Revolution of the Carnations" in Portugal began a democratic revolution 
that went through all non-democratic Southern Europe. Peru, Ecuador, Ghana, Nigeria 
and Turkey seemed to oscillate back and forth between democratic and undemocratic 
systems (Ozbudum, 1989: 207). In East Asia, Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia 
became less democratic while Taiwan remained undemocratic; Thailand and Malaysia 
remained partially democratic (Samudavanija, 1989: 312-315; Ahmad, 1989: 360-
368). 
Poland began the movement toward democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the late 1980s. Finally, in the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought 
along the democratisation of Russia and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. One 
communist regime after another was replaced by at least ostensibly democratic 
government. Rumania was more problematic. When the Soviet Union collapsed and 
fragmented into fifteen self-governing states, many of those fragments claimed to be 
struggling to establish democracy (Alarc6n-Orguiz, 1994: 66-86; Pribicevic, 1993: 
345-359). 
Massive oppositiOn overthrew the government of Ferdinand Marcos in the 
Philippines in 1986. Electoral politics replaced the military regime in South Korean in 
1987 (Smith & Lee, 1990: 164-179). Less fortunate was the Chinese pro-democratic 
demonstration in China; it was dramatically suppressed by force. The Burmese 
movement's electoral success of 1990 was not recognised by the military regime. In 
Haiti, the first president elected by the first credible elections in its history, was 
inaugurated in 1990; although he was overthrown by the Haitian military, he was later 
returned to office by external force (Von Hippel, 1995: 11-13). 
Islamic movements, in the 1990s, accepted democratic procedures in their 
struggle for power in North Africa and the Middle East. The Salvation Islamic Front 
(SIF hereafter) was certain to gain a very important success in the first contested 
national elections in the history of Algeria. The military cancelled the elections and 
staged a coup in 1992 (Amirouche, 1998: 82-86). In several other Muslim countries, 
such as Tunisia and Egypt, Islamic opposition movements have also called for open 
electoral competition (Sadiki, 1995: 249-250; Makram-Ebeid, 1994: 83-86). Further 
to the South, in Africa, democracy has also progressed. Opposition leaders won 
elections in 1991 in two former Portuguese colonies, the Cape Verde Islands and Sao 
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Tome and Principe. Kenneth Kaunda, who had been ruling Zambia since 1964, lost 
the 1991 presidential elections to the opposition leader, Frederick Chiluba. 
(Ihonvbere, 1994: 83-84; Beck, 1997: 1-6). In Mali, General Moussa Traore was 
deposed after 23 years in power and elections were held in March 1992. There have 
been democratic movements in Kenya and Mozambique has ended its long and 
traumatic civil war and has attempted to introduce democracy (House-Midamba, 
1996: 289-291; Isaacs, 1995: 13-15). Finally, no discussion would be complete, 
especially in this study, without mentioning the long and painful process that South 
Africans concluded in the early 1990s to end apartheid and bring democracy to all. 
The first elections, in which all adult South Africans could participate, took place in 
1994 (Stoddard, 1997: 83-84; 90-93) and the second in 1999 (see Reynolds, 1999). 
In Latin America, also in the mid-1970s, the Brazilian military began negotiating 
a relaxation - abertura - of its authoritarian style and by the end of 1983 Brazil had 
made substantial progress back towards a democratic system. The coup there in 1964 
had become the paradigmatic case of anti-democratic rule for industrial Latin 
America (Fleischer, 1986: 12-14). The organisations on the left did not trust the 
military's overtures. However, this process led Brazil to the election of a civilian 
president a decade later (Lamounier, 1989: 111-112). At the end of 1983 Argentina 
had a democratically elected government (Arceneaux, 1997: 327-331). 
By the 1980s, military government had disappeared from South America. Some 
fell precipitously, as in Argentina after Great Britain defeated a military attempt to 
occupy some disputed islands (Waisan, 1989: 59-63); other governments began a 
return to a civilian rule, as in Uruguay. Even Paraguay's non-democratic regime 
underwent the same process. Chile was the last undemocratic country in South 
America to democratise when the first civilian president was elected democratically in 
1989 after a cruel dictatorship that lasted 15 years. However, the former dictator, 
Pinochet, remained as the head of the army and, later, as a life-long senator 
(Loveman, 199: 35-37; Angell, 1993: 563-564). In Central America the Nicaraguan 
Sandinistas, a revolutionary socialist party, made a surprise move by, first, calling for 
a general election and, later, accepting the electoral victory of its opponent, Violeta 
Chamorro (Gonzalez Guerrero, 1991: 449-453; Paterson, 1997: 380-381). 
By the early 1990s every state south of Mexico was at least nominally 
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democratic, a state of affairs unprecedented since the wars of independence of the 
early nineteenth century. The only significant Latin American countries to hold on to 
non-democratic rule in the mid-1990s were Cuba and Mexico. The president of 
Mexico claimed, however, to be opening up the system. For the first time publicly 
announced election results meant victory for candidates from opposition parties. In 
July 1999 the opposition "Alianza por el Cambio" won an important victory against 
the all-powerful Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary 
Party) and gained the governorship of the State of Nayir, and in the State of Mexico 
the governing PRI won a very narrow victory. Finally, PRI lost the presidential 
elections held in June 2000 against Partido de Accion Nacional (El Pais, 02-6-00). 
There are two main reasons for the ongoing political changes in Mexico. The first is 
the change in the international context after the fall of Soviet empire and, second, the 
rise of a modernising society, which is the result of the economic growth which led to 
an "increasing participation of the middle classes in the benefits of the economic 
development" (Randall, 1996: 10)2. 
1.3 Latin America: A political laboratory 
With reference to democratisation process, Latin America's political history is 
very peculiar. Since independence Latin America has often experienced a swing 
between democracy and dictatorship, but the contemporary consciousness has been 
shaped by three swings of the pendulum since the World War II. Each of these swings 
went further toward democracy than the previous one. The first swing - at the 
beginning of 1944 - was the most precarious, but it still left an important 
psychological imprint on the youth of the region and probably made the second swing 
toward democracy in the late 1950s deeper. Similarly, the third one occurred in the 
1970s (Munck, 1989: 25-26; Diamond & Linz, 1989: 1-2; see also Meyer, 1989). 
The first swing begun in Guatemala in 1944. Venezuela followed in 1945. In 
Venezuela the dictator was overthrown and elections were held soon after; Costa Rica 
also joined the democratic club. In 1954 the army in Venezuela stopped following the 
orders of Jacobo Arbenz and gave their support to an insurgence financed by the 
2 For further details on these swings of democratisation see Huntington (1991a; 1993; 1996; 1997); 
Pinkney, (1994); Markoff, (1996); Stromberg, (1996); Diamond, (1996). On the third wave in Africa, 
see Ihonvbere, (1996); Schraeder, (1995). 
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United States. In 1948, when the democratic pendulum "swung back", only Costa 
Rica remained democratic. In 1955 Peron fell in Argentina and other dictators also 
fell like dominoes - Gustabo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Marcos Perez Jimenez in 
Venezuela, Manuel Odria in Peru, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Fulgencio Batista in 
Cuba. Before Dominican democracy could even settle down after Trujillo's death, 
Argentina's military overthrew the government in March 1962. The military then also 
intervened in Peru. In the Dominican Republic in September 1963 the newly elected 
government was toppled by the military. A coup followed in Honduras, and, fmally, 
the military intervened in Brazil in 1964. The military took power in fifteen out of 
twenty-one Latin American nations. When the pendulum swung back again, 
Venezuela and Colombia joined Costa Rica and other long-lasting democracies like 
Chile and Uruguay. The journey back to democracy started slowly but more 
uniformly. 
In the 1970s the third swing towards democracy started. In 1974 General and 
President Emesto Geisel gradually opened the Brazilian political system - abertura -
until January 1985, when an opposition leader was elected president. In 1978 the 
Dominican Republic became democratic. In 1979 a social democrat leader was 
elected in Ecuador. In May 1980 F emando Belaunde won the presidential election 
and was duly inaugurated. Other military governments in Honduras, Panama, El 
Salvador and Bolivia had agreed to open up their political systems. Argentina also 
democratised after the collapse of the military in the Malvinas war. In 1979 in Central 
and South America only Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia and Suriname were 
democratic. By 1988 all of South America was democratic, except Chile and 
Paraguay - they joined the club later - and Guyana and Suriname were taking steps 
toward democracy (Pastor, 1989b: 3-11; Smith, 1974: 241; Paz: 1983: 9; for 
comparative approaches see, for instance, Linz & Stepan, 1989 and Whitehead, 1989). 
Generally, scholars have been more effective in explaining the previous swing of 
the pendulum than in predicting the next swing. The first swing was viewed as 
evidence of a universal movement toward democracy that accompanied the defeat of 
Germany, Italy and Japan. The reversal was interpreted in terms of the region's 
chronic instability. Scholars understood the second swing in the 1960s in terms of a 
middle class challenging the agrarian oligarchy. It was seen as both a positive and an 
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inevitable result of the breakdown of a feudal political and economic system (see 
Porter & Alexander, 1961; Pastor 1989b ). Scholars such as Huntington ( 1968), · 
O'Donnell (1973), Smith (1974), Wiarda (1986), to mention but a few, did not foresee 
the return of democracy in the late 1970s. 
A closer look at some examples may enable the reader to understand better the 
processes of the rise and collapse of democracy. The following examples have been 
chosen because they show how some democracies break down and others stabilise. 
Venezuela October 18, 1945. A coup deposes government of President Isaias 
Medina Angaria. A Junta (military committee) led by the provisional President 
R6mulo Betancourt takes office. Important political and economical reforms are 
established. In January 1946 the Christian Democratic party, Comite de Organizacion 
Politica Electoral1ndependiente, is established and becomes the most important party 
in opposition to Accion Democratica. On 15 March 1946 the electoral law is passed 
granting universal suffrage. On 14 December 194 7 R6mulo Gallegos, Acci6n 
Democnitica presidential candidate, wins the presidency. On 24 November 1948 a 
military coup overthrows the government of R6mulo Gallego. During the trienio 
(three-year period) this democracy had an extremely fragile base of legitimacy. The 
country had no previous experience in democracy (see Dahl, 1971). Few organised 
social or political groups had the skills or resources of mass organisation necessary to 
challenge the power of the new regime. Several important actors, particularly those 
whose interests had been protected under previous regimes, had not abandoned their 
ties to authoritarianism (Gibson, 1989: 159-163; Karl, 1987: 63-67; Levine, 1985: 47-
89; 1989: 247). 
Guatemala, 1954. Rebellions break out against the thirteen-year-old dictatorship 
of Jorge Ubico. A three-person Junta, which includes reformist officer Jacobo Arbenz 
and conservative officer Jorge Arana, assumes power and calls for elections. In 
December 1945 Juan Jose Arevalo is elected president with 85 % of the vote. A 
Democratic-reformist regime is inaugurated. On July 1949 Jorge Arana is murdered. 
Arbenz's associates are implicated in the murder. Armed fights break out between the 
government and Arana's supporters. Jacobo Arbenz assumes the presidency. In June 
1952 the most extensive agrarian reform law in Guatemalan history is enacted. Part of 
the land held by the US-owned United Fruit Company is expropriated. Other 
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measures are taken to counter US economic influence in Guatemala. In January 1953 
Dwight D. Eisenhower is inaugurated as president in the United States. Conflict with 
the US grows. During May-June 1954 the US exposes Czech arms shipment to 
Guatemala and denounces the government as a "communist beachhead in the 
Americas". An anti-Arbenz invasion force, supported by the US government, enters 
Guatemala. On 27 June 1954 Arbenz resigns from the presidency following an 
ultimatum from his military high command. The 1954 overthrow of the 
constitutionally elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, presents a 
clear case of a democratic regime breaking down through external force (Gibson, 
1989: 169-172). As Linz and Stepan (1989: 41-61) noted, a democratic regime 
requires not merely the passive support of its followers, but their aggressive support in 
times of crisis. 
Argentina, September 1955. The army stages a coup against Juan D. Peron and 
the government is overthrown. Two and half years later General Pedro Aramburu 
calls for presidential elections. Arturo Frondizi wins the election with over 50 % of 
the vote. He is overthrown by a military coup following Peronist victories in 
congressional elections. From September 1962 to April 1963 armed clashes take place 
between the 'Gorila' faction of the armed forces, favouring the establishment of a 
military government and the 'legalist' faction. Clashes result in a decisive 'legalist' 
victory. Arturo Illia is elected to the presidency in March 1963. In March 1965 the 
Peronists gain decisive votes in congressional elections. In June 1966 President Illia is 
overthrown by a military coup. General Ongania is named president by the military 
Junta. The key task of democratic leaders between 1958 and 1966 was to expand the 
legitimacy of a system whose consolidation represented their only long-term hope of 
preserving political power. Their causes of failure to do so lay largely in the 
constraints imposed on them by the military and other powerful sectors (Gibson, 
1989: 173-177; Waisan, 1989: 69-72). 
Brazil, August 1961. Janio Quadros, president of Brazil, resigns unexpectedly 
after half a year in government. In September, 1961 the Vice-President, assumes the 
presidency. In mid-1963 the stabilisation plan fails and the economic crisis grows. 
Political instability and mobilisation affect most of the country. On 13 March 1964 
President Goulart tries to enact basic reforms in the nation's constitution and 
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economy. He calls for massive demonstrations and nation-wide strikes to pressure 
Congress to support the reforms. In March 1964 an enlisted men's naval mutiny takes 
place in support of the Goulart government. The government guarantees amnesty to 
the mutineers. On 31 March 1964 a military coup overthrows the government of 
President Janio Quadros. The collapse of the Brazilian constitutional regime in 1964 
was a direct result of actions taken by the incumbent leadership, particularly during 
the final weeks of the regime, which eroded the legitimacy of the government and 
generated a critical mass of support for a military coup. The mobilisation, far from 
serving as a manifestation of support, gave the impression that the political process 
was no longer being controlled by the constitutional leadership. This case also 
exemplifies the possibility of a democratic breakdown in an industrialising country 
(Mauceri, 1989: 217-221; Lamounier, 1989: 124-127). 
Costa Rica, 1948. In presidential elections Otilio Ulate (PUN party) gams a 
short-lived victory over Dr. Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia (PRN party). PRN-
controlled Congress overturned the results claiming fraud in the elections and 
declared Calderon Guardia the winner. During · March 1948 to April 1948 the 
opposition candidates Jose Figueres Ferrer (PSD) and Otilio Ulate (PUN) formed an 
alliance and established an army to defeat Calderon. Civil war conditions arise in San 
Jose. In May 1948 a Junta is established with Figueres as president. Constituent 
Assembly elections result in Ulate's forces controlling the assembly. An invasion by 
PRN forces from Nicaragua is defeated. The new constitution abolishing the armed 
forces is adopted and Ulate assumes the presidency. In July 1953 Figueres and his 
newly formed PLN win the presidency with 65 % of the vote and enact a reform 
program involving new taxes and wage increases. In early 1955 remnants of 
Calderon's forces invade Costa Rica with four hundred men and support from 
Somoza. The invasion is terminated after the United States and the Organisation of 
American States (OAS hereafter) censure it. In July 1958 Mario Echandi (PUN) is 
elected president with 46 % of the vote. The PLN remains the largest party in the 
Legislative Assembly with twenty seats, though a Calderon-Ulalte alliance gives 
control to the government. July 1962-1966: Presidency of Francisco Orlich 
Bo1marcich (PLN). July 1966-1970: Presidency of Jose Joaquin Trejos (PUN). July 
1970: Jose Figueres Ferres (PLN) is elected president for a second time with 55 % of 
the vote. Costa Rica has a long history of democracy after the 1948 Revolution. Since 
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1949 several peaceful transfers of presidential power have occurred (Mauceri, 1989: 
204-208; LOpez, 1996: 115-120). According to Huntington's (1993) "two tum-overs" 
thesis 3 this country could be considered as democratically consolidated. 
Venezuela, December 1957-January 1958. A meeting in New York among 
Venezuela's three major party leaders leads to an agreement on cooperating for a 
transition to democracy. This was followed by the publication of a "Declaration 
Concerning the National Political Situation" in which business leaders urge an end to 
the dictatorship. In late January 1958 the regime of General Perez Jimenez is 
overthrown and a transitional Junta is installed. Between July 1958 and October 1958 
two coup attempts by forces loyal to the former dictator are thwarted. The Pact of 
"Punta Fijo" (fixed point), in which the parties decide to co-operate during the 
consolidation period is signed. In December 1958 R6mulo Betancourt of Acci6n 
Democnitica (AD) receives 49.2 % of the vote in the presidential elections_and leads 
a coalition government of AD and Comite de Organizaci6n Politica Independiente 
(COPEI). An agrarian reform law is enacted. Splits in AD over the Cuban issue lead 
to urban disturbances and insurgency. In December 1963 Raul Leoni (AD) is elected 
president with 32.8 % of the vote: He governs with COPEI co-operation. In December 
1968 Rafael Caldera is elected president and power is transferred peacefully for the 
first time. The insurgent groups are largely defeated and given the option of entering 
the electoral system, which most accept. In May 1973 the Presidential candidacy of 
former dictator Perez Jimenez is prohibited by constitutional reform. In December 
1973, Carlos Andres Perez is elected president with 48.6% of the votes. Venezuela's 
stable democracy rests on a strong multiparty system that promotes the sharing of 
democratic norms and acts as conflict regulator in society. Since 1958, it has 
maintained its democracy through several peaceful transfers of presidential power 
(Mauceri, 1989: 217-221). However, in 1999 General Hugo Vazquez- the President 
- claimed that people "were requesting" the president to stage a Fujimorazo 
(executive coup), although surveys reveal that more than 80 % of the population 
supports democracy and few people supported his various attempts at staging a coup 
in previous years (before winning the elections) (El Pais, 02-7 -99). In July 1999, the 
electorate banished traditional parties from the political sphere and gave nearly 
3 This theory implies that a de~ocracy in which political power has been transferred peacefully twice 
can be considered as consolidated (see Huntington, 1993). 
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complete power to Hugo Vazquez($! Pais, 27-7-99; McCoy, 1999: 64-65; see also 
Norden, 1989: 43-44; 161-162). 
Brazil, January 1974- November 1974. General Ernesto Giesel is inaugurated as 
president and initiates a policy of abertura. The opposition party MDB captures 
sixteen of twenty-two contested Senate seats in congressional elections. In April 1977 
the "April package" is announced by Geisel, reducing the congress and the opposition 
power. This is followed by riots and demonstrations during the summer. In December 
1977 new laws are enacted, substituting the former Institutional Acts. The reform of 
the party system is also announced. In January 1978 President Joao Figueiredo is 
inaugurated. In elections in November 1982 the opposition parties gain twenty of 
twenty-two governorships, while the regime maintains its majorities in Congress and 
the state assemblies. In January 1984 a demonstration of two hundred thousand 
people in Sao Paulo pushes for presidential elections. An amendment demanding 
direct elections is defeated in the regime-controlled Congress. In January 1985 
Tancredo Neves, the leader of the opposition party (PMDB) is elected president in the 
electoral college by a 450-180 margin. After the death of Tancredo, his vice-president 
Jose Sarney is inaugurated. In February 1986 President Sarney announces "Plan 
Cruzado" (Crossed Plan), a economic programme to control persistent inflation 
(Mauceri, 1989: 222-225; Munck, 1989: 130-136). 
Argentina4, March 1981- July 1981. General Roberto Viola assumes the 
presidency. Viola's overtures to the opposition consisted of the formation of the 
Multipartidaria (party alliance) to negotiate a return to democracy. In December 1981 
Galtieri (hard-line faction) replaces Viola in the Junta and he is inaugurated as 
president. He imposes an austerity program. Talks of transition come to an end. Anti-
regime demonstrations begin and the parties toughen their positions. During April 
1982 to July 1982 Argentina invades the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The British 
naval forces arrive and surround Argentina's troops, who surrender at Port Stanley. 
Galtieri resigns and is eventually replaced by General Bignone. Between September 
1982 and December 1982 demonstrations and strikes increase and an election 
timetable is announced. In October 1983, Raul Alfonsin wins the presidency with 52 
% of the vote. In June 1985, "Plan Austral" is approved by President Alfonsin to 
4 Argentina is used again. Now it serves as an example of stable democracy. 
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control inflation and increase economic confidence. The austerity measures include a 
new currency, wage and price freezes and budgets cuts. Between March and April 
1987 a series of rebellions by junior military officers takes place, protesting 
prosecutions for actions taken during the rule of the military regime. Argentina's road 
to democracy was characterised by deep cleavages both in the military and among 
political parties. The country remains democratic (Munck, 1989: 102-122; Mauceri, 
1989: 240). 
It is remarkable that Latin American democracies have survived at all considering 
the enormous stresses that they have experienced over the past decade - economic 
recession, increase in poverty, drug trade, violence and corruption. This can be 
viewed as a sign of the regularisation and maturation of democratic politics not seen 
in previous eras. However, stagnation and erosion are offsetting liberalisation and 
consolidation. Many of the new democracies are in serious trouble in the 1990s 
(Arimateia de Cruz, 1993: 145-147). For instance, the autogolpe (coup staged by the 
president) of President Alberto Fujimori of Peru was preceded by years of steady 
deterioration in political rights and civil liberties. Historically, the path to military 
coups and other forms of democratic breakdown has been strewn with problems such 
as the growth of corruption, malfunctioning of democratic institutions, popular 
disaffection with politics, etc. (Palmer, 1992: 378); Colombia's politics comes close 
to what may be defined as civil war and, in general, there are "important signs of 
violent democratic involution and anything can be expected" (Pagina 12, 13-7 -99); 
and, in Ecuador, also in 1999, the Minister of Defence, General Jose Gallardo, has 
hinted at the risk of a coup against the president, Jamil Mahuad (/!:1 Pais, 17-7-99). 
This finally occurred in January 2000 (El Pais, 22-01-00). 
As seen above, the road to democratisation is not easy path and countries have to 
face many problems if stability is to be reached. The main causes, reasons or 
problems that, historically, challenged democracy can be summarised as follows. The 
first long "wave of democratisation" (Huntington, 1991a) that begun in the early 
nineteenth century led to the triumph of democracy in some 30 countries by 1920. 
However, authoritarianism and the rise of fascism in the 1920s (beginning with 
Mussolini's march on Rome) and the 1930s reduced the number of democracies in the 
world to about a dozen by 1942. The second, short wave of democratisation after the 
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second World War again increased the number of democracies to over 30, but this too 
was followed by the collapse of democracy in many of these countries. The third 
wave of democratisation that begun in Portugal in 1974, with the "Revolution of the 
Carnations", has seen democratisation occur much faster and on a scale far surpassing 
that of the previous waves. Two decades ago less than 30 % of the countries in the 
world were democratic; now more than 60 % have governments produced by some 
form of open, fair and competitive elections. Nevertheless, by 1990 at least two third-
wave democracies, Sudan and Nigeria, had reverted to authoritarian rule; the 
difficulties of consolidation could lead to further breakdowns in countries with 
favourable conditions for sustaining democracy (Huntington, 1996: 3-4; Diamond, 
1996: 30-33). Moreover, in Latin America the signs of "involution" can be seen all 
over (Pagina 12, 13-7 -99). 
Among the factors leading to the breakdown of democracies one can mention the 
low commitment to democracy among both the elite and the general public; an 
economic crisis that intensifies social conflict and heightens the popularity of 
remedies that can be imposed only by authoritarian governments; and terrorism, 
insurgency, intervention, conquest or "reverse snowballing5" (Huntington, 1996: 7). 
Coups can be carried out by the army or by the executive itself. Military coups 
are responsible for the end of democratic systems in the new countries of Eastern 
Europe and in Greece, Portugal, Argentina, Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Greece, 
Nigeria, Turkey and in many countries in Latin America. Executive coups occurred 
in Korea, India, the Philippines or Peru. In Asia and the Middle East elected leaders 
themselves have also been responsible for ending democracy, Syngman Rhee and 
Park Chung Hee in Korea, Adnan Menderes in Turkey, Ferdinand Marcos in the 
Philippines, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore or Sukarno in Indonesia (Huntington, 1996: 
9). 
A reverse snowballing can also be of great importance. If a non-democratic 
country (i.e. China) greatly increased its power and began to expand beyond its 
borders, this too could stimulate authoritarian movements in other countries. For 
5 For instance, the economic progress of an undemocratic country may incite others to follow the same 
track. 
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instance, the establishment of an authoritarian regime m India could have a 
significant demonstration effect on other Third World countries. In this regard Italy 
and Germany in the 1920s and the 1930s and Brazil and Argentina in the 1960s and 
1970s were leading countries in introducing these new forms of non-democratic rule 
and became the examples to be emulated by anti-democratic groups in other countries 
(Huntington, 1996: 16). 
The cultural obstacles also need to be taken into account. The Western culture 
thesis has direct implications for democratisation. Western Christianity, feudalism, 
the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and liberalism (all of 
them implicit in the notion of democracy) are Western European ideas, not Asian or 
African, which may entail an extra handicap if democracy is to be introduced in these 
areas. In this regard the words of Mr Anyaoku, former Nigerian Secretary-General of 
the Commonwealth, are interesting: "I do not know of any African language whose 
political lexicon includes the concept of a 'leader of a loyal opposition'. Instead there 
is a clear concept of political enemy" (The Economist, 22-02-99)6 . 
Nationalism also plays a role. The election process pushes political leaders to 
compete for votes. In many situations the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to 
tribal, ethnic and religious constituencies (Casas-Perez, 1996: 71-72; MacFarlane, 
1997: 400-401; 411-417; Denitch, 1996: 459; McCracken, 1998: 231-249). In this 
context politicians competing for office have little choice and finally end up asking 
for votes in these terms (Burg, 1991: 6-14). In non-western societies the introduction 
of democracy facilitates the coming to power of groups that appeal to indigenous 
ethnic and religious loyalties and are very likely to be anti-Western and anti-
democratic. The Algerian case in 1992 is a good example of this (Mortimer, 1997: 
231-235; see also Brumberg, 1991). 
Threats to present-day democracies are likely to come from participants in the 
democratic process. These are the political leaders and groups who win elections, take 
power and then manipulate the mechanisms of democracy. In the past, when 
democratic regimes fell as a result of coups or revolutions, there was no doubt as to 
what had occurred. The authoritarian regime was implanted clearly and drastically. 
6 On cultural obstacles see Huntington, (1991a: 22-30); see also Marcin, (1995); Fukuyama, (1995). 
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The problem now is not overthrow but erosion, in other words the intermittent or 
gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it. The erosion of 
Argentina's democracy is a clear example (O'Donnell, 1994: 67). The return of 
former communist parties to some countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as 
Poland, also needs to be considered. In Central and Eastern Europe this should be 
understood as simply "political punishment" by the electorate of the parties in office 
as a result of the lack of improvement in the economic situation and not as a willing to 
return to a Communist system (Olias, 1996: 89-91). 
Another potential threat to new democracies comes from the electoral victory of 
parties or movements apparently committed to anti-democratic ideologies. This 
possibility arises most strongly with Islamic fundamentalist groups. In Algeria in 
1992 the army cancelled the election that the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) was 
certain to win (Mortimer, 1997: 231-235). 
Also dangerous is executive arrogation, which occurs when an elected chief 
executive concentrates power in his own hands, subordinates or even suspends the 
legislature, and rules largely by decree. In 1995 the president of Colombia, faced with 
charges of massive drug-related corruption, declared a state of emergency and 
announced that he would rule by decree for the next three months. Four years later the 
situation in Colombia was close to civil war. In the most extreme case President 
Alberto Fujimori carried out a full-scale executive coup in Peru. He suspended the 
legislative and judicial branches and political parties, imprisoned politicians and 
intellectuals, censored the media, and drastically curtailed human rights (Mauceri, 
1995: 7-33). In the same way President Menem of Argentina was re-elected largely on 
the basis of results he achieved by the use of undemocratic means such as 
constitutional amendments to allow himself to be a presidential candidate again, etc. 
(O'Donnell, 1994: 67; Schmitter, 1994: 61). In Venezuela there was an attempt to 
stage a coup by the army (El Pais, 07-7-99) and in Ecuador a coup was finally staged 
in January 2000 (El Pais, 22-01-00). 
1.4 Conditions for democracy 
As mentioned above, democracy is clearly not always part of the natural order of 
life. This non-democratic condition remained the situation in virtually all the countries 
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of the world until well into the nineteenth century. There is no proof that democracy is 
inevitable, irrevocable or a historical necessity (Schmitter, 1994: 57). Why, then, did 
the situation change? 
In searching for clues it is possible for the social scientist to point out the 
differences in the countries where democracy now prevails compared with the days 
when it did not. Most of these countries underwent industrialisation, migration to 
urban areas, vast educational expansion, longer life expectancy and, of course, 
improvements in material well-being and increased leisure time. This enabled people 
to think more of their requirements and aspirations beyond mere survival. Society has 
also been transformed in terms of the social groups which exist and the ways in which 
they interact with each other. While the former relationship between lord and peasant 
could remain virtually static for years, the relations between different sections of the 
middle and working classes are today less bound by tradition and are more likely to 
be characterised by conflicting demands, which governments are expected to resolve. 
The political attitudes and actual behaviour of these social groups are also to be 
considered as there is an expectation of governmental responsiveness rather than 
fatalistic acceptance, especially if the groups have the means of articulating their 
demands and threatening sanctions if they are not met. Such articulation and the 
governmental responses to it are possible because of the existence of a complex 
network of political institutions both within the formal state structure and in the 
"political sub-system" of groups from the wider society interacting with it. Finally, it 
follows that if the economic conditions and the political structure in a society are 
different from those prevailing in pre-democratic times, a variety of different changes 
must have occurred at different times to bring about this transformation. 
It has not been the intention of this research so far to demonstrate that democracy 
was the result of a process of cause and effect. It has simply noted a correlation 
between democratic development and other developments, but even here there are 
exceptions. Nevertheless, in trying to generalise, it is possible, at least, to enumerate 
the "ingredients that are commonly found in the democratic cake, even if we are not 
yet in a position to specify the proportions in which they may be best combined, or to 
offer a recipe to show how they should be processed" (Pinkney, 1994: 20). 
There are numerous theories and explanations of democratisation but it has been 
18 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
difficult for researches to agree on the most appropriate theoretical interpretation of 
democratisation. Actually, various theoretical approaches compete with each other. 
The necessary conditions (if any) to be achieved by a democratic regime that strives 
to remain stable in time have been one of the main subjects of study of political 
scientists. Among these conditions are economic development; political attitudes; 
inter-elite relations; social structure and interactions between social groups; political 
institutions; sequences in development and external influences. These conditions are 
explained below. 
1.4.1 Economic development 
It is certainly true that virtually all the countries of Western Europe, North 
America and the Old Commonwealth have achieved substantial economic 
development and arrived at the democratic destination despite their different starting 
points, different problems along the way and the different beliefs and responses of 
political actors, but the question of causality has still not been resolved. 
Aristotle already associated variations in political systems with variations m 
social conditions, particularly the relative strength of the rich, the poor and the middle 
class. He assumed that the best type of political system would be possible in 
circumstances in which wealth in the hands of the few would lead to extreme 
democracy, oligarchy or tyranny (see Aristotle, 1962). 
Schumpeter (1947) was sure that modem capitalism led to modem democracy, 
but he was not sure about how democracy was related to socialism. However, he 
concluded that "socialist democracy may eventually turn out to be more of a sham 
than capitalist democracy ever was" (Schumpeter, 1947: 284, 296-297, 103; see also 
Heilbroner, 1981; Haberler, 1981 ). 
Lipset (1959; 1981), whose work was based on Schumpeter's ideas, was one of 
the first researchers to set some social requirements for democracy if any democracy 
was to remain stable. Economic development emerges as the main determinant for the 
future stability of the political democracy. Thus he states that "the more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1959: 56). 
However, he noted that it would be very difficult to ascertain any one factor critically 
associated with the emergence of democracy, because many factors may represent the 
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initial conditions of democracy (Lipset, 1959, 1963). He refers (1981) to several 
authors who have found a positive relationship between economic development and 
democracy, confirming the findings of his original study (1959). Thus, for him the 
association between stable democracy and indicators of national wealth, 
communication, industrialisation, education and urbanisation has been amply 
confirmed. He thinks that democratic attitudes and beliefs serve as intervening 
mechanisms between economic development and democracy. It should be noted that, 
in addition to economic development, he stresses the significance of political 
development, the significance of political culture, legitimacy and suitable institutions 
as conditions of democracy (Lipset, 1994). 
In a later study (Lipset et al., 1995) confirmed his original findings but 
emphasises that economic development alone does not produce democratisation. 
Other relevant factors including national idiosyncrasies, the role played by historical, 
cultural and political factors and the behaviour of leaders - all of them discussed 
below - in advancing or obstructing democratisation in a country. However, he still 
regards economic development as the crucial factor. 
Schweinitz (1964) is of the opinion that the emergence of political democracy in 
the Western world was intimately related to industrialisation. It created new social 
classes and empowered workers and other unprivileged groups educationally, 
economically and organisationally to enable them to demand a greater share of 
welfare and political power. Economic growth provided the means to make 
compromises. The extension of the franchise and the reforms of the representative 
institutions of government were responses to pressure from below. He assumes that, 
because of the many obstructions to development and growth, countries undertaking 
industrialisation in the present century are not likely to follow the same road to 
democracy. 
Diamond (1992) showed that there 1s a strong causal relationship between 
economic development and democracy. Furthermore, he thinks that economic 
development continues being the most powerful predictor of the likelihood of 
democracy. Diamond (1992) re-evaluated Lipset's (1959) thesis and tested it against 
new empirical evidence. The development-democracy linkage was even stronger 
when the Human Development Index (HDI) constructed by the United Nations 
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Development Program (1991) was used as an indicator of development. The HDI had 
a substantially higher correlation (0. 71) with the combined index of political freedom 
than GNP (0.51). Diamond argued that a country's level of human development or 
physical quality of life predicts its likelihood of being democratic and its level of 
political freedom better than its per capita level of income. He fmally re-formulates 
Lipset's thesis in a different way: "The more well-to-do the people of a country, on 
average, the more likely they will favour, achieve, and maintain a democratic system 
for their country" (Diamond, 1992: 125-128). 
1.4.2 Political attitudes and behaviour 
Almond and Verba's (1963) The Civic Culture shifted the focus from the 
economy to the desire of people to accept government by consent as a means of 
resolving conflict. There is no obvious reason why such a willingness should entail 
having a high per capita income. The ancient Greeks managed to sustain such a 
culture, whereas relatively wealthy people in modem Cyprus or Northern Ireland have 
been unable to agree on who should rule over whom or by what means. Greater 
wealth may help to take the rough edges off political conflict because differences 
between winning and losing are less a matter of life and death, but whether one is 
willing to compromise with one's adversaries and to concede advantages to them as a 
result of majority decisions or the working of constitutional checks and balances will 
depend on a variety of cultural and historical factors. 
Pennock (1979) remarks that it may be impossible to say of any particular 
condition that it is either "necessary" nor "sufficient" for either the establishment or 
the maintenance of a democratic regime. This is so because most of the conditions are 
matters of degree and they tend, within limits, to be mutually interchangeable. 
Besides, the conditions for democracy are not necessarily the same at all times and in 
all places. Pennock refers to many types of assumed conditions for democracy. They 
are classified into historical and political factors, socio-economic factors and political 
culture, which includes a collection of individual characteristics, values, attitudes, 
beliefs, myths, sentiments and ideologies. For him, "the most likely candidates for 
'necessary' are to be found under the heading 'political culture', whereas none of the 
items discussed under the headings 'history' or 'socio-economic conditions' qualifies 
as necessary" (Pennock, 1979: 210). He analyses Aristotle's work and asserts that, 
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according to him, Aristotle believed that for the most part political attitudes were 
determined by economic interest - not the quantity, but the distribution of wealth 
(Pennock, 1979: 206-259). 
Gastil (1985) argues strongly that democratisation may depend on the diffusion 
of democratic ideas more than on any socio-economic factors. The future of 
democracy is, then, related to the continuing strength of this diffusion (see also 
Fossedal, 1989). 
1.4.3 Inter-elite relations 
For Rustow (1970) certain ingredients are indispensable for democracy: A sense 
of national unity; the termination of entrenched and serious conflict; a conscious 
adoption of democratic rules; and, politicians and the electorate must be habituated to 
these rules. 
Rustow (1973), like Almond and Verba, puts the emphasis on a willingness to 
compromise by admitting democratic rules, but with a greater emphasis on groups as 
collective bodies or on elites leading the groups than on a collection of individual 
attitudes. In Rustow's model a prolonged and inconclusive struggle between groups 
ends when neither genocide nor expulsion (nor, presumably secession) is possible. 
Decisions are thus taken to come to terms with the situation by agreeing to peaceful 
competition for power. This requires the adoption of democratic rules, including the 
appropriate checks and balances, and the protections of rights. Once such a 
framework is in place, it may be consolidated by subsequent generations of 
politicians, elites and voters, and may be adapted to bring previously excluded groups, 
such as the poorer classes, into the political process. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also pay attention to the crucial role of the 
political leadership in the final stages of transitions from authoritarian rule to 
democracy. 
1.4.4 Social structures and interactions between social groups 
Moore (1966) studied the social origins of dictatorships and democracies in 
England, France, the United States, China, Japan and India. He attempted especially 
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to explain the diverse political roles played by the landed upper classes and the 
peasantry in the transformation from agrarian to modem industrial societies. He stated 
five conditions that have apparently been crucial to the development of democracy. 
They are the development of a balance to avoid a too strong crown or a too 
independent landed aristocracy; a shift towards an appropriate form of commercial 
agriculture; the weakening of the landed aristocracy; the prevention of an aristocratic-
bourgeois coalition against the peasantry and workers; and, a revolutionary break with 
the past. He assumes that western feudalism contained certain institutions that 
distinguished it from other societies in such a way as to give it democratic potential. 
The main aspect of western feudalism was "the growth of the notion of the immunity 
of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler, along with the conception 
of the right of resistance to unjust authority". He emphasises the role of revolution 
(Moore, 1966: 415; 430-431; 505-508). 
Moore, like Rustow, focuses on the interaction between groups in society, but 
with greater emphasis on whole social groups rather than elites (Moore, 1966: 413-
470). While Rustow sees democracy as evolving out of reconciliation, Moore sees it 
as emerging out of revolution, with the victories of the Puritans in England, the 
Jacobins in France and the antislavery states in the United States paving the way for 
democratic development. He offers an elaborated model in which democracy is 
facilitated by the emergence of a strong bourgeoisie, or an aristocracy engaging in 
commerce and a curtailing of feudal tendencies by the counterweight of the 
monarchy, in contrast to the communist model, where the aristocracy remained 
indifferent to commerce and a large peasant mass survived, thus facilitating revolution 
in the absence of a safety valve of bourgeois democracy. This is also in contrast to the 
fascist model, where the upper class used political and social levers to keep the labour 
force on the land and make the transition to commercial farming in this (non-market-
oriented) way. This, together with industrial growth, which was again presumably 
controlled by the levers of state power rather than market forces, again left limited 
room for an autonomous bourgeoisie (Moore, 1966: 413-422). Democracy today, has 
spread through conquest and contagion to many lands, as Moore suggests, but its 
survival can not be attributed to conquest and contagion alone. 
Karl (1991) applies Moore's (1966) thesis to explain Latin America's different 
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political trajectories in Central America. Specifically, democracy is supposed to have 
emerged in Costa Rica due to the creation of a yeoman farmer class, while the 
persistence of authoritarian rule in Guatemala and El Salvador is attributed to the 
continued dominance of the landed aristocracy. 
Kornhauser (1960) assumed that democracy originates in a pluralist society. He 
states that "where the introduction of democratic rule is based on a pluralistic society, 
especially a balance of classes and religious groups, it will tend to be strong and 
viable, but where its introduction is not accompanied by multiple independent groups 
capable of fighting for the sustenance of individual rights, and at the same time ready 
to support a basic framework of authority, democracy may readily lose out to new 
forms of autocracy" (Kornhauser, 1960: 131, 141). 
Wittfogel (1963) traced the origins of Oriental despotism to the extreme 
concentration of the control of the strategic means of production, especially cultivable 
land, in the hands of the Oriental state. He associated democracy with multicentered 
society. 
1.4.5 Political Institutions 
Systems of representation, arrangements for the division and supervision of 
powers and methods of organising interests, as well as legal doctrines and the rights 
and obligations associated with citizenship, can and do vary widely among regimes 
that are generally recognised as democratic. This raises the question: Which 
institutions have what effect under which historical conditions? More concretely, it is 
possible to ask whether it can be expected that a democracy will last longer under 
presidentialism than under parliamentarism. Linz addresses this question and gives 
several reasons why parliamentary democracies should prove more durable than 
presidential ones (see Linz, 1990a; 1990b). 
Under presidentialism, the election is a race, which can only have a single 
winner. In a presidential democracy the loser has no role in politics afterwards, and 
will most probably not even be a member of the legislature, whereas in parliamentary 
democracy the defeated candidate for the premiership will be the leader of the 
opposition. Furthermore, the fixed term of office under a presidential democracy is 
generally longer than in parliamentary regimes. Finally, in a presidential system "the 
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chief of the executive is at the time the head of the State, thus being able to portray 
the president's partisan interest and thereby undermine the legitimacy afforded to the 
opposition" (Przeworski, 1991: 44; see also Linz, 1990a; 1990b ). 
Another reason why presidential democracies may be less durable is that they are 
more likely to generate legislative paralysis. However, this can occur under any 
regime, since in a parliamentary democracy it may happen that no majority is formed. 
Heper ( 1991) argues that material wealth, democratic attitudes and an 
interdependent relationship between social groups will be of little use in facilitating 
democracy unless institutions evolve that can translate political choices, demands and 
decisions into actual "outputs" via institutions such as parties, pressure groups, 
legislature and bureaucracies, whose roles and existence are accepted by most of the 
population. Stephens' (1989) study of Latin America offers a useful detailed 
complement to Heper' s work. 
1.4.6 External Influences 
No scholar, to the author's knowledge, has offered external influences as a 
primary explanation of democratisation, but it is obvious from what has been said that 
democracy would have not taken root when it did in many countries without the 
impact of external forces. These may be direct, as with the allied occupation of the 
former fascist countries after 1945, or they may involve sanctions against non-
democratic governments in the form of trade boycotts and the withholding of aid and 
investment, actual or threatened, as in Chile and South Africa, or they may merely be 
the influence of ideas and political practices (Pinkney, 1994: 24). 
, This is not to say that "Western" pressure has been entirely on the side of the 
democrats. United States support for the Contra terrorists who opposed the elected 
government in Nicaragua had much to do with the electorate's eventual decision to 
remove the Sandinista Government in the hope of ending terrorism and the economic 
deprivation that went with fighting terrorism. It is also possible to argue that 
American support for the ruling elites in Guatemala and El Salvador has provided 
them with a life-line and enabled them to use repression rather than reconciliation in 
dealing with the opposition, which in turn has continued to resort the violence in the 
belief that it would not be allowed to compete in free and fair elections (see Mauceri, 
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1989; Gibson, 1989). 
External pressures can quite easily be brought to bear on a country to democratise 
through means such as economic sanctions and support for subversion or even 
invasion, but their ability to create a democracy is more limited. By its nature external 
pressure cannot be imposed, as can authoritarianism, and external forces can only help 
if some of the preconditions are already present (Huntington, 1991 a: 14 ). 
1.4. 7 Evolution theory 
The work of some authors such as Hamilton (1978) or Alexander ( 1979a; 1979b) 
is based on an evolutionary theory. This implies the assumption that various forms of 
political systems have evolved in the continuous struggle for power. Political systems 
can be regarded as behaviour patterns characteristics of a species. 
In an attempt to explain this view Vanhanen (1984: 16) asserts that "a power 
structure reflects the way in which power is distributed among various sections and 
competing groups in a society. This structure is tested in the daily struggle for power 
and is continually adjusted to actual changes in the relative strengths of competing 
groups. The process of continuous change is analogous to a process of differential 
reproduction of variants". The elements and characteristics of political systems that 
are "better adjusted to actual relations of strength between competitors tend to appear 
more frequently and gradually to become predominant. If one group is able to 
subjugate other sections of the population and to establish its hegemony, we can 
expect structures and institutions to emerge reflecting this state of affairs. On the 
contrary, if no single group is able to achieve a hegemonic position in the struggle for 
power, it is expected that political institutions that regulate the sharing of power 
between the principal competitors will emerge. Thus, natural selection in politics 
leads to the survival of the better adapted power structures" (Vanhanen, 1984: 16). 
Darwin's ( 1981) theory states that the scarcity of resources makes the struggle for 
survival universal and inevitable. The struggle for power is but one form of the 
general struggle for existence. We struggle for power because we can use it to get 
other scarce resources. In politics natural selection implies daily and hourly scrutiny 
throughout the political world, rewarding with greater power those who are stronger 
or in some other way better adapted to their environment and removing power from 
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those who are weaker or in some way less well adapted to their environment. The 
struggle for power is the main mechanism of this selection. Consciously or not, the 
participants in this struggle try to use all available means to increase their own power. 
The more effective power resources a group has; the more power it will get. Actual 
power structures vary greatly, but this "behavioural characteristic" is common to all 
of them. It forms the constant thread, which runs through all power structures and 
makes them regular and predictable. According to this, political systems are products 
of evolution through the struggle of power. That struggle is universal and inevitable 
because all living organisms have evolved to compete for scarce resources. Natural 
selection in politics selects and supports power structures, which are in harmony with 
the actual relations of strength among the competitors. Power relations are m 
accordance with the distribution of power resources. When sanctions are widely 
distributed, conditions are favourable for the sharing of power; if, on the contrary, 
they are concentrated, conditions are favourable for more hegemonic and autocratic 
power structures. Democracy will emerge under conditions where power resources 
have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its 
competitors or to maintain its hegemony. Under those conditions the competitors have 
to agree to share power with each other. For Vanhanen this is a condition of incipient 
democracy (see Dawkins, 1979; Barash, 1981; Vanhanen, 1984; 1997). 
1.4.8 Mixed approaches 
Some other authors offer a "mixed recipe" for the democratic "cake". 
Bryce (1921) did not provide any precondition for democracy, but he gave 
various reasons for the progress of popular government from its beginning in the 
eleventh century in Italy to its status in the early 1900s. The first is the influence of 
religious ideas; second, the discontent with royal or oligarchic misgovernment and 
consequent efforts at reform; the third is social and political conditions favouring 
equality, etc. 
Dahl (1971), in his well known Polyarchy, argues that democratisation cannot be 
explained by any single causal factor and that several different conditions should be 
taken into account. He differentiated several sets of conditions and assumed that if all 
of them were favourable, a country would have many opportunities to establish and 
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maintain polyarchy, and vice versa. In his later study, Democracy and its critics 
(1989), he continues the same line of argument. He links democracy to environmental 
conditions, but not to any single explanatory factor. The first favourable condition is 
that the means of violence are dispersed or neutralised. The second condition 
concerns the nature of a society. A modem dynamic pluralist society, in which wealth, 
income, education and status are dispersed among groups and individuals, provides a 
favourable condition for democracy. Such a society disperses power sufficiently to 
inhibit its monopolisation by any single group, although it does not necessarily 
eliminate significant inequalities in the distribution of power. Thirdly, cultural 
homogeneity facilitates democracy, while cultural differences obstruct it. However, he 
notes that under certain conditions democracy can survive, despite sub-cultural 
pluralism. The fourth condition deals with the beliefs of the political activists. A 
country is very likely to develop and maintain democracy if it possesses a political 
culture and values, particularly among the political leaders, which support the 
institution of democracy. The next condition would be foreign control or influences. 
All the conditions set by Dahl are relevant for democracy, although the problem 
is how to operationalise and measure/compare them. Beside, some of these conditions 
are not equally relevant for all countries (see O'Regan, 1992, Vanhanen, 1997). 
Huntington (1984) is of the opinion that it is not easy to explain democratisation 
with any coherent theory because there are too many factors that can promote/obstruct 
democratisation. He refers to Rustow ( 1970), who criticised studies that focus on the 
preconditions of democracy and regard them primarily as economic, social, cultural 
and psychological, but he also emphasises the significance of the political process of 
democratisation. Concerning preconditions, he points out that the emergence of 
democracy is helped by higher levels of economic well-being, the absence of extreme 
inequalities in wealth and income, greater influence vis-a-vis the society of existing 
democratic states and a culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and 
compromise. However, he notes that no single one of these conditions can lead a 
country to democracy, although a market economy may be a necessary condition. 
Regarding the political process, he says that a central requirement would be that either 
the established elites after an authoritarian regime or the successor elites after an 
authoritarian system collapses see their interests served by the introduction of 
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democratising institutions. Pessimistically, he assumed in 1984 that the limits, with a 
few exceptions, of democratic development in the world might have been reached 
(Huntington, 1984). The collapse of the Soviet Empire a few years later, for instance, 
proved Huntington's (1984) prophecy to be wrong. 
The prospects for democracy have always been difficult to predict. Six years 
before Huntington's article, Buultjens (1978) had presented even gloomier predictions 
on the future of democracy. He regarded democracy as an endangered species and 
argued that, in the modern world, democracy is fast losing out to other political orders 
and there is little indication of any mass movement toward the full restoration of 
democracy where it has been lost or even its revitalisation where it exists. He failed, 
as did Huntington (1984), in his prediction. 
In a later work Huntington (1991a) analyses the "three" waves of democratisation 
since the last century and tried to explain the causes and the consequences. He 
reiterates his idea that causes of democracy differs substantially from one place to 
another and from one time to another (Huntington, 1991a: 30-38). Therefore, it is 
hardly possible to find - according to him - a common independent variable that 
could explain democratisation in all countries. The following summarises his 
arguments: 
No single factor is sufficient to explain the development of democracy in all 
countries or even a single country. Furthermore, no single factor is necessary for the 
development of democracy in all countries. Moreover, democratisation in each 
country is the result of a combination of causes. Actually, the combination of causes 
producing democracy varies from country to country and generally the combination 
of causes responsible for one wave of democratisation differs from that responsible 
for other waves. The causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a 
democratisation wave are likely to differ from those responsible for later regime 
changes in that wave (Huntington, 199la: 38). 
He explains the third wave of democratisation by referring to many different 
causal factors, including the declining legitimacy of non-democratic rule, economic 
development effects (or snowball effect), the significance of political leaders and a 
strong middle class. Particularly, he pays attention to the process of democratisation 
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and draws a distinction between broad-based economic development involving 
significant industrialisation and development based on the sale of oil (Huntington, 
1991a: 65). This is especially interesting since he directs attention to the structural 
consequences of economic development, i.e. to the fact that the control of economic 
resources becomes diversified (Vanhanen, 1997: 17). 
Sancton (1987: 28) set as necessary conditions a "fairly high level of economic 
development, a strong middle class, a tradition of tolerance and respect for the 
individual, the presence of independent social groups and institutions, a market-
oriented economy and the existence of elites willing to give up power" (Sancton, 
1987). Sancton's formulation represents the central arguments of the development 
paradigm. However, The Latin American Dependency by Frank ( 1967) challenged 
development theory in the 1960s and claimed that global capitalism was the cause of 
underdevelopment in the Third World (see also O'Donnell, 1973; dos Santos, 1993; 
Wallerstein, 1982; 1993). 
Diamond, et al. (1988) sought to explain whether, why and to what extent 
democracy has evolved and taken root in the vastly different cultural and historical 
soils of twenty-six nations. They assume that multiple factors can facilitate or obstruct 
the emergence, installation and consolidation of democracy. As a starting point, they 
refer to the theoretical dimensions associated with democracy in various theoretical 
and empirical works: (1) political culture, regime legitimacy and effectiveness; (2) 
historical developments (specifically the colonial experience); (3) class structure and 
the degree of inequality; ( 4) national structure (ethnic, racial, regional and religious 
cleavage) and state structure, centralisation and strength (including the state role in 
the economy, the roles of autonomous voluntary associations and the press, 
federalism and the role of the armed forces); (5) political and constitutional structure 
(parties, electoral systems, the judiciary); (6) political leadership; (7) development 
performance; and, (8) international factors. 
In a later study based on twenty-six countries, Diamond et al. (1990) listed the 
following facilitating and obstructing factors for democratic development: (1) 
legitimacy and performance; (2) political leadership; (3) political culture, social 
structure and socio-economic development; (4) associational life, state and society; 
(5) political institutions; (6) ethnic and regional conflicts; (7) the army; and, (8) the 
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international factor. 
Their list of relevant factors does not constitute any clear theory of 
democratisation, but implies that there is not any single factor by -which 
democratisation can be explained in any country (see Cammack, 1994). 
Others like Przeworski and colleagues (Przeworski et a!., 1996) enlarge the scope 
of conditions and include aspects related to the income share, the international 
climate, the "political learning" and the role played by institutions. They find that 
democracies tend to remain more stable in those countries where income inequality 
decreases over time. (According to their analysis, democracies are expected to endure 
84 years in declining-inequality countries and 22 years in increasing-inequality 
countries.) 
International conditions are an important factor to be taken into account. 
Furthermore, according to them such conditions can predict regime survival better 
than level of economic development does. Although they cannot distinguish 
statistically the different mechanisms by which the international climate becomes 
transmitted to particular countries, the proportion of other democracies in the region 
and in the world affect the survival of democracy in any particular country. As a 
result, the larger the proportion of democracies on the globe and in the region during a 
particular year, the more likely democracy is to survive in any particular country. His 
findings provide evidence that "contagion operates independently of the direct 
influence of Western governments and various international institutions" (Przeworski 
et al., 1996: 43). 
Political learning also plays an important role. It is often argued that the absence 
of democratic traditions impedes the consolidation of new democratic institutions and 
that democracy is more stable in countries that have enjoyed it in the past (see Dahl, 
1971). Russia and Chile, respectively, can be considered as clear examples. But this 
argument produces the following one: If a country had a democratic regime, it is a 
"veteran" not only of democracy but also of the "successful subversion" of a 
democracy. An overthrow of democracy at any time during the past history of a 
country shortens the life expectancy of any democracy in that country. 
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1.4.9 Others 
Chilcote (et al., 1992) attempted to apply the concepts of a Marxist class theory 
of state to transitions from dictatorship to democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece, 
but their country analysis did not produce any clear, defined, stable theory or 
hypothesis on the transition to representative democracy. In fact, he was more 
concerned with the problem of why the transition to socialism did not take place in 
those countries. 
McColm ( 1992) attributes the democratic changes of the past decade to "a wide-
range of impersonal historical factors such as the integration of the global economy, 
the cross-boundary appeal of new information technologies and the growing desire of 
nation-states to become re-integrated into larger regional economic and political 
communities" (McColm, 1992: 49). However, to the author's knowledge, no attempt 
has been made to test this assumption empirically . 
. Held (1992) edited the study, Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, 
West. This book is concerned with the evaluation of alternatives to liberal democracy 
as well as with the assessment of liberal democracy itself. Problems of democracy are 
discussed from many different perspectives but the book does not produce any clearly 
stated testable theory of democracy or democratisation, although various assumptions 
on the conditions of democracy are discussed and formulated. 
1.4.10 Sequences in development 
Having considered what are said to be the basic ingredients of the democratic 
"cake" and having noted the extent of disagreement as to the "proportions" in which 
they should be combined and the distinctive "flavour" which each contributes, we are 
left with the question of the sequence in which the ingredients should be added. Dahl 
explored these questions in 1971 and concluded that polyarchies fared best if political 
competition preceded inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971: 203). 
The contributors to the volume edited by Binder (et at., 1971) look at a wider 
range of chronological orders of events. They suggest that a country may be 
confronted with a variety of "crises" in the process of "political development": Crises 
of identity, participation, penetration, legitimacy and distribution. An ideal path on the 
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road to democracy would, perhaps, be one along which the question of identity is 
resolved at an early stage, as in Rustow's model, with the question of legitimacy also 
resolved before the demands for increased participation and a redistribution of 
resources to less privileged groups put too much pressure on the system. 
This was the path followed by Western Europe, firstly, by sorting out the 
national-building issues; secondly, by introducing a market economy; and finally by 
inaugurating democratic structures. The whole process lasted more than five 
centuries. In Eastern Europe politicians and international organisations pretended that 
the whole area underwent the same process - the introduction of democratic 
governments in areas with national borders not firmly settled and without previous 
experience in a market economy - and in a very short period of time. These are 
probably some of the reasons why the area is still unstable and democracy has not 
finally taken root yet (see Olias, 1996). 
1.4.11 Critical approaches 
The theories presented above are not at all immune to criticism. One of the 
leading and classical works in this regard is O'Donnell's (1973) Modernisation and 
bureaucratic-authoritarianism, which attempts to question the previously discussed 
conditions for democracy in Latin America. In general, he thinks that economic 
development brought authoritarianism to the political scene in Latin America. 
A later critical study, also focused on Latin America, is Karl's (1991). For Karl 
the experience of Latin American countries challenges all presumptions about 
preconditions. Peru's transition was characterised by stagnant growth rates, extreme 
foreign debt, persistent balance of payments problems and a regressive distribution of 
income. Nor can they explain why the abnormally high levels of per capita GDP were 
persistently accompanied by authoritarian rule. As the Catholic church took an 
increasingly active role in opposing authoritarian rule, especially in Brazil, Chile, 
Peru, Central America and Panama, the argument about the so-called "anti-democratic 
bias" of Catholicism became increasingly implausible. These anomalies indicate a 
pressing need for important revisions, even reversals, of the way democratisation in 
contemporary Latin America is understood. 
First, there may be no single precondition that is sufficient to produce such an 
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outcome. The search for causes rooted in economic, social, cultural or international 
factors have not yielded a general law of democratisation. What has been conceived in 
the literature in the past as being preconditions may be better conceived in the future 
as the outcomes of democracy. In other words, what has been emphasised as 
independent variables in the past might be more fruitfully conceived as dependent 
variables in the future (Karl, 1991: 5). 
Latin America, at one time or another, has experienced all four modes of 
transition. Generally, efforts from below, which have been characterised by 
unrestricted contestation and participation, have met with subversive opposition from 
unsuppressed traditional elites, as the cases of Argentina (1946-1951), Guatemala 
(1946-1954) and Chile (1970-1973) demonstrate. Revolutions generally produce 
stable forms of governance (Bolivia is an exception) but such forms have not yet 
evolved into democratic patterns of fair competition, unrestricted contestation and 
participation (Karl, 1991: 8). Where democracies "that have endured for a respectable 
length of time appear to cluster is in the cell defined by relatively strong actors who 
are prepared to engage in strategies of compromise, i.e. Venezuela (1958), Colombia 
(1958), Uruguay (1984) and Chile (1932). These foundational pacts are generally 
negotiated by the military, economic and party leaders on the basis of explicit 
institutional arrangements" (Karl, 1991: 9). 
According to Karl, there are two critical tasks initially facing Latin American 
democratisers. First, to arrive at a sufficiently strong consensus about the rules of the 
game, so that no major elite is tempted to call upon the military to protect its vital 
interests and, second, to begin to design conscious strategies from the establishment 
of qualitatively new civil-military relations appropriate to future stable civilian rule. 
Political democracy in Latin America may be rooted in a fundamental paradox. 
Ironically, the conditions that permit democracies to persist in the short run may 
constrain their potential for resolving the enormous problems of poverty and 
inequality that continue characterising the south of the continent (Karl, 1991: 1-4; 12-
13). 
All the above points imply that no single factor can be considered as the single 
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cause responsible for democratisation in any countrl. On the contrary, there are 
many democratising agents, which interact at the time, to be considered when 
exploring the democratisation process of any country. However, the fact that certain 
conditions may facilitate the introduction and later consolidation of democracy is, in 
one way or another, implicit in most of the theoretical and empirical studies. One of 
the main conditions appears to be economic development. This has been measured 
several times in terms of personal income (see, for instance, Przeworski et al., 1996). 
The case of the oil-exporting countries proves clearly that it is necessary to take into 
account the existing income inequality (for instance, GINI index). This leads to the 
following proposition: To control for economic development itself is not enough, but 
it is also necessary to control for income inequality. Economic development itself 
should produce a decrease in income inequality if stabilisation is sought (a reduction 
in the GINI index. A perfect egalitarian society would have a zero Gini index). 
Empirical studies prove that income inequality is generally focused in the middle, 
which means that if the income is divided into quintiles, for instance, the higher the 
inequality, the smaller the third (the middle) quintile (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615). 
This is indicative of a weak and small middle class. In his study of the origins of 
dictatorship and democracy, Moore (1966) clearly states: No middle class, no 
democracl. 
1.5 Statement of problem and hypothesis 
Against this background this study proposes to identify and describe the South 
African middle class before and after 1994 to establish whether it has grown larger or 
smaller. South Africa's new democracy implies that all citizens can participate in 
politics regardless of their race, sex, religion, etc. (South Africa, 1996). It is difficult 
to find a stable democracy without a relatively strong middle class. With reference to 
this, the middle class in South Africa needs to be analysed to determine, firstly, its 
composition in the former regime and secondly, the changes in its composition and 
7 For further analyses on conditions for democracy see Pennock (1979), Sartori (1987), Arat (1991 ), 
Whistler (1993), Diamond (1992; 1994a), O'Reagan (1992), Almond (1992) and Sorensen (1993), 
among others. 
8 This relation between the middle class and democracy is amply explained in Chapter 2. 
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size in the period 1970-19999 (before and after the first democratic election). By 
analysing the changes from 1970 (which will give us the size and composition of the 
middle class under the former regime) to 1999, the year of South Africa's second 
democratic election, it would be possible to make a prognosis about the possible 
consolidation of democracy. 
South Africa's first democratic elections produced, among other things, two 
effects: First, the end to economic sanctions; second, the possibility of incorporating 
formerly excluded people into the traditional middle class. It is therefore expected 
that the middle class will change in terms of both its composition and its size. The 
expectation is that an increase in the independent variable "middle class" will affect 
the dependent variable "consolidated democracy". As Lip set (1963: 51) stated 
" ... middle classes temper conflicts by rewarding moderate and democratic parties and 
penalising extremist groups." 
Accordingly, the hypothesis of this study is as follows: The larger the middle 
class is, the greater the chance for consolidating democracy. 
Lip set (1981) stated that economic development is closely associated with 
increases in level of education, which in turn promotes political attitudes conducive to 
democracy, such us interpersonal trust and tolerance of opposition. Second, economic 
development alters the pyramid-shaped social stratification system, in which the 
majority of the population is lower class and poor, to a diamond shape, in which the 
majority of the population is middle class and relatively wealthy. This social change 
moderates the intensity of the class struggle by reducing the proportion of the 
population that is susceptible to anti-democratic parties and ideologies and by 
increasing the proportion of the population that supports moderate pro-democratic 
parties. Moreover, because middle-class occupations require an educated population, 
the middle class will hold political attitudes conducive to democracy that are acquired 
through formal education (see Huntington, 1984; 1991a; 1993; Lipset, 1959; 1963; 
Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Muller, 1995a). 
9 This period has been selected on the basis of the availability and comparability of the data. The 1970 
Census provides the closest comparable data to post-1994 data. The 1980, 1991 Census did not include 
the former Independent Homelands. Other surveys conducted before 1994, such as the Omnibus 
surveys of the Human Sciences Research Council do not cover the former Independent Homelands 
either. The exact data sets will be explained later in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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It is important also to state that this is a descriptive study. In this sense, it aims at 
(i) describing the middle class in South Africa; (ii) describing the consolidation (if 
consolidating) of its democracy - as will be explained later, in terms of political 
tolerance and trust; (iii) describing the evolution of these two variables (middle class 
and consolidation of democracy); (iv) showing the correlation existing between them; 
and, (v) making some prognosis about the future of democracy in South Africa. 
However, there is no intention to explain any cause-effect relation. Stated differently, 
it is a descriptive and predictive study but not explanatory1 0 • 
1.6 The limitations and delimitation 
The important role that middle classes can play in the transitional process to 
democracy is well known. However, this study does not pretend to research the role 
of the middle class in the South African transition to a democracy. It focuses on the 
description of the size and composition of the South African middle class as a feature 
of the stabilisation of the new democracy. The aim of this study is to establish 
whether, with reference to the composition and size of its middle class, South Africa's 
new democracy is stabilising and consolidating. As previously mentioned, a large and 
strong middle class is one of the indications of a consolidated democracy. An increase 
in the size of the middle class would be indicative of an increase in the commitment to 
democracy. 
Another important aspect to clarify is that the study will make use of indic~tors of 
political culture in South Africa to show the trend over time as an indicator of 
democratic consolidation. This, however, does not imply that this is a study on South 
African political culture. That would imply coverage of a wide range of issues, some 
of which are not even related to democratic consolidation. This research uses those 
indicators most related to democratic consolidation (tolerance and trust)11 to show its 
evolution over time. This would allow for making a prognosis about the future 
democratic consolidation in South Africa. 
The first limitation is that there is no consensus on the concept "middle class". 
All definitions are imprecise. If we opt to define it in terms of employment, income, 
10 See Keyness, (1979) and Kane, (1985). 
11 See Chapters 4 and 5 for detailed justification of its use. 
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education and the like, it will always depend on the researcher to set what groups of 
people belong to the middle class. On the other hand, we can opt to ask people to 
include themselves in one or another class division, but this will depend on the 
personal criteria of the interviewees to assign themselves to one or another social 
group 12 . In this study, the middle class will be defined in terms of occupation (see 
Wright, 1985; Golthorpe, 1987; So, 1995; Evans & Mills, 1999). 
The second limitation is that the 1994-1999 period - the democratic period - was 
not long enough for the middle class to mature and reach the level of other 
consolidated democracies. However, a longitudinal survey on that period may point 
out the tendency of growth, a trend which will allow us to make a prognosis about the 
consolidation of democracy in South Africa. It will not be possible to state whether 
the democracy is consolidated or not, but whether democracy is being consolidated or 
not (in this sense, this study conceives consolidation of democracy as a process)13 . 
1. 7 Research methodology 
In this study, both qualitative and quantitative approaches as described by Leedy 
(1993) will be used. 
The literature on the middle class-democracy link is firstly reviewed to support 
the study theoretically. After this, the middle class is conceptualised and 
operationalised. Various approaches are offered and the final choice is selected and 
justified. Consequently, the conceptual variable "middle class" w'ill be converted into 
an operational variable (into a percentage of the South African population) and it will 
be measured for 1970, 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999 14 . It will be tested whether the 
middle class increased or not and whether formerly excluded people were being 
included. After that, the idea of "consolidated democracy" will be defmed and 
operationalised. As done with middle class, several approaches are offered. The final 
one will be selected and justified. Finally, the results are interpreted and some 
concluding remarks offered. 
12 With reference to this, see Cole, (1955). 
13 The study deals with the idea of"consolidated democracy" later in the Chapter. 
14 1996 and 1998 surveys show problems with the biographical data. The middle class figures resulting 
from the analysis of 1996 and 1998 surveys are inexplicable - very low percentage of middle class. 
This may be the result of a wrong coding. Thus, they are excluded. 
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The necessary data will be gained from the South African Data Archive (SADA 
hereafter), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa hereafter) and the 
HSRC Social Movements in South Africa Project. The exact description of the data 
sets will be done in Chapters 3 and 4. 
1.8 Assumptions 
At this point, it is necessary to explain what is assumed in this study and why. 
The first thing to be assumed is that democracy is desirable, a good thing. There 
would be little sense in studying the consolidation of something which is not good. 
Secondly, if we want to test whether democracy in South Africa is consolidating or 
not, we have to suppose that South Africa's regime is fully democratic. 
The first and the second democratic elections held in South Africa on the 27 
April 1994 and the second on the 2 June 1990 fulfilled all the necessary requirements 
for the political system be declared democratic since the "most powerful collective 
decision makers [were] selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which 
candidates freely compete[ d] for votes and in which virtually all the adult population 
[was] eligible to vote" (Huntington: 1991a: 6-7). Also, as Linz says, it allowed the 
free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of 
association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition 
between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claim to 
rule without excluding any effective political office from that competition or their 
preference (Linz, 1978: 5). 
Accordingly, it can be assumed that South Africa's political regime satisfies the 
necessary requirements to be labelled as (at least procedurally) 15 democratic. 
1.9 Contribution to the field 
The aim of this study is, on the one hand, to survey the evolution of the degree of 
inequality in South Africa from a different angle: To investigate the size and 
composition of the middle class and monitor the evolution of aspects of its political 
15 The differences between procedural and substantive democracy will be explained in Chapter 2. 
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culture as an indicator of democratic consolidation. On the other hand, it also intends 
to develop an analytical tool to test the consolidation of any democracy. 
1.10 Chapter outline 
The first Chapter intends to introduce the reader briefly to the project. The 
statement of the problem is given, as well as the limitations and delimitations of this 
study. This is followed by the presentation and justification of the methodology 
adopted. Finally, the hypotheses to be tested and verified, and the contribution of the 
study to the field close this Chapter. 
The second Chapter deals with the link between democratic consolidation and the 
middle class. It firstly includes a framework definition to enable the reader to 
understand the major concepts as they are used in this study. It finally embodies a 
review of the existing literature on the relation between the dependent variable, 
democratic consolidation, and the independent one, middle class. 
The third Chapter addresses the operationalisation of the variable middle class. 
The South Africa's middle class is converted into an operative variable (a percentage 
of the Economically Active Population). It is then measured in 1970, 1994, 1995, 
1997 and finally in 1999. 
The fourth Chapter gives the operationalisation of the variable democratic 
consolidation and attitudinal surveys are analysed. 
The fifth Chapter is concerned with the interpretation of the collected and 
analysed data of the previous Chapters. The validation of the hypothesis is also tested 
in this Chapter. 
Finally, the sixth Chapter presents the concluding remarks. 
1.11 Summary 
At this point it is worth summarising for the reader the key aspects presented in 
this Chapter. 
Firstly, it was said that modern democracy began in the nineteenth century and 
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since then it has spread all over the world but with various swings back and forth 
between consolidation and breakdown. A historical review has been carried out with 
the help of some examples for a better understanding of these processes, and the 
causes of the "birth" and "death" of democracy. 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the main aspects presented in the Chapter. They attempt 
to present some hypothesis on the reasons why the initial, and sometimes the second 
and the third attempts at democracy failed. Many of the variables involved (Table 1.1) 
can be seen as the mirror image of those that were suggested previously (Table 1.2) to 
be conductive to democracy. Thus economic development "can 'lubricate the wheels' 
of democracy, while economic decline can intensify a crude struggle for power; 
consensus between dominant groups and construction of effective institutions can 
contribute toward effective democracy, while irreconcilable conflict and the absence 
of effective channels for mediating conflict can contribute to praetorianism. Social 
structure also arises strongly as a determining factor. But the forces making for the 
rise and decline of democracy are not symmetrical. The creation of democracy, by its 
nature, requires a process of steady building rather than a "big bang", whereas its 
destruction can come much more suddenly through an economic crisis, a careless 
decision by political actors or a military coup. The root causes of these events may, of 
course, have been festering for some time, but their actual occurrence still depends 
largely on man-made choices" (Pinkney, 1994: 65). 
Finally, the reader may have been overwhelmed with an avalanche of concepts 
such as democracy, democratic process, consolidation of democracy, breakdown and 
others. Clarification of all the main concepts used in this study is attempted in the 
following Chapter. 
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Table 1 1 Ecliose of democracv (Pinkne~ 1994) 
' 
EXPLANA ARGUMENTS REGION MOST 
TION RELEVANT 
Economic 1. Early stages of economic development involve greater 1 . Latin America, South Korea 
inequality; this makes government by consent 
increasingly difficult. 
2. Changes in the economic structure are to the (short-term) 2. Latin America, South Korea 
disadvantage of the mass of the population; they can only 
be overseen by authoritarian governments. 
3. Economic changes produce a more articulate working 3. Latin America, South Korea 
class that places new demands on the political system, 
which government cannot or will nor meet. 
4. Economic resources decline in already poor countries 4. Tropical Africa 
leaving fragile governments with fewer resources to 
distribute, and leaving the public indifferent to their fate 
Social 1. A growing range of conflict was difficult to deal with 1. Tropical Africa 
after independence. 
2. The social structure provided few democratic controls. 2. Tropical Africa 
3. The bulk of the population was largely indifferent to 3. Tropical Africa 
democracy. 
4. Narrow pluralism was discredited; new middle-class 4. Middle East 
nationalists, including army officers, rejected Western 
institutions. 
Institutional 1. Parties failed to adapt from opposition to government. 1. Tropical Africa 
2. Bureaucracies lost their 'legal-rational' role without 2. Tropical Africa 
gaining a 'democratic' one. 
3. Institutions lacked autonomy from the state, and therefore 3. Latin America 
offered limited resistance to authoritarian attacks. 
Behavioural 1. New rulers saw little need to respect people's 'rights' 1. Tropical Africa 
2. New rulers failed to deliver material benefits 2. Tropical Africa 
3. Therefore population was largely indifferent to the 3. Tropical Africa 
removal of governments by undemocratic means. 
4. Elected politicians chose to use undemocratic methods. 4. Latin America, Turkey 
Military 1. Soldiers acquired a greater sense of corporate identity 1. Tropical Africa, Pakistan 
2. Soldiers acquired greater confidence in their ability to 2. Tropical Africa 
intervene 
3. Soldiers perceived threats to their immediate interests 3. Ghana, Bangladesh 
4. Officers developed ideological beliefs which became 4. Latin America, Middle East 
increasingly distant from those or ruling politicians. 
External 1. The United States aided those which were willing to 1. Latin America 
challenge 'ideologically unacceptable governments'. 
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Table 1.2 Conditions conducive to democracy (Pinkney. 1994) 
II CONDITIONS I ARGUMENTS I PROBLEMS 
Economic Correlation between wealth and 1. Correlation is not the same as cause. 
development democracy; increased national wealth 2. Greater wealth may strengthen the resources of 
makes competition for resources less 
authoritarian rulers. desperate. 
3. Process and rapidity of economic growth are not 
specified clearly. 
Political Democracy requires a willingness to 1. Attitudes may be shaped by social and economic 
attitudes accept government by consent as a circumstances. 
means of resolving conflict. 
Inter-elite Democracy emerges when elites 1. Why is a point reached where national unity is 
relations agree to the rules of the political preferred to violent conflict or disintegration? 
game rather than risk national 2. How can elite attitudes be ascertained? disintegration; these rules can 
subsequently be adapted to 
accommodate non-elites. 
Social Democracy is most likely to evolve 1. How to explain the existence of democracy in 
structures and where the monarchy checks the countries with a diversity of social antecedents. 
interaction power of the nobility and aristocracy 
between social goes in commerce. 
groups Certain social classes promote 
democracy. 
Political Development requires the I. Danger of historical determinism. 
Institutions development of institutions 2. Role of economic changes, external influences, (especially pressure groups and 
political parties) and even society, not clear. 
Sequences in Democracy is easier to establish if 1. Danger of historical determinism. 
development political competition precedes mass 2. Problems of recognising and quantifying the participation and if major conflicts 
over the role of the state are resolved variables. 
one at a time. 
External Foreign government, institutions or I. Influence can only be indirect; democracy cannot 
influences individuals may supply ideas, offer be imposed 
inducements or apply sanctions. 
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Chapter 2. Middle class and democratic consolidation: Theory and 
background 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, the reader was introduced to the general aspects of 
democratisation. The problems that regimes have to solve to become democratic and 
the conditions that favour the inauguration and consolidation of democracy were 
explained, as were those that favour its decline. This Chapter goes further and 
concentrates on one of the conditions that favour the consolidation of democratic 
regimes, namely the social structure. Furthermore, it attempts to demonstrate that, in 
order to survive, democracies have to develop a large middle class. 
The first thing to be done is to explain what it is meant by both middle class and 
consolidated democracy. Middle class and consolidated democracy are ambiguous 
concepts as it is evidenced in any attempt to defme them. This, plus the fact that both 
concepts are part of wider notions, namely "class" and "democracy", respectively, 
makes it absolutely necessary to define and delimit them carefully and accurately in 
order to avoid any misunderstanding that could lead to erroneous interpretations and 
confuse the reader. 
The conceptualisation section starts in each case with those broader ideas of 
which they are part, namely "class" and "democracy". "Class" and "middle class" are 
conceptualised in the subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. Afterwards, the concepts 
"democracy" and "consolidated democracy" are conceptualised in the subsections 
2.2.3 and 2.2.4. 
After clarifying, defming and delimiting these two main concepts, the linkage 
between them is explained in the next section. The proper conceptualisation of the 
variables will enable the reader to understand the link between them much better than 
if the linkage is explained before the conceptualisation of the variables. 
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2.2 Conceptualisation 
This section starts with the definition of "class", a notion that includes "middle 
class". The understanding of the former (class) will help the reader to understand the 
latter (middle class). Finally, an attempt is made to comprehend the South African 
case. After this the concept "consolidated democracy" undergoes the same process for 
its definition: "Democracy" first, and then "consolidated democracy". 
2.2.1 Class 
Even cursory reading in the field of class and stratification reveals terminological 
and conceptual controversy. Thus, the terminological confusion reigning in the field 
of social class and stratification will be the point of departure. 
All societies are stratified. That is one of the few general statements that are 
possible in social science (Raynor, 1967: 5). Complex societies are characterised by 
the unequal distribution of material and symbolic rewards. It is also true, as 
Crompton ( 1993: 1) states, that "no persisting structure of economic and social 
inequality has existed not having some kind of meaning system(s) which seeks both to 
explain and justify the unequal distribution of societal resources". 
Social stratification, which is the term that describes these structures of 
inequality, has been explained in pre-industrial societies as deriving from "the 
divinely ordained structuring of society or nature" (Crompton, 1993: 2). In these 
societies, relative economic stagnation was also associated with social rigidity 
concerning stratification. However, these societies did not endure, and were deeply 
transformed by the development of capitalist industrialism throughout the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is a feature common to the 
writings of all authors who are characterised as working within the conflict approach 
to social stratification in these new industrial and post-industrial societies: All of them 
identify social classes as the primary actors within stratification systems (see Collins 
1971; Dahrendorf, 1959; 1988; Lockwood, 1974; Marshall, 1963, or Rex, 1961; 
1986). However, there is a marked lack of precision or agreement as to the definition 
and meaning of"class" (Crompton, 1993: 9). 
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The term class was already used to refer to the division of the Roman population 
on the basis of property for fiscal and military purposes, but Marx's and Weber's 
theories are the two "towering contributions to the conceptualisation and theorisation 
of class. Moreover, their theories have been extensively reinterpreted and 
reformulated by successive generations" (Edgell, 1993: 1 0). 
Marx was responsible for the first and most important sociological theory of 
class. There is no doubt about the centrality of class in Marx's work (see Marx & 
Engels, 1962). For him, class relationships are embedded in production relationships; 
more specifically, in the patterns of ownership and control that characterise these 
relationships. Thus, the two great classes of capitalist society are bourgeoisie and 
proletariat, - the former being the owners and controllers of the material means of 
production, the latter owning only the labour power, which they are forced to sell to 
survive. However, Marx neither gives a precise definition of the class concept 1, nor 
had, as has been suggested many times, a two-class model of society. Furthermore, 
he referred to many other classes 2. The Marxist concept of class is based upon a 
psychological characteristic- consciousness of class. 
Weber, in contrast to Marx's opposition to industrial capitalism, approved of the 
rationality of modern capitalism and was opposed to socialism. He was an explicit 
methodological individualist, which means " ... that all social collectivities and human 
phenomena have to be reducible to their individual constituents, and explained in 
these terms ... " (Crompton, 1993: 29). His idea of class rests on functionalist 
characteristics. 
Besides noting that, the expectation was the petty bourgeoisie to decline and 
white-collar workers to expand with the development of industrial capitalism (Weber, 
1968: 305). Weber did discuss class divisions and conflict (Edgell, 1993: 12). Weber 
stressed, more than Marx did, the class advantages flowing from knowledge or skills. 
Moreover, while Marx concentrated on the role of conflict and the polarisation of 
class structure, Weber focused on the problematic nature of class action and the 
1 His last manuscript breaks off just at the moment when he appeared to be on the point of giving such 
a definition (Marx, 1974: 886). 
2 This is clearly evidenced in various works, but most notably in The eighteenth brumarie of Louis 
Bonaparte. 
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fragmentation of the class structure (Edgell, 1993: 15). 
The importance of Marx's and Weber's account of the meanmg of class is 
reflected in the " ... continuity between their perspectives and virtually all-subsequent 
attempts to understand the key concept of class" (Edgell, 1993: 16). Clear examples 
of this are Wright's and Goldthorpe's social theories. They have influenced the 
development of class schemes that have been used in recent empirical research. More 
specifically, Wright's contribution involves a revision of Marx's model of class and 
has been successfully operationalised in sociological studies of the American, 
Swedish and British class structures (see Wright, 1985; Edgell & Duke, 1991). On 
the other hand, Goldthorpe's contribution is a revision of Weber's model of class and 
has been used to study the British social structure and other modem industrial 
societies (see Goldthorpe, 1987; Marshall eta!., 1988; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; 
Foessa Foundation, 1984). However, the borderline between them is not very clear 
and it is possible to find attempts at synthesis, like the "New socio-economic 
category "3; those "who do not renounce to the most orthodox methods (R. Miliband, 
1969); those who focus on certain and specific aspects (such as the state (T. H. 
Marshall, 1970), or corporatist organisations (C. Offe, 1984))" (quoted in Foessa 
Foundation, 1994). 
Summarising, it is possible to say that it is a fact that among sociologists and 
other social scientists different words are used for the same object. It is also a fact that 
they mean, or seem to mean, different things by the same word. Centers (1949), to 
quote one single example, reserves the term class for psycho-social grounding, 
collections of people held together by class consciousness and class identification. He 
deplores the practice of other writers of applying the term to objectively defined 
categories, for instances such as equal income, similar occupations, or the same 
amount of education. For such objectively defined categories, Centers (1949: 74; see 
also Wesolowski, 1979; Beteille, 1996) employs the term strata. The term class is rich 
in emotive content, and plays a role in political propaganda. Here, probably, resides 
much of the terminological confusion. This may serve as a summary of the social 
3 Termed by the authors of the project "Estructura, Conciencia y Biografia de clase .. directed by J. 
Carabafia, which is part of the international project on social classes directed by E. 0. Wright (see 
Foessa Foundation, 1994). 
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debate between psychologists - mainly led by Marxists - and structural-functionalists 
- Weber's tradition. 
What does it mean, then, to define a term that admittedly is used in a variety of 
senses? It might be futile and presumptuous to ask for the definition of class. As far as 
previous usage is concerned, not one but many definitions are admissible. One 
definition may be found better than another because it proves more fruitful or 
rewarding, leads to more interesting research, etc. No definition of class is unique to 
the extent that it deserves to be called the definition (Carlsson, 1958). It is dangerous, 
as Marshall (1950) already pointed out some time ago, to start with the assumption 
that because the word "class" is commonly used it must express a definable concept. 
It is perhaps natural for consumers of definitions to make this mistake. Most 
sociologists and other social scientists are probably perfectly aware of the situation, 
and when they talk of the definition, they probably intend to say, in most cases, that 
they use class in a certain way, and they think it advisable to do so for a variety of 
reasons. 
In an attempt to avoid any ideological shortcoming, this study conceives social 
class as an individually decomposable group of people, with similar levels of income, 
education and occupation. Consequently, it adopts a functionalist point of view -
Weber's tradition. 
2.2~2 Middle Class 
Notwithstanding their differing emphases, both Marx and Weber argued that the 
ownership of property for exchange and being propertyless are the basic categories of 
all class situations (Edgell, 1993: 116). According to this, when we use the word 
class or class situation, we are referring to a person's economic or market position. 
Then occupation serves as its primary index. As Runcinman (1966: 23) wrote," ... to 
speak of a person's class is to speak of his approximate shared location in the 
economic hierarchy as opposed the hierarchies of prestige and power." 
Against this background, the term middle class refers to a concrete and certain 
position in the economic hierarchy, to a person's economic or market position. It is 
necessary to distinguish between old (propertied) middle class and new (non-
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propertied)4 middle classes. 
For Marxists, the former (old- propertied- middle class) simultaneously works 
and owns the means of production, and sometimes employs others, generally 
relatives. Marx referred to this as "the lower strata of the middle class" (Marx, 1972: 
62-63) and Weber as "the lower middle class"5. They both also expected this sector 
to be "extinguished by the fire of competition from big capitalists". However, 
whereas Marx emphasised their decline into the expanding proletariat, Weber argued 
that their best option was to become technically trained (Edgell, 1993: 63 )6 . 
On the other hand, the latter (new middle class) refers to white-collar employees 
(office workers). For Marx (1974: 300), they " ... belong to a better paid class of 
wage-workers ... " and due to the advance of the "division of labour ... the supply of 
this type of worker would increase and their wage would fall .... " In contrast to this, 
Weber expected the opposite trend to prevail. He argued that the "increasing 
bureaucratisation of administration enhances the importance of the specialist 
examination ... " and that the consequent "universal clamour for the creation of 
educational certificates in all fields makes for the formation of a privileged stratum in 
bureaus and offices ... " (Weber, 1961: 241). Thus, Marx and Weber noted the 
emergence of white-collar workers. Both were correct (although they interpreted it in 
different ways): The new middle class has split into two distinct groups, a "de skilled" 
routine white-collar fraction and a skilled specialist fraction (Edgell, 1993: 66; see 
also Abercrombie & Urry, 1983). 
As said above, this study follows the Weberian theory of class. All societies can 
be fractionated into its individual members. Subsequently, the Weberian concept of 
middle class will be used. 
As a result, middle class is understood in this study as a social group mainly 
integrating professionals, businessmen and clerks, - white collar workers - both in the 
public and private sector and civil service, plus those individuals running their own 
4 Also called petit bourgeoisie or white-collar workers, respectively. 
5 Others, such as Mills (1956: 28), referred to it as the "lumpen-bourgeoisie". See also Tezanos, (1975). 
6 As Edgell (1993) said, this is an early version ofwhat was to become a major debate in the sociology 
of class, namely proletarianisation versus embourgeoisement (Bogenhold & Staber, 1991; Burrows & 
Curran, 1989; Sease & Coffee, 1980; Storey 1983). 
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businesses with similar income. 
In principle, this definition could be considered as very simplistic since, it does 
not take into account, explicitly, two of the three main characteristics of middle class, 
which are high education and high income - only occupation. But delving into it 
carefully, it is possible to observe that all of them are taken into consideration since 
those occupations imply a certain remuneration (a second characteristic) and a certain 
level of education (the third one) (on detailed characteristics of middle class see 
Glassman, et al., 1993; 1997). 
2.2.2.1 The South African case 
South Africa's social structure, as in most African countries, is characterised by a 
high level of ethnic heterogeneity. This situation in the African countries dates from 
the colonial times, "when boundaries were drawn artificially and heterogeneity 
became the standard" (Breytenbach, 1998a: 7). In South Africa, this is especially 
reflected in its labour structure, mainly due to the apartheid labour policy - what can 
be called "ethnic labour division". 
Due to this, the middle class during the former regime was mostly consisted of 
white population. This study aims to analyse whether, after the demise of apartheid, 
Black, Coloured and Indian people are being integrated in it. Consequently, the 
middle class in South Africa is conceived, in this study, as said above, as a social 
group composed of professionals, businessmen, and clerks, both in the private and 
public sector and civil service, plus those individuals running their own business, with 
similar income. 
2.2.3 Democracy 
In this section the term "democracy" is explained before the concept 
"consolidated democracy" is conceptualised. Understanding the former (democracy) 
helps the reader to understand the latter (consolidated democracy). It is handiest, as it 
was done with the concepts class and middle class. 
The initial problem facing any student of democracy is how to define the term. 
The word is constantly used in the news media and every discourse to define our own 
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culture and to shape our policies toward others, who are said to be delinquent if they 
are undemocratic. It has to be considered as a "good thing" since happiness is aroused 
when it is heard that "development of democracy throughout the world" was 
proclaimed in December 1995 by United States and the European Union as one of 
their main goals of pursuit (quoted in Stromberg, 1996: 3). It is presented as a cure-
all for troubled peoples and lands although there is much confusion in the usage of the 
term. It is generally confused with liberalism or constitutionalism or social equality or 
national independence. Democracy is invoked as a model and used to legitimise 
different causes for different reasons. 
Throughout the world everybody invokes it; even tyrants claim to be democrats. 
Sheik Meijimar Rahmar of Bangladesh explained in 1975 that banning opposition 
parties and strikes was necessary in order to ensure democracy. Fujimori carried out 
an executive coup in Peru 1992 to save democracy. In July 1999, Venezuela's 
president, Hugo Vazquez, asserted that people were requesting a Fujimorazo 
(executive coups like Fujimori's one) in the country to save Venezuela's democracy 
(although people expressed no public manifestation in that sense (see El Pais, 05-7-
99)). In former Communists systems, the regime was called "people's democracy". 
Those members of the extreme nationalist party, which many called fascists and 
which, in combination with ex-Communists, strove to overthrow the precarious 
reform government of Boris Yeltsin, called themselves the Liberal-Democrats 
(Markoff, 1996: 14). 
2.2.3.1 Confusion with other ideas 
In this new arena of argumentation the concept has become confused or 
amalgamated with other ideas. It is, for instance, often assumed that equality and 
democracy are identical (see for instance Parlmer, 1982), but they are certainly not. 
The fact that one might produce the other does not imply that both are the same thing. 
Another confusion is found between democracy and liberalism. Nowadays 
democracy is sometimes used when referring to human rights. Let's remember that 
Hitler was brought to power democratically in Germany. On the other hand, England, 
for instance, developed a passion for individual liberty, perhaps unique in the world, 
while governed by a hereditary monarchy and a legislature, one branch of which was 
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hereditary and the other elected by a severely restricted suffrage. All this means that 
we may nowadays be talking about contexts - or conditions -, in which - or thanks to 
which - democracies endure but may be not understood as being the same thing 7. 
2.2.3.2 Democracy: In search of a definition 
The definition of the term often depends on local conditions and special 
circumstances. Such indiscriminate use of a word risks turning it into a nonsense 
expression. Actually, this word has been so abused by propaganda that it has ceased to 
have value for a reason. It has gone so far that it is not difficult to fmd that 
contemporary academics concerned with analysing the processes of government or 
the nature of society tend to avoid the term or show their embarrassment by putting it 
in quotations marks. It is too hopelessly vague that professors, who must aspire to the 
status of scientists, nowadays have come up with other terms such as pluralism or 
polyarchy. Thus the usage of the word has come out the scientific arena to the 
meaningless-general-public realm (Stromberg, 1996: 3-6). 
When seeking a definition of democracy one usually ends up distinguishing 
between types. Macpherson, (1977: 2-8) for instance, found four models of 
historically-successive democracy, namely, (i) protective democracy, (ii) 
developmental democracy, (iii) equilibrium democracy and (iv) participatory 
democracy. But it is Schumpeter's (1947: 250-284; 232-302) division between 
procedural and substantive democracy which has become most deeply embedded into 
the contemporary theory of democrac1 (Dahl, 1989: 163-167). 
The word "democracy" was coined in the fifth century BC and since that time 
until roughly one century ago, it has been a political concept9• That is to say, 
democracy meant political democracy. As Finer (1962a: 67) wrote, "the term has 
come to mean so many things, some very hostile to each other, that it needs careful 
analysis if misunderstanding and idle controversies are to be avoided". That implies 
that it is very difficult to delimit. Nevertheless, the basic idea underlying democracy 
seems to have remained the same for the past 2000 years. 
7 For more details about democracy's meaning through history see Stromberg, (1996). 
8 This differentiation between types of democracies will be explained later in this section. 
9 Nowadays we hear about economic democracy, industrial democracy, etc. 
---- ~-~~-~ -~----~ 
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According to Bryce (1921 : 23) the word "democracy has been used since the time 
of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of a State 
is legally vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the 
community as a whole". This means, in communities which act by voting, that "rule 
belongs to the majority, as no other method has been found for determining peaceably 
and legally what is to be deemed the will of a community which is not unanimous" 
(Pennock, 1979: 3). 
In later times democracy was defined in different ways, but the idea of the rule of 
the majority has mostly been included in definitions, as have references to 
competitive elections, equality and liberty (see Schumpeter, 1947: 269-273; Lipset, 
1963: 27-28; Ranney & Kendall, 1969: 46-61). 
One of the most important and most widely known definitions of democracy was 
set up by Schumpeter fifty years ago, in his Capitalism, socialism and democracy 
(Schumpeter, 1947: 232-302). Today it still is a necessary and unavoidable point of 
reference, without which any attempt to explain democracy would be incomplete. 
He begins by explaining the essence of the eighteenth century philosophy of 
democracy, which is understood as the "institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions which realise the common good by making the people itself decide 
issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its 
will" (Schumpeter, 1947: 251; italics added). This implies, for him, the existence of a 
common will and a singular people. He criticises this, arguing that there is no 
common good, "no such thing ... that all people could agree or be made to agree on 
by the force of rational argument" (Schumpeter, 1947: 251). This is due to the fact 
that the common good means different things to different individuals. Moreover, - he 
continues - even if a sufficiently definite common good could be approved for all, it 
would not give "equally definite answers to individual issues". For Schumpeter, the 
will of the people is "frankly derived from the good of the individuals" (Schumpeter: 
1947: 252). 
Rationality of thought does not guarantee rationality of action. Furthermore, the 
latter can be present without the existence of the former. This implies a lack of sense 
of reality, which involves a reduction of responsibility and effective volition. 
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Once he explains why the classical doctrine of democracy is not operating, he 
speculates about why such a contrary-to-fact theory can survive so strongly. He finds 
the answer in the fact that, although the classical doctrine of democracy might not be 
supported by the empirical analysis, it "is powerfully supported by that association 
with religious belief.. .. " Classical theory of democracy "embodies essential features 
of the faith of Protestant Christianity and was in fact derived from that faith. For the 
intellectual who had cast off his religion the utilitarian creed provided a substitute" 
(Schumpeter, 1947: 264). Thus, turned into the rank of religion, this doctrine changes 
its real substance. There is no need for logical doubts about the Common Good and 
Ultimate Values. It is the voice of the people, the voice of God. The main problem he 
finds is that "the people" can not, as it is supposed, hold a definite and rational 
opinion about every individual question ... " For Schumpeter "the utilitarian 
rationalism is dead" (Schumpeter, 1947: 265). Furthermore, democracy is not 
democracy itself but "democratic process", "democratic method", which consists in 
an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' 
(Schumpeter, 1947: 269; italics added). 
The following premises can be gathered from the preceding paragraph: 
o The people are meant to be the electorate 
o Their primary function is to produce a government 
o The main substance of the democratic process is a competitive struggle for 
the vote. 
Implicit in Schumpeter's explanation of democracy, is a division in the theory of 
democracy that has remained alive until today. The contemporary debate on 
democracy still deals with method and values, norm and procedure, idea and reality, 
in other words, what was to be called empiricism versus rationalism. 
This division has been developed by many scholars and students of democracy. 
Without a doubt one of the most rich, fruitful and explanatory works in the field is 
that of Sartori. 
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Sartori (1969) defines democracy as the opposite of autocracy: "In democracy no 
one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule, and 
therefore no one can arrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power. The 
difference between democracy and its opposite lies in the fact that in a democracy 
power is scattered, limited, controlled and exercised in rotation: whereas in an 
autocracy power IS concentrated, uncontrolled, indefinite and unlimited" (Sartori, 
1969: 36). 
His theory of democracy is compactly presented although well abridged, in his 
The theory of democracy revisited (Sartori, 1987). In this re-authored book on 
democracy, he warns about the problems of hyperrealism. He alerts about the 
excessive procedural definitions of democracy that can oversimplify the concept. 
When democracy is made to seem very simple, "we can be sure that the simplification 
has gone too far, that we are disserving, rather than serving democracy" (Sartori, 
1987: 13). 
He firstly establishes the differences between empmctsm and rationalism. 
Rationalism is defined as "the opposite of empiricism or in contradistinction to 
empiricism". Both realism and rationalism are conceived as "mental orientations, 
mental mechanism". A first difference is that the empiricist mentality "stays in the 
middle of the things, close to what can be touched, seen and tested, whereas the 
rationalist mentality soars to a far higher level of abstraction, to a level that is far 
removed from the facts" (Sartori, 1987: 49). Thus, the empiricist tends to work back 
from reality; the rationalist attempts to remake the real world as a reflection of reason. 
An empiricist tries to look at how things work out and rationalism tries to remake 
everything "starting from tabula rasa". For empiricism, when things do not work 
properly in practice, there must be something wrong in the theory. The case is the 
opposite for rationalism. Therefore, when something is wrong, the problem is located 
in the practise. Rationalism is concerned with the construction of orderly logical 
relationships, regardless of the connection of those relationships with the real world. 
Empiricism is tentative, is improved from the experience; rationalism is definitive and 
tests everything. According to Sartori, in the end, empiricism becomes more 
reasonable than rationalism, for which logical rigour is above everything, even at the 
expense of being unreasonable (Sartori, 1987: 50). The empirical mind conceives 
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problems from a practical angle. On the other hand, rationalism is not willing to 
explain how the world works but interested in constructing prototypes and searching 
for definitive solutions. 
The preceding conclusion makes Sartori differentiate between empirical and 
rational democracy. The former is obviously realistic, whereas the latter is meant to 
be anti-realistic. From this point, his argument shifts to the distinction between 
rational and empirical democracies. He identifies, historically, the former as the 
French-type democracy and the latter as the Anglo-American type. A first difference 
is that the French type was brought about by a revolution, whereas the Anglo-
American democracy is the result of a cautious and consistent process of historical 
development. The English Revolution "did not vindicate, politically, a fresh start but 
the restoration of the Englishman's 'birthright' that in a pristine Anglo-Saxon 
Constitution had been affirmed against the Norman Kings in the Magna Carta and 
had been trampled upon by the Tudor and Stuart usurpations. As for the American 
Revolution, it was not, in truth, a revolution - it was a secession. The American 
declaration of independence of 1776 was, in essence, a claim for the right to advance 
along the path of the liberties already existing in England. The French Revolution 
was, instead, a very deliberate break with, and rejection of, the past" (Sartori, 1987: 
52). Furthermore, he argues that English constitutions do not recognise any entity as 
"people" with constitutional status. By contrast, the Constitution of the Weimar 
Republic, for instance, says that the power of the state is derived from the people 
upwards. "People" is a plural in English and a singular in Continental-European 
languages (French, German, Spanish, and Italian). French "peuple" is a conceptual 
idea, whereas English people are specific persons. Moreover, in the English-speaking 
countries it is customary to speak of "government" while Continental-Europeans 
speak about "State". Once more, it shows a difference in the level of abstraction. For 
Sartori, the difference that separates a rational from an empirical democracy "can be 
ultimately reduced to whether the chain of argument is tight or loose, rigid or flexible. 
That is to say that rational democracies are constructed deductively and rigorously 
from premise to consequence, joining one link of the chain to the next as tightly as 
possible; whereas the construction of empirical democracies largely results from 
feedbacks and, in this sense, from inductive elements" (Sartori, 1987: 53). 
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To illustrate this, he states that, in Continental Europe, a large number of the 
democracies evolved in the direction of parliamentary systems, whereas neither a 
similar progress took place in England (where - he argues - parliamentary 
government is not a proper name for a cabinet system), nor in the United States 
(Sartori, 1987: 54). He finds further proof in the fact that those Western Continental 
European democracies "have abandoned (or never adopted) the single-member 
district and have basically settled for electoral systems of proportional representation. 
If the people's power premise is developed with deductive rigour, it follows that (a) 
true representation is, and can only be, proportional representation; (b) parliament 
must be the real site of representative sovereignty; and (c) government should only be 
(as the wording says) 'executives' .... In a deductive chain of reasoning all of the above 
is a must, a set of necessary logical consequences" (Sartori, 1987: 54). Then, he 
speculates about why the Anglo-American democracies are not obliged to such a 
must. His answer is that empirical democracies are not assembled deductively but on 
the experience that effective and efficient government is important, that assembly 
systems are malfunctioning systems and that proportional representation will probably 
create more problems than it may solve. Empiricism is "impressed - he finishes -
neither by 'democratic consistency' nor by the display of a 'well reasoned' democracy" 
(Sartori, 1987: 54). 
Bryce ( 1921: 208) already pointed out that French people adopted democracy 
"not merely because the rule of the people was deemed the completest remedy for 
pressing evils ... but also in deference to general abstract principles, which were taken 
for self-evident truths". 
In the same direction, Tocqueville (1856: 222-223) stated that "while in England 
those who wrote about politics and those who engaged in it shared the same life ... in 
France the political world sharply divided into non-communicating provinces .... In 
one [the politicians] administered, in the other [the writers] formulated abstract 
principles. Above the real society ... little by little an imaginary world took a shape in 
which everything seemed simple and coordinated, uniform, just and rational". 
Many other definitions have been set up but this distinction is either clearly 
maintained or one of them is directly adopted over the other (empirical or rational 
definitions). 
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Dahl (1989: 90-91) also follows this criterion, when he distinguishes between 
democratic ideal and reality, substance and process. He refers to ideal, normative or 
rational democracy as substantive democracy and to empirical, descriptive, realistic 
democracy as procedural democracy, 
He alerts the reader about the fact that, taken to an extreme, the substantive 
democracy can become a justification for anti-democratic performance in the form of 
dictatorships (Dahl, 1989: 163). To support this, it can be argued that, in South 
America, dictators referred to their regimes as "tutored democracies" 10 ; in Spain, 
Franco referred to his regime as "organic democracy" and the former Communist 
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe were known as "people's democracies". The 
balance to be reached between substance and process, idea and reality takes up most 
of his work (see Dahl, 1989). 
Lipset (1963) sides with Schumpeter (1947) and prefers a procedural definition of 
democracy. Democracy, for Lipset (1963: 45), consists in a "political system which 
supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and 
a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to 
influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office" (see 
also Lipset, 1959: 71; 1981: 27; Diamond & Marks, 1992b: 1-14). 
Pennock, (1979: 6-7) in the same debate, differentiates the ideal definition of 
democracy from the procedural one. The former establishes the ideals and values that 
are used as criteria when political systems are evaluated. The latter definition uses as 
its criteria a set of procedures. According to this one, a democracy is rule by people 
where the "people" includes all adult citizens, with some exceptions, and "rule" 
means that public policies are determined either directly by vote of the electorate or 
indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonable intervals. 
10 In these regimes, a society is perceived as an organic whole with common interests. Leaders claim to 
know what these interests are (the general will) and the state exists to execute the general will without 
being inhibited by constitutional checks to protect minorities or even by majorities who have a false 
perception of their real interest (Pinkney, 1994: 9). These regimes were found in the former soviet 
systems in Central and Eastern Europe, but also countries like Kenya and Tanzania and Cuba showed a 
"more opened guided democracy" allowing a choice between parliamentary candidates of the same 
party. Military governments in Brazil and Indonesia have permitted rival parties to compete for seats in 
the legislature. Also Franco, in Spain, conducted some referendums on punctual aspects. 
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Kirkpatrick's ( 1981) work on democracy contributes to clarify the differences 
between both approaches. She makes the same kind of distinction between normative 
and descriptive democracy. The former approach "postulates norms against which 
institutions can be measured, ideas of the good life or the good theory or the good 
government''. This vision of democracy tends to identify democracy with the vision of 
the perfect society, whereas those in favour of the descriptive definition use the term 
as "a symbol for specific patterns of behaviour of persons in political contexts. The 
theory resulting from this approach is based on descriptions of electoral systems, 
legislative process, interest groups, administrative behaviour, voting behaviour, 
political parties and related institutional practices" (Kirkpatrick, 1981: 326). Elections 
are crucial to Kirkpatrick's descriptive theory of democracy. Democratic elections are 
competitive, periodic, and inclusive. She concludes that when people who are to make 
and enforce rules for the society are embraced by democratic elections, the resulting 
government is termed "democratic" (Kirkpatrick, 1981: 326-331). 
Beetham (1992) means by democracy "a mode of decision-makin~ about 
collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the 
most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collectivity enjoy 
effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly - one, that is to 
say, which realises, to the greatest conceivable degree, the principles of popular 
control and equality in its exercise". For him the opposite of democracy is "a system 
of rule where the people are totally excluded from the decision-making process and 
any control over it" (Beetham, 1992: 40; see also Beetham, 1993). In the expression 
"mode of decision-making" can be found the key to catalogue Beetham's definition as 
procedural (empirical, realistic or descriptive). 
Parekh (1992) argues that democracy has been defined and structured within the 
limits set by liberalism and that western liberal democracy can not claim universal 
validity. According to him, liberal democracy basically means a form of government 
in which people wield the ultimate political authority, which they delegate to their 
freely chosen representatives and which they retain the right to withdraw if the 
government were grossly to violate its trust" (Parekh, 1992: 45). He implies that 
democracy might take a different form in non-western societies, but he does not 
specify those alternative forms of democracy, nor does he give examples of them. 
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Hadenius (1992) formulates political democracy at the national level as follows: 
"Public policy is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the people whereby all 
individuals include three principles of democracy: A general principle of sovereignty; 
a principle of freedom and a principle of equality. He emphasises that "it only makes 
sense to speak of democracy as a mode of decision-making" (Hadenius, 1992: 9). 
Then he makes an important conclusion: "Hence, it naturally follows that political 
democracy must mean the same thing irrespective of the state or part of the world 
where it is examined. East, West, North, South - economically developed or less 
developed country -, it makes no difference how the concept is to be defined" 
(Hadenius, 1992: 35). 
At this point, he clearly differs from Parekh (1992), who claims that there cannot 
be a "universalist" concept of democracy. 
Huntington, (1993) following Schumpeter, prefers a procedural definition of 
democracy. He defines "a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the 
extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, 
honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in 
which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington, 1993: 6-7). 
In this regard, the Marxist analysis distinguishes between bourgeois and socialist 
democracy and complains that the former does not profess the values of democracy. 
Under capitalism, democracy is a democracy for the minority, but not for the 
majority, and nominal equality before the law in bourgeois society is a cover for 
social inequality. On the other hand, socialist democracy is the highest form of 
democracy, being a democracy for working people (Pennock, 1979: 443; Parry & 
Moran, 1994: 3; see also Kelle & Kovalson, 1973). Socialist democracy is meant to 
go beyond the mere proclamation of broad rights and freedoms. It guarantees their 
execution by providing the relevant material potential. However, socialist democracy 
does not include the freedom to create competing political parties. The Communist 
Party "is the directing and guiding force within society's political system" 
(Chkikvadze, 1960: 61-62; see also Topornin, 1979; Babiy & Zabigailo, 1979). For 
Vanhanen, the most crucial difference between the Western and the Marxist definition 
of democracy "concerns the need and right to form legal opposition parties" 
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(Vanhanen, 1984: 10) 11 . 
This distinction between procedural and ideal (Pennock, 1979); descriptive and 
normative (Kirkpatrick, 1981) or empirical and rational democracy (Sartori, . 1987) 
lead us to the distinction identified by Diamond (1996: 23) between what he calls 
electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Electoral democracies have governments 
produced by free and fair elections, but they lack the protection mechanisms for rights 
and liberties existing in liberal democracies. These not only have elections but also 
restrictions on executive power, independent judiciaries to maintain the state of law, 
protections for individual rights and liberties of expression, association, belief and 
participation, respect for the rights of minorities, limitations to the capacity of the 
ruling party to influence the electoral process, etc. 
With few exceptions 12, elections are considered to be the key concept for 
definitions of democracy. This implies that the only thing upon which social scientists 
have agreed after 2500 years of using the word democracy is the necessity of 
periodical, free and fair elections in a context of the rule of law. 
If, after more than 2500 years, scholars have not yet agreed about what 
democracy is and is not, it would probably be impossible to set up a definition of 
democracy that gains general approval. Surely, after assessing such a definition, and 
bearing in mind that, as Finer (1962a: 67) stated, "the term has come to mean so many 
things", many democracies would cease to be called democracies. Due to this, this 
study's definition of democracy is a minimalist one. Consequently, democracy is 
understood in this study as a political regime in which rulers are elected by - and 
accountable to -, the ruled in fair, free, competitive and periodical elections, where 
citizens have the right to freely express, associate, create political parties, pressure 
organisations, without fearing being repressed by the state for doing so, and where 
the electoral losers' rights will be protected by the Rule of Law. 
Accordingly, South Africa's political regime can be labelled as democratic, as it 
11 For more definitions of democracy see Holden, (1988: 5); Arat, (1991: 15; 19-22); Held, (1992: 10-
40); Whistler, (1993: 18-29) or Diamond, (1996: 21-25). 
12 Mueller (1992), for instance. In his article, he does not only say that elections are not the key concept 
of democracy but that democracy may exist even in the absence of such a process. 
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accomplishes the above-cited requirements of this study's definition13 . 
2.2.4 A new angle: Democratic consolidation 
The previous section attempted to delimit "democracy" and its different 
approaches, the democratic process and the ideals that guide that process. 
The weakness of Latin American democracies, for instance, proves that the 
establishment of electoral processes is not enough to expect a regime to remain 
democratic over time. This opens up a new angle in the debate: The consolidation of 
democracy. 
Firstly, it is necessary to differentiate between transition to and consolidation of 
democracy. Both are conceptually distinct aspects of democratisation, although, they 
may temporally overlap or sometimes even coincide. Transition begins with the 
breakdown of the former regime and ends with the establishment of a relatively stable 
configuration of democratic institutions within a democratic regime. Consolidation 
refers to the achievement of substantial attitudinal support for and behavioural 
compliance with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game that they 
establish. The outcomes of these processes are also different. Transition results in the 
creation of a new regime; consolidation happens in the stability and persistence of that 
regime, even in the face of serious challenges (Gunther, Diamandauros and Puhle, 
1995: 3). Consolidation is rather more complicated and distinctly lengthier than the 
preceding phase of democratic transition. Generally, the consolidation of democracy, 
which is based on the development of a social consensus, is preceded by the phase of 
emergence, characterised by struggle with an uncertain outcome between the 
dominant actors and groups, and the phase of effective installation of democracy, 
which is characterised by compromise among the moderate elements of the dominant 
groups (Kaufman, 1986: 100-107; Baloyra, 1987: 297-302). 
"Democratic consolidation", as a concept and analytical framework, has so far 
suffered from a poverty of theory. Compared to regime transition it is a much more 
nebulous phenomenon, and there is considerable uncertainty about its point of ending 
(Pridham, 1990: 8). While some monographic studies have gone beyond the 
13 For a description of the South African system see its Constitution (South Africa: 1996). 
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traditional focus on transition to explore processes of democratic consolidation, very 
few explicitly comparative studies have done so. Actually, while different theories of 
regime or democratic transition are to some extent viable for comparative studies, the 
few studies published to date which have conceptualised the consolidation of 
democracy as a distinct process categorically different from the transition, have not 
gone beyond noting the structure of the problem and asking important questions 
(Mainwaring, 1992: 294-341; White~ead, 1989: 76-95). For instance, most of the 
comparisons between Southern Europe and Latin America, and increasingly since 
1989, Eastern Europe, have so far not gone much beyond typological comparisons 
and have principally focused on the problems of the transition (clear examples are 
Nohlen & Solari, 1988 or Przeworski, 1991 for the Eastern European case). 
With regard to this, some authors concentrate their research of democratic 
consolidation on institutional variables. These studies centre on the political factor 
when explaining the consolidation of democracy (i.e. Apter, 1991: 464-478; Smith 
1991: 609-633), like political parties (Diamond et al., 1987: 5-19, Lechner, 1991: 
541-553; Dahl, 1989: 157-158; 275-277; MacLeod, 1990: 321-328). Parties are 
considered to be effective and significant intermediary structures in liberal 
democracies, crucial as political and organisational linkages between state and society 
(Bar, 1984: 134-136; Ware, 1987: 23-30). This idea, that political parties are of great 
importance when dealing with consolidation, has been challenged by authors such as 
Boschi (1990: 214-235) who attach much importance to social movements 14, interest 
groups and media in contemporary democracies. 
Others centre on the electoral system (Lijphart, 1990: 2-13; Blais & Dion, 1990: 
250-266; Horowitz, 1990: 73-79). The debate on the electoral system is concentrated 
on which representation best enhances the chances for democratic consolidation. 
Proportional representation is accused of producing two problems: Instability and 
irresponsibility. Instability is a result of the multiplication of parties represented in 
parliament. No party has a majority of seats and a coalition is needed. These 
coalitions are fragile and weak. In such situations small centrist parties have great 
14 See also Mainwaring, (1989; 1987); Boschi, (1987; 1988); Tironi, (1987); Campero, (1988); 
Filgueira, (1988). On this topic and regarding the African situation the view of Gyimah-Boadi, (1996) 
about the difficulties of these organisations (social movements, NGOs, etc.) in Africa in general and in 
South Africa in particular is of great importance. 
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negotiating power. Irresponsibility occurs in extremist parties that can not form part 
of any coalition, and participate in the downfall of the various attempts to build an 
enduring allegiance. On the other hand, plural elections in a single-member election 
are supposed to lead to a two-party system. However, it is not as simple as that 
(Laasko & Taagepera, 1979: 3-5). The plurality systems are meant to enhance 
government stability and responsibility but exacerbate feelings of alienation among 
minority groups and pave the way for a single-party system (see Blais & Dion, 1990: 
255-258; Lijphart, 1990:4-8, 11; 1991c: 42-48). 
Some other authors focus on the relationship between the executive and 
legislature. The extensive literature on this reflects the importance assigned to this 
matter by many scholars (Linz, 1990a; 1990c; Riggs, 1997; Lijphart, 1991a; Di 
Palma, 1990b; Diamond et al., 1990; Hagopian, 1990; Suarez, 1987; Lechner, 1991, 
to mention but a few). Here, the discussion is centred on the debate between 
presidentialism, semipresidentialism and parliamentarism. Parliamentary systems 
allow parties to exercise maximum control over political life. Multiparty systems, 
where no party can form a government alone, provide the parties, and particularly the 
small parties of the centre, with a great deal of bargaining power. On the other hand, 
presidential systems, because of the separation of powers, encourage institutional 
rivalries, which the president can exploit to limit the control parties have over the 
decisional process. In semipresidential systems, the constitution gives independent 
powers to a president elected by universal suffrage and forces the government to be 
responsible before both the parliament and the president (on this see Duverger, 1978; 
Rigg, 1997). 
Party leaders have also been in the centre of attention during research on 
consolidation (Pasquino, 1990: 54-56; Hagopian, 1990: 149-152). 
Another important standpoint is the so-called theories of modernisation. These 
theories state that the consolidation of democracy depends on structural factors, such 
as economic development, modernisation, urbanisation, etc. (see, for instance, Lipset, 
1959; Adelman & Morris, 1967; Apter, 1965; Deutsch, 1961; Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Giner & Sevilla, 1980; Lipietz, 1985; Hermet, 1990). 
Although these studies generally give a definition of consolidated democracy, 
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they can not be regarded as focused on consolidation but on (f)actors that may help 
democracy to consolidate. However, in the recent years, a growth in the literature 
focused on consolidation itself has occurred (see Gunther et al., 1995, or Linz & 
Stepan, 1996a, for instance). These studies concentrate on what consolidation is and 
how it comes to pass - not on those factors, variables or (pre-?)requisites of 
democratic consolidation. 
This extension of the literature on consolidation might be due to the fact that the 
so-called third wave of democratisation may have come to an end. Many countries 
immersed in this pro-democratic swing have reverted to dictatorship and some of 
them are having trouble to consolidate (Huntington, 1997: 6-7; Diamond, 1996: 30-
32). Thus, the attention has shifted from the transition to the consolidation of 
remaining democratic regimes. 
The point at which a new democracy becomes consolidated has generated 
considerable scholarly debate. However, no consensus has emerged and it is clear 
that one of the reasons is the lack of a common definition of "consolidated 
democracy" (Gunther et al., 1995: 5). 
Gunther (et al., 1995: 5) state that the starting point should be the recognition of 
the fact that the concept of "democratic consolidation is double-barrelled". In order to 
conclude that democratic consolidation has succeeded in a particular case, it 1s 
necessary, first, to ascertain whether the regime is fully democratic and then to 
determine if that regime is consolidated. As both democracy and consolidation are 
ideal types, both must be closely approximated before one can conclude that 
democratic consolidation has occurred. 
There is ample discussion about what democratic consolidation is and when a 
democracy is consolidated, although no agreement has been reached. This lack of 
agreement on a definition of "consolidated democracy" should not be surprising. 
There being no agreement on the term democracy, it is understandable that there 
should be lack of agreement on a more complex concept. 
Schmitter (1985: 10) says that a regime is consolidated when " ... social relations 
become social structures, i.e. patterns of interaction can become so regular in their 
occurrence, so endowed with meaning, so capable of motivating behaviour that they 
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become autonomous in their internal function and resistant to externally induced 
change". Generally, this can be obtained either by looking at the attitudes of the 
political parties - elite level - to the democratic institutions, or at the political culture 
and to the social values of the society - mass level. 
O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986: IV) state that consolidation of 
democracies is characterised by free expression of divergent interests due to the 
atomisation of civil society; formation of majority governments and peaceful 
alternation in power due to the development of political parties that are pluralist, 
unified, and legitimate; enhancement of the legitimacy of organisations belonging to 
civil society and of the efficiency of political representation of interests due to the 
deepening of relations between political parties and interest groups; acceptance of the 
constitution by the majority of citizens, interest groups ad political parties; and, 
setting up of mechanisms, formal or informal, limited or permanent, of consultation 
( concertation) between the state, the political parties and the principal interest groups 
and deepening of effective recognition of the principle of citizenship. 
Whitehead (1989: 79) asserts that the essence of the consolidation process is that 
"the new regime becomes institutionalised, its framework of open and competitive 
political expression becomes internalised and thus, in large measure, the preceding 
uncertainties are overcome. It is unlikely that such a process can ever be fully 
accomplished in less than a generation". 
Przeworski (1991: 23) states that "democracy is consolidated when under given 
political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only 
game in town; when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, 
when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which 
they have just lost". 
Gunther (eta!., 1996: 153) considers a democracy sufficiently consolidated when 
" ... all politically significant groups 15 in a new democracy acknowledge its political 
institutions as the only arena for political contestation and adhere to their behavioural 
15 Regarding this, they state that " ... as with all ideal types, there is no real world case in which all 
citizens or political groups strictly obey democratic rules of the game and fully acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the political institutions and principles under which they live ... " (Gunther eta!., 1995: 7). 
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norms .... " 
O'Donnell (1996: 34-51) determines whether a democracy is consolidated by 
means of the following indicators: "1) alternation in power between former rivals; 2) 
continued widespread support and stability during times of extreme economic 
hardship; 3) successful defeat and punishment of a handful of strategically placed 
rebels; 4) regime stability in the face of a radical restructuring of the party system; 5) 
the absence of a politically significant antisystem party or social movement" (see also 
O'Donnell, 1989: 76; 1992: 21)16. 
On the other hand some scholars, like Pridham (1995: 169), insist on the 
adherence to democratic norms and values by most individuals in a society as a 
measure of consolidated democracy. Pridham distinguishes between "positive 
consolidation" and "negative consolidation". Negative consolidation implies the 
achievement of a significant or partial degree of consolidation, but it is positive 
consolidation, which ultimately completes the process. Negative consolidation 
includes the solution of any problems remaining from the transition process and, in 
general, the containment or reduction of any serious challenges to democratisation. 
Negative consolidation is achieved when the presence or impact of groups or 
individuals characterised as antisystem, becomes numerically or politically 
insignificant. Obviously, this dimension of consolidation refers to elites, political 
parties and their behaviour during regime consolidation. Positive consolidation places 
more emphasis on attitudinal patterns and it refers especially to wider or deeper levels 
of the overall process. It includes the inculcation of democratic values at mass level. 
Therefore, it includes some remaking of those aspects, related to democracy, of the 
political culture in a direction that is system-supportive for a new democracy- being 
removed, therefore, the last of the uncertainties "remaining" in the aftermath of the 
transition. Positive consolidation refers to longer-term change, while negative 
consolidation may be achieved in a shorter period. Positive consolidation places more 
16 Other definitions of democratic consolidation, which are similar to these, are set forth by 
Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela (Mainwaring eta!., 1992: 3, 48-49, 58-72 respectively). 
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emphasis on the relationship between the new political system and the society 
(Pridham, 1995: 169; see also Pridham, 1990: 8-16). 
Since this study is focused on the relation between consolidated democracy and 
middle class (a social strata and not a political institution), the finally-adopted concept 
of "consolidated democracy" will be based on the last conception above: The 
adherence to the social values and the political culture, concretely on Pridham' s 
theory of "positive consolidation" (engagement with political institutions, motivation 
for participation in political processes, acceptance of political results, confidence in 
the government, and, as stated by Lipset (1963: 1): " ... the adherence by the "outs" to 
decisions made by the "ins", [and] the recognition by the "ins" of the rights of the 
"outs" ... "). This is so as to differentiate it from those "democratisation" -
electoralisation would probably be a better term - processes that have occurred 
mainly in Latin America, which did not lead to stable and lasting democracies 
(consolidated democracies). In these countries, the political system has been 
characterised by continuous alternations in office between the army and 
democratically elected governments. The lack of economic development produced 
high rates of inflation, poverty, unemployment, political and social instability (and 
consequently no development of the middle classes), etc. In these circumstances, 
then, the army obtains control through a coup. Concrete examples are Honduras, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Argentina and Bolivia, to mention but a few 
(Lipset, 1993: 164; Huntington, 1993: 59-72, see also Muller, 1995a). 
Those regimes could not " ... remain stable in the face of such serious challenges 
as a major economic crisis ... " (Gunther et al., 1995: 8). We could say, using Lipset's 
previously cited words, that the "outs" did not adhere to the decisions made by the 
"ins". 
The above-mentioned (this Chapter, section 2.2.3.2) difference between 
normative and descriptive democracy holds broad consequences for the definition of 
democratic consolidation. It can be said that those who rest their defmition of 
consolidated democracy on the attitudes of political parties towards democratic 
institutions, such as Gunther, Mainwaring, O'Donnell, Puhle, etc., are basing their 
definition of democracy on empiricism. If a regime is to be called democratic when it 
complies with some electoral requisites, it is to be understood that the more frequently 
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free and fair elections are held, the more consolidated a democracy would become. 
This leads the debate to the idea suggested by many scholars, that alternation in office 
after an election is an indicator of democratic consolidation. The best expression of 
this idea is Huntington's "two-turnovers test" (Huntington, 1990: 42; 1993: 266-267; 
see also Dahrendorf, 1990: 74). In brief, this method proves that in the system there 
are, already, two major groups committed enough to the maintenance of the 
democratic regime as to abandon office when they lose the election. This means that, 
when something needs to be changed, the rulers are changed but not the ruling 
system. 
An advantage of this method is that it is easy to test. However, Huntington 
himself recognises that there are problems with this method when measuring the 
consolidation of a democracy, as evidenced with the Peruvian case, for instance. Alan 
Garcia won the first democratic elections in Peru after the military regime. He was 
succeeded by Alberto Fujimori who, shortly after winning presidential elections in 
1992, carried out an executive coup (Palmer, 1992: 378). 
On the other hand, countries such as Japan would still be consolidating 
democracy since the liberals have remained in office since World War II. In 1996 the 
Liberal party again won the elections. In the same way, in El Salvador, competitive 
elections were held at regular intervals during the 1960s and the 1970s, but there was 
no respect for democratic values or for the political aspirations of the Salvadoran 
people (Whitehead, 1989: 76-77). 
This proves that alternation-in-office or election-counting systems do not prove 
properly the consolidation of democratic regimes. 
On the other hand, those who base their definition of consolidated democracy on 
social values, like Pridham17, are basing it on rationalism. Latin America's fragile 
democracies prove that elections and other related institutional procedures are not 
17 What is more, we can find in Pridham's work both an empirical and a rational conception of 
democracy. What he calls "negative consolidation" would be related to the empirical nature of 
democracy whereas his "positive consolidation" would be concerned with the rational essence of 
democracy. 
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enough to call a regime democratic - Mexico 18 is a clear example (Diamond, 1996: 
25; on Mexico's politics see Lawson, 1997; Blum, 1997; Valenzuela, 1997). 
Democratic ideas and values need to be disseminated throughout the society to ensure 
that the regime will remain democratic even in the face of important challenges such 
as economic crises. It is the rational, ideal or substantive democracy that deals with 
this. It is not a matter of quantity but of quality. A democracy would be consolidated 
not according to the number of fair and free elections or alternations in office but 
according to the ideas, values, motivations and behaviour that motivate individuals in 
those processes. 
Against this background, and as previously suggested, this study considers a 
democracy to be consolidated when most of its citizens believe that the current 
democratic institutions are the best for governance. This means that people consider 
the regime legitimate. As Mainwaring (1992: 306, italics added) states, legitimacy 
" .. .is every bit as much the root of democratic stability .. .. " 19 Diamond (1996: 33, 
italics added) also affirms that "in essence consolidation is the process of achieving 
broad and deep legitimisation, such as that all significant political actors, at both the 
elite and mass levels20 , believe that the democratic regime is better for their society 
than any other realistic alternative they can imagine". 
Consequently, this research will conceive democracy in South Africa to be 
consolidating if the social values and political ideas of the society are growing in the 
18 Mexico was not considered to be a real democracy (until 1988) since its, then, "institutionalising 
ruling party [made] extensive use of coercion of patronage, media control, and other tools to reduce 
opposition parties to decidedly 'second-class' status" (Diamond, 1996: 25; see also Sartori, 1976 
regarding the 'second-class parties'). 
19 On the discussion about democratic legitimacy and economic efficiency see Linz & Stepan, (1989); 
Mainwaring, (1992); Linz, (1978). Legitimacy is one of the basic aspects on which political systems 
depend. It involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary 
democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key 
issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved. Accordingly, legitimacy is an 
evaluative concept (see Lipset, 1963: 22-27, 68-71). Weber distinguishes three historical forms of 
legitimacy: The traditional - exercised by the patriarch -, the charismatic - exercised by individual 
leadership according to heroism, revelation or any other quality of the leader-, and, finally, the legal 
(rational) -by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional competence based on 
rationally created rules (Weber, 1968: 36-38; 212-245). For further and comprehensive studies on 
legitimacy see Connolly, (1984); Schaar, (1981 ). 
20 This differentiation between consolidation at "the elite and mass levels" is easily connected to 
Pridham's, (1995: 169) Negative and Positive consolidation respectively. 
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above direction. 
Thus, the values, ideas, motivations and, in general, the political behaviour of the 
individuals, which make them adhere to and defend the democratic institutions even 
in the face of important challenges such as economic crises, need to be explored. 
2.3 Democracy and Middle class: Following the link 
The explanation and delimitation of both "middle class" and "consolidated 
democracy" was presented above. Now, the link between them is to be explained. 
2.3.1 Theoretical background 
It has been maintained that democracy is promoted by reducing inequalities in 
wealth, at least since Aristotle (1962: 173). On the other hand, it has also been 
suggested that democracy and inequality have no connection with each other (see 
Neubauer, 1967: 1008-1009). 
Aristotle stated that "in Democracy the poor has more sovereign power than the 
men of property; for they are more numerous and the decisions of the majority 
prevail" (Aristotle, 1962: 237). Moreover, he says that "where one set of people 
possesses a great deal and the other nothing, the result is either extreme democracy or 
unmixed oligarchy or a tyranny due to the excesses of the other two" (Aristotle, 1962: 
173). 
The idea that political democracy and greater economic equality are linked is an 
old one and was held by both radicals and conservatives in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century. During the debate on the 1832 Reform Bill in England, John 
Stuart Mill foresaw the prospect of a revolution that would "exterminate every person 
in Great Britain and Ireland who has £500 a year". John Wilson Croker, the leading 
Tory publicist of the day, expected the result would be "no King, no Lord, no 
inequalities in the social system; all will be levelled to the plane of the petty 
shopkeepers and small farmers" (Jaher, 1973: 206). 
For longer than 150 years, researchers on democracy have assumed that social 
and economic equality naturally lead to political equality, that political democracy is 
71 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
more likely to occur where societies are more egalitarian. This, as Turner and 
Carballo (1993: 270) wrote, is "historically and logically accurate: Before the French 
Revolution aristocrats in Europe and autocrats in other parts of the world monopolised 
political power, economic privilege and social distinction. Conversely, many social 
scientists and planning ministers have assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that the 
processes of development at the end of the twentieth century are working in some 
sense all together to create greater equality in the economic, political and social 
spheres". 
Predetermined characteristics of civil society are usually observed either as 
"important preconditions for the emergence of democracy or as persuasive elements 
for the bringing-up of a positive context for the consolidation of democracy" (Boschi, 
1990: 214). It is possible to find support for this idea both in the empirical and the 
theoretical fields. 
The analysis of conditions for the emergence and maintenance of democratic 
political systems is one of the central concerns of political science. As a well-known 
precursor stated, "the organisation and establishment of democracy . . . is the greatest 
political problem of our time" (Tocqueville, 1969: 13). Since Tocqueville and his 
study, this statement has not lost any of its substance or more immediate 
repercussions. Today we witness processes of democratisation the world over, the 
most dramatic of these taking place in what used to be called the Second World. 
However, we are aware of the many problems and potential setbacks inherent in 
democratisation (see, for instance, Pennock, 1979; Powell, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; 
Diamond eta!., 1988; Sartori, 1987). 
For Key (1949), democratic institutions are important because they give rise to 
organised political competition. In light of his analysis of the one-party factionalism 
common in South America, he concluded that single-party politics precludes 
organised debate on issues, and leads instead to a politics of personality. The lack of 
sustained competition between two clearly defined political groups makes 
government more susceptible to individual pressures and favouritism. Single-party 
politics has a statu quo bias that benefits the "haves" at the expense of the "have-
nots" (Key, 1949: 307). Anyway, Key recognises that political competition itself does 
not guarantee that the "have-nots" can be an effective political force, but he argues 
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that the absence of competition excludes any such outcomes. 
Lenski (1966) bases a deductive argument on the redistributive significance of 
democracy on two assumptions, the first being that those who control the government 
are able to determine the rules governing the competition for rewards in society, and 
by virtue of this power, are able to influence profoundly the outcome of this 
competition. The second is that political democracy has significantly shifted the 
distribution of political power from the rich to the poor. He shows that "industrial" 
societies have a more equal distribution of income than do "agrarian" societies and 
also a much greater diffusion of political power. For Lenski (1966), the "new 
democratic ideology" is significant because it legitimates a major distribution of 
political power in favour of the majority - namely the disadvantaged element of the 
society. This increased political equality has led to greater social equality because the 
major electoral demand made on modern political elites has been for a more 
egalitarian redistribution of material goods (Lenski, 1966: 43-94, 297-434, 443-447). 
Those who argue that political democracy has not resulted in a more equal 
stratification fall into two schools: The Functionalist and the Marxist. 
The former argues that the form of government, irrespective of whether 
democratic or non-democratic, socialist or non-socialist, has no effect on the 
stratification system because the needs of modern industrial economies will require 
similar differences in earnings between occupational groups, similar mobility rates 
and similar government policies, etc. Any change in the distributive system is 
explained as a result of the "logic of industrialism". Industrial and technological 
change lead to a convergent pattern of development in the stratification system of 
politics. The latter assumes that the capitalist class is able to dominate the state and 
use their power to maintain their economic and social privilege (see Hewitt, 1977; 
Miliband, 1969; Parkin, 1971). 
One of the first (and very controversial) theories addressing this matter dates 
from the early sixties. The reference is to Lipset's Political Man (1963), in which he 
draws up the "social conditions of democracy". Dahl's well-known Polyarchy (1971) 
also deals with this question. Analysis of political development and modernisation 
such as Huntington's (1968) or Cutright's (1963) are also important. No list could be 
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complete without at least mentioning O'Donnell and Schmitter's ( 1986, 1990), 
Rubinson and Quilan's (1977) and Muller's (1988; 1995a) work in the field. 
More specifically, there has been increasing emphasis on the relation between 
social structure and democratisation. Against this background, there is ample research 
on the middle class-democracy linkage that has to be explained. 
Lipset (1993: 166) states, for instance: "People with more income, in complex 
and widely interdependent work situations, with more education ... are more likely to 
ask for increased political freedom." High levels of income, education and access to 
health and other services are characteristics of the middle class. These citizens' 
demands become more visible, as does a pattern of politics that can accommodate 
them (Lipset, 1993: 167). This pattern, then, naturally holds implications for 
democratising countries (see Lipset, 1959; 1963). Actually, in the early 1970s, Spain 
was the only one of 19 industrial market economies with a large middle class which 
did not operate as a democracy (Lipset, 1993: 158). 
The most extensive process of democratisation occurred in the second half of this 
century, parallel to a significant enlargement of the middle classes (see Huntington, 
1993: 3; Marshall, 1963: 148). Concretely, after the Second World War, there has 
been a narrowing of the inequality gap in the distribution of income that is clearly 
visible if the rise in the share of the lower ordinal groups is considered. In most 
countries, the share of the richest five per cent group (before taxes) was twenty 
percent or less in the post-Second World War years compared to well over fifty per 
cent in the 1920s, while that of the top twenty per cent group was between forty and 
forty five per cent in the 1920s. Information relating to the share of the lowest sixty 
per cent is scarce but there is some indication that this was below thirty percent in the 
1920s and 1930s and rose to well above thirty per cent in the post-Second World War 
years (Paukert, 1973: 103). 
This middle class was produced by the unprecedented global economic growth 
and industrial development of the 1960s, and is considered to be one of the main 
reasons for the rise of democratisation movements during the twentieth century 
(Huntington, 1993: 45). In fact, these democratic movements were mostly led by the 
urban middle class (Huntington, 1993: 67). Tezanos (1975: 87) also states that" ... the 
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middle classes are the most favourable to democracy ... " 
At this point, it can be assumed (and will be shown later) that a large and well-
developed middle class and stable democracy are parallel phenomena. A large middle 
class - as will be evidenced in this Chapter - is a characteristic of stable democracies. 
According to many scholars, the lack of a stable economic development in Latin 
America was the reason for its political instability (Lipset, 1993: 164) and, 
consequently, its lack of middle classes (Huntington, 1993: 59-72). 
At this point it is also necessary to re-connect to the historical debate about the 
linkage between democracy and economic development. Many studies link 
democracy and economic development but the question is whether democracy 
produces economic development or vice versa. Huntington (1997: 5) states it directly: 
". . . in short, if you want to get democracy promote economic development". There 
are several reasons to support this statement. Economic development implies a change 
in the occupational structure - produced by the increase in the urbanisation, and 
education -, which mainly consists of a decrease in the peasantry and increase in 
middle class and urban working class. These groups demand patterns of politics in 
which they can participate more directly (Lipset, 1993). These groups are in better 
condition to organise themselves - political parties, trade unions, etc. On the other 
hand, the bourgeoisie that controls the new independent centres of power based on 
technology, communication, etc. also demand patterns of politics in which they can 
exercise direct influence. Although generally - as previously said - the economic 
development comes before democracy (Western Europe, for instance), there, 
obviously, are exceptions such as Central and Eastern Europe where the collapse of 
the communist economic system produced political defeat (Cotarelo, 1996) or South 
Africa where the democracy was forced upon it (Thompson, 1995). 
When we talk about a large middle class, we not only talk about social structure 
itself but also about the existing inequality level in a certain society. An extensive 
middle class implies low income-inequality. Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) reasoned 
that a very egalitarian income distribution reflects the rise of a strong and autonomous 
bourgeoisie, which strives to establish parliamentary democracies in order to convert 
its economic power into correspondent political power (see also Moore, 1966). 
Therefore, they estimate that a country's level of democracy "will vary as an inverse 
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monotonic function of income inequality, since countries with low income inequality, 
indicative of a strong middle class, will be more likely to establish democracy than 
those with high income inequality, where the middle class is weak". In other words, 
they stir the issue of the relationship between class structure, political competition 
(and interaction with the state) and the formation of political regimes (Rubinson & 
Quinlan, 1977: 622). Muller also asserts (1988: 61) that "income inequality has a 
negative impact on level of democracy because it reduces the likelihood of 
inauguration of democracy". 
In this regard, Dahl ( 1971 : 103) gives the following proposition: "In a society 
that already has a regime with public contestation, extreme inequalities increase the 
chances that competitive politics will be displaced by a hegemony. Polyarchies are 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of extreme inequalities. Extreme inequalities in 
the distribution of key values are unfavourable to competitive politics and to 
polyarchy because this state of affairs is equivalent to extreme inequality in the 
distribution of key political resources and is likely to generate resentments and 
frustrations, which weaken allegiance to the regime" (Dahl, 1971: 1 05). 
All this gives rise to the question of allegiance, again. Nordlinger (1977: 93) 
defines the term "legitimacy deflation" as a "weakening of support for democratic 
regime due to the presence of high levels of economic inequality". Scholars such as 
Finer (1962b), Nordlinger (1977) or Welch and Smith (1974), to mention but a few, 
attach great . importance to the legitimacy variable. For them, a high level of 
legitimacy is supposed to act as psychological barrier that inhibits the military or the 
executive from usurping power. A coup against a legitimate regime is likely to 
generate opposition even within the officer corps. If we assume that the legitimacy of 
democratic government is eroded by a high level of income inequality, it can also be 
assumed that a democratic regime in a very non-egalitarian society is strongly 
susceptible to overthrow by a coup d'etat. This was the case of Brazil in 1964, 
• Panama and Peru in 1968, Chile and Uruguay in 1973, Turkey in 1980, Gambia, 
Nigeria - even before its inauguration - and Niger in the 90s, where the army came to 
be in charge through a coup (Diamond, 1996: 31). In addition, an executive coup 
(where the chief executive decides to retain power indefinitely) took place in 
Philippines in 1969, carried out by the President Ferdinand Marcos; and in Peru in 
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1992 by Alberto Fujimori. We also saw significant restrictions on political liberty in 
Malaysia in 1969 when the parliament was suspended (Diamond, 1996: 28-31). 
2.3.2 Empirical studies 
At this point it is possible to make the following assertion: The higher the income 
inequality in a certain society, the less stable democracy becomes in that society. A 
country with a high income inequality is a country with a narrow and non-powerful 
middle class. This can be shown in two ways: Either by looking at the income share 
of the richest five per cent of the population or by dividing the income into quintiles 
and looking at the size of the middle quintiles. If the income-share of the quintiles in 
the middle (middle class) is high it means that the economic inequality is low (large 
middle class). If, on the contrary, it is low (narrow middle class), the inequality is 
high. On the other hand, if share of income of the upper five percent is high, the 
inequality is high (medium strata are small). 
With this, the old debate about the democracy-socioeconomic development link 
is brought back. Originally developed by Lipset (1959; 1963) the discussion is still 
alive. 
There are many empirical studies linking socioeconomic inequality and 
democracy. What follows is an exposition of the main findings in the area. 
Frequently, the studies refer to other studies and this could confuse the reader. In 
order to avoid this, the studies are chronologically presented, presenting at the 
beginning of each, in bold, the author's name. 
Cutright ( 1963) posited a linear relationship between socioeconomic 
development and political development. This implies that, as countries become more 
advanced economically, they tend to become more politically advanced. Cutright 
sought to "polish" Lipset's methodology and, at the time, to broaden the theoretical 
scope of his conclusions. Four years later, Cutright (1967) identified an obvious 
negative effect of democracy on inequality, even controlling for the economic 
development. 
Neubauer (1967) attempts to demonstrate that there is no relation between social 
equality and political democracy or between social equity and political democracy. 
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For him, any sort of combination of these variables is spurious. He criticises the 
methodology used by Cutright (1963) in probing his hypothesis. He argues that the 
method used to measure what Cutright defines as political development does not 
measure that, but democratic political development. On the other hand he also 
criticises Lipset (1959) because his study, according to him, suffers from 
methodological shortcomings. Using a different method he reaches different 
conclusions. He does not fmd any relation between level of performance in 
democratic countries and socio-economic development. However, Neubauer (1967: 
1 007) admits that "certain levels of 'basic' socio-economic development appear to be 
necessary to elevate countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, 
nation-wide patterns of political interaction, one of which may be democracy ... [but] 
once above this threshold, the degree of to which a country will 'maximise' certain 
forms of democratic practise is no longer a function of continued socio-economic 
development" (he talks about level, not stability of democracy). 
Jackman ( 197 4) reviews the subject, doing an analysis of a cross section of sixty 
developed and non-developed countries (data from the 1960s) and his results indicate 
that the effect of the level of economic development on social equality (measured in 
terms of experience with social insurance programmes; income inequality and a social 
welfare index) and political democracy is positive and curvilinear. This implies that, 
while industrialisation results in greater social equality in the earlier phases of 
economic development, a threshold is reached in later phases of this process when the 
effects of industrialisation on social equality become progressively weaker. However, 
the political effect of political democracy on social equality is spurious once the 
economic development is controlled for. Although he accepts the hypothesis drawn 
up by Cutright (1965), which suggests that both the economic development and 
political democracy exert a joint effect on social equality, he maintains that political 
democracy does not have any separate effe~t on social equality or vice versa. Finally, 
he admits, in his conclusions, that "while this analysis indicates that political 
democracy is not related in any important causal manner to social equality, the last 
consideration does point to the utility of specifying 'political' variables precisely. That 
is, the above results should not be taken to mean that politics has nothing to do with 
the distribution of material rewards . ... The present study suggests that the argument 
[democracy-social equality link] is incorrect, but further research is needed ... " 
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(Jackman, 1974: 42-3; italics added). 
Rubinson and Quilan (1977) find that inequality has a negative effect on 
democratisation but there is less empirical support for the hypothesis· that 
democratisation negatively affects inequality. 
They review Cutright's (1967) results (as clear example of positive relation 
between the social equality and democracy link) and Jackman's (1974) findings (as a 
good example of non-existent relation). Jackman (1974) compared the above-
explained hypothesis of Lenski (1966) with an alternative suggesting that this 
relationship is spurious, once the economic development is controlled. These results 
contradict the findings of an earlier study carried out by Cutright in 1967. Cutright 
researched the same kind of relations and his results showed that there was a 
significant negative effect of democracy on inequality, even controlling for the 
economic development. Thus, we have two similar studies with opposite results. 
The first point Rubinson and Quilan ( 1977) noticed is the different methodology 
used by Cutright and Jackman in their respective studies: Different indexes of 
democratisation; different samples of countries used; the relationship between 
democratisation and inequality and the important issue of the direction of the causal 
relationship between democratisation and inequality. They also criticise the fact that 
none of them has made the most of the rich and complex original and common 
starting point: That ofLenski (1966). 
The first difference between them is the measure of democracy. Jackman (1974) 
argues that his index of democratic performance measures more precisely "what more 
theories mean by democracy". In this sense, he criticises Cutright's method because it 
measures stability instead ofthe level of the democratic system (Jackman, 1974: 43). 
They tried to find out whether this was the reason for different results. They inspected 
the correlation matrix and carried out a factor analysis of those two indexes and a 
third index of democratisation, Dahl's polyarchy measure (1971). They found that the 
correlations among them are relatively high (Jackman and Cutright: .8182. Both of 
these indexes have practically the same correlation with Dahl's index: . 7201 for 
Jackman and .7330 for Cutright) (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 614). The relatively 
high magnitude of these correlations implies, to some extent, that it is not possible to 
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simply assert- as Jackman does- that the different results found by Jackman between 
him and Cutright are due to the different political dimensions. The results of their 
analysis indicate that Cutright's and Jackman's methodologies do not capture different 
political dimensions. 
Another reason why they get different conclusions might be that they use 
different samples. They only used those countries for which there was complete data 
on their necessary indicators. Jackman used 60 countries and Cutright 54. However, 
the comparison between the samples shows that they had 44 cases in common. This 
evidences that the different results cannot be explained by the different sampling. 
When they correlated the 44 common cases, they found a correlation of only .645. 
They reasoned that "although we can not determine the source of this low correlation, 
we can conclude that the difference in findings between Cutright and Jackman may be 
due to the fact that the two measures of sectoral income inequality do not correlate 
highly" (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 616). 
Apparently, the main reason could be the measures of sectoral income inequality 
as a measure of inequality. While they both used the same conceptualisation of 
sectoral income inequality, it is possible that errors resulting from coding or from 
using different sources for determining sector income and workers per sector could be 
responsible for the discrepant findings. 
Both Jackman and Cutright assert that sectoral income inequality does not 
measure social inequality as actual personal income distribution does (Cutright, 1967: 
563; Jackman, 1974: 19-21). They both were forced to use this measure because they 
did not have measures of personal income distribution. Sectoral income inequality is a 
measure originally developed by Kuznets (1963). Hewitt (1977: 53) also critiqued 
Cutright's and Jackman's "unsatisfactory measure of income inequality". The use of 
sectoral income inequality is viewed by both writers as a substitute measure for 
individual-income-distribution data that are unavailable for many of the low- and 
middle-income countries that they analysed. It has also been criticised by Taylor and 
Hudson (1972). Certainly, it is hard to see why sectoral would be chosen over 
individual, if it was not because of the lack of available data. 
Another method is offered by Parkin (1971). He measures income inequality by 
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ratios of the average earnings of different occupations groups. The downside of this 
method is the different occupational classification among countries and that ignores 
the income differential within occupation categories. 
In order to find out which of them was right, they re-analysed the data using 
personal income distribution. When they substituted personal income as the measure 
of social inequality,21 they found that Jackman's indicator of democratic performance 
has an important effect on lowering income inequality, even controlling for the level 
of economic development. 
Their analysis of Cutright's study showed a similarly strong negative relation 
between the variables. Moreover, they say that "other results not presented here, also 
show that Jackman [with this new operationalisation] has significant effects on 
increasing the income of the bottom 20 percent of the population" (Rubinson & 
Quilan, 1977: 615). 
According to their re-analysis, they conclude that both Cutright's and Jackman's 
researches imply a strong negative relation between democracy and social inequality 
(Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615). 
After ratifying Cutright and correcting Jackman, they went further and addressed 
a matter done by neither of them. Both Cutright and Jackman established the relation 
between democracy and social inequality as a one-way situation: Democracy affects 
social inequality. However, there is a large research body, which infers that 
inequality affects democracy negatively. The main argument for this is the following: 
Observation of income differences among countries, proves that most of the 
difference is located "in the middle of the income distribution" (Rubinson & Quilan, 
1977: 615; italics added). The countries that exhibit the greatest income equality are 
those which have a greater share going to the third and fourth quintiles of the 
population and a smaller share of income going to the top twenty percent of the 
population. Countries with the most unequal income distributions are those in which 
the top twenty per cent of the population has a relatively large share of the income and 
the middle quintiles have a relatively small share (Pauker, 1973). 
21 Jackman himself claims it to be better that his own (Jackman, 1975). 
81 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
This conjecture suggests that the inequality of income among countries depends 
largely on the relative strength of socio-economic groups. The lowest amount of 
inequality "is associated with a large and economically powerful middle class group. 
Thus, when we compare countries on the basis of ~nequality, we are basically 
comparing their class structures and, particularly, the degree to which they are 
dominated by a middle class. It is interpreting inequality as an indicator of class 
structure that leads to the hypothesis that social inequality [negatively] affects 
democracy" (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615; italics added). 
It is possible to find a broad scope ofhistorical studies that point in this direction. 
As the reader can easily figure out, one of them is the Marxist school of thought. 
Marx's social analysis stated that the growth and institutionalisation of the bourgeoisie 
rests on parliamentary democracy. This relationship between bourgeoisie and 
democratisation arose because the rising capitalist classes used parliamentary methods 
to get the control of the state from the Crown and the traditional land elite (Marx, 
1972). 
In the same way, Moore (1966) supports the idea that the urban bourgeoisie has 
been the crucial socio-economic group in the major democratic revolution. He 
concludes by saying that the strength and organisation of the urban bourgeoisie has 
been the crucial condition for the institutionalisation of democratic forms of 
government. 
Following this, Soboul (1975), in his analysis of the French Revolution, 
maintains that the establishment of legal equality (the classic conception of 
democracy) over other visions of equality was due to the fact that the urban 
bourgeoisie eventually got the control of the French state. 
To summarise, Rubinson and Quilan (1977) think that all the above-exposed 
imply that the degree of inequality, as an indicator of class structure, affects 
democratisation. While it might not be true, in theory, that the larger the income share 
going to the third quintile, the less the inequality in the data, it is empirically true in 
the data on income distribution presented by Pauker (1973) and the analysis of 
Rubinson (1976). 
Their new analysis (taking into account the income share for the third quintile) 
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showed that there is a strong positive effect of the third quintile on both Cutright's and 
Jackman's measures of democratisation (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 616). 
They fmally conclude with two statements: The first being that they .found 
theoretical and empirical support both for the assertion that democracy affects 
inequality andfor the statement that inequality (interpreted as class structure) affects 
democracy. In other words, they bring along the issue of the relationship between 
class structure and competition to the formation of political regimes. The second is 
that it is necessary to warn the reader of the operationalisation process (Rubinson & 
Quilan, 1977: 617). 
Bollen and Jackman (1985), in the same way, reviewed previous research on the 
matter, accusing the researchers of lack of precision resulting from the shortcomings 
of their specification, measurement and sample composition. They attempted to 
overcome those limitations and in doing so, did not find any evidence of direct effects 
of political democracy on income inequality or vice versa. However, according to 
them, economic development influences both variables. The essay ends with a 
criticism of both on the flaws in prior studies linking democracy with equality and of 
the political process that undermines such linkage. 
They state that if this relation exists, the direction in which it occurs has to be 
figured out, which means that it is not clear which is the independent variable and 
which is the dependent. Democracy can affect or can be affected by income 
inequality. The third possibility is that the relation might be non-existent. They bring 
in Aristotle, Mill (1862), Key (1949), Lipset (1959) and Lenski (1966) to present 
(more theoretically than empirically) the possible effect of democracy on social 
inequality. Afterwards, they allude to Tocqueville (1969), Marshall (1950), Dahl 
(1971) and Lindblom (1977) to explain the potential influence of social inequality on 
democracy. In sum, the effect of inequality on democracy is anticipated because 
concentrated econonnc rewards lead to similarly concentrated political resources, 
undermining political equality. In addition, economic inequality generates 
frustrations that threaten loyalty to democratic procedures. 
They also review the theoretical arguments of the democracy-social inequality 
non-relationship, calling attention to Kerr (et al., 1964) and "its logic of 
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industrialism" by which the process of technological development shapes both the 
distribution of material goods and the structure of political institutions. Therefore, 
according to them, any observed association between the latter two is spurious. 
Political structures are subordinate to technological development. Indeed, most 
Marxists - they continue - would argue that the logic of industrialisation implies the 
opposite. Marxist perspectives also imply no meaningful relationship between liberal 
political democracy and income inequality. Democratic structure and ideology serve, 
instead, to legitimise the existing class relations, while economic inequality serves as 
a manifestation of those relations. On the other hand, they refer to Lijphart (1984) to 
evidence that only a few democracies adhere rigorously to majoritarianism (in which 
the argument that political democracy reduces inequality is embedded). It is also 
assumed, they say, that low-income voters (the majority of the electorate) demand 
redistribution by supporting programmatic parties of the left, but it is difficult to 
overstate the degree to which democratic parties are programmatic (Downs, 1957; 
Edelman, 1964; Lindblom, 1977). To prove that this is wrong, they use India as an 
example where lower-income voters appear to lack the requisite class consciousness 
and are not well organised by labour unions and political parties with redistributive 
goals (Kohli, 1980). In a similar way - they continue - the argument for a social 
inequality-democracy effect rests on the assumption that inequality undermines the 
legitimacy of democratic regimes. However, they argue, to have such an effect, 
inequality has to be perceived as unjust, and "there is no reason to believe that 
inequality automatically generates perceptions of inequity. It is evident that 
proponents of a democracy-inequality linkage have not explored all the possibilities" 
(Bollen & Jackman, 1985: 441). 
In their research, they found no empirical evidence of any linkage between 
political democracy and socio-economic inequality. According to them, with 
economic development controlled for, no statistically significant effect was found. 
However, they admit that it is possible that "future studies with better measures, a 
larger sample, an alternative specification or some combination of the above, might 
provide evidence of this linkage" (Bollen & Jackman, 1985: 450; italics added). The 
reason for this lack of linkage appears to be the common dependence of both, 
democracy and social inequality, on economic development. They point again to 
Kerr's logic of industrialisation (Kerr et al., 1964), which itself changes the 
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occupational structure in a more egalitarian direction and helps to produce pluralistic 
political institutions. 
They also add to this the political factors, which also undermine any possible link 
between democracy and social inequality. They argue that, although, in democracies, 
the electorate can convert its preferences into actions, it is possible that the dominant 
preferences of the voting population are not for redistributive policies (Parkin, 1971; 
Jackman & Jackman; 1983; McDonough et al., 1985). Such preferences - they 
maintain - may have more to do with equality of opportunity than with equality of 
results. Alternatively, many people in capitalist countries may not allow the 
government intervention in the economy that would be necessary to institute the 
policies required to redistribute income, - they state. Their reason for this is that 
organised competition along clear left-right political lines is unlikely to occur (with 
one party adopting a redistributive program and another embracing a non-
redistributive program). This undermines the responsible-party model implicit in 
Lipset argument (1960). When political discourse is ambiguous, voters are unlikely 
to adopt clear positions. 
Finally, they invoke the legitimacy argument. According to them, Lipset (1960), 
Dahl (1971) and others have argued that high levels of inequality lowers the 
possibilities for democracy to survive, because inequality reduces legitimacy of 
regimes and democracy depends on legitimacy to survive. Nevertheless, all regimes 
need legitimacy to survive. Furthermore - they maintain -, even in the presence of 
high levels of inequality, regimes can maintain a degree of legitimacy by invoking 
other political symbols (nationalism, etc.). They end up suggesting that, as inequality 
is a vague term, it can be used in a highly ambiguous manner, those regimes that do 
declare that they pursue egalitarian principles have considerable room to scheme. 
Muller (1988), from the same point of view, analyses forty countries that were 
under democratic rule in 1961. The relation between the upper-quintile-income share 
and democratic stability is shown in his study. All democracies with high income 
inequality (an upper-quintile share of more that 55 percent) were highly susceptible 
to military coups. On the other hand, more than two thirds of the democracies with an 
intermediate level of inequality (an upper-quintile share between forty-five and fifty-
five percent) remained stable and all of those with relatively low inequality (an upper-
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quintile share of less than forty five percent) were stable. 
Turner and Carballo de Cilley (1993) delved in the same area and, after a short 
though serious review of the concerned literature, found a strong negative relation 
between democracy and inequality, contradicting Bollen and Jackman (1985) and 
supporting Cutright (1967), Muller (1988) and others. According to their results, 
those countries with low levels of per capita income, are more likely to maintain 
authoritarian regimes (Turner & Carballo de Cilley, 1993: 273). Concretely, they state 
that "analysis of late twentieth century data confirms that international inequalities in 
living standards that prevailed before the twentieth century, hindered or prevented the 
spread of democratic government around the world. In the 1990s, the wealthiest 
group of nations is the most consistently democratic, and the poorest are those where 
democracies endure the least. At the same time, as significant advances in per capita 
income have spread to most nations over decades, opportunities for polyarchy are 
significantly enhanced, and in fact the number of polyarchies increased dramatically 
by the early 1990s" (Turner & Carballo de Cilley, 1993: 281). 
Finally, Muller (1995a) tried to determine why in the sixties and seventies, 
economic development did not converge to democracy. Actually economic 
development was associated with declines m democracy, especially in Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, and Uruguay). Important declines of democracy also occurred in Europe 
(Greece), the Middle East (Turkey, Lebanon, Tunisia) and Asia (Malaysia and the 
Philippines). He finds income inequality to be the answ~r for that question. Income 
inequality is an economic determinant of democratisation; Furthermore, its negative 
effect on democratisation can counteract the positive effect of economic development 
(Muller, 1995a: 967). 
The process of capitalist economic development is expected to have a positive 
impact on democratisation because it produces a shift in the labour force from 
agriculture to industry and services. This shift increases the size of the urban middle 
class (see Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1991) and the urban working class (see 
Rueschemeyer et al., 1992) "which fosters the inauguration of democracy. However, 
capitalist economic development also initially heightens income inequality in a 
country, and this is expected to have a negative impact on democratisation because a 
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high level of income inequality radicalises the working class, enhances class 
polarisation and reduces the tolerance of the bourgeoisie for political participation by 
the lower classes. Therefore, income inequality is incompatible with the stability of 
democracy over time" (Muller, 1995a: 967-969). 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Muller's research: The first is that 
income inequality weakens democratisation and this negative effect explains the trend 
among countries at intermediate levels of economic development for democracy to 
decrease instead of increase. These countries are more likely to experience substantial 
declines in democracy than are countries at low or high levels of development 
because their high levels of income inequality make it difficult to sustain a relatively 
high level of democracy over time. Second, when the impact of income inequality is 
controlled for, the economic development has the expected positive effect on 
democracy. Consequently, a pattern of relationship between capitalist economic 
development and democratisation requires that income inequality be investigated 
(Muller, 1995a: 983). 
Thus, Muller finds out why, during the 1960s and 1970s, middle-income and 
upper-middle-income countries that fit the prediction of the economic development-
democracy hypothesis, such as Portugal, Spain or Thailand, were greatly 
outnumbered by middle-income and upper-middle-income countries that did not, like 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Uruguay, Turkey, Peru, Mexico, South 
Korea, Nicaragua or Panama. The reason is that income inequality is not reduced as a 
country develops economically, as the proponents of the economic development 
explanation used to assume. Income inequality is an inverted-U function of level of 
economic development. Countries at intermediate levels of economic development 
thus tend to have the highest levels of income inequality. Countries with high levels 
of income inequality in the 1970s were much more likely to suffer a substantial 
decline in level of democracy than those countries with relatively low levels of 
income inequality. Muller's findings show that income inequality has "a robust 
negative impact on democratisation that can counteract the positive effect of 
economic development. Income inequality appears to be important in explaining why 
economic development has often failed to promote stable democracy. . . . In sum, 
evidence from this study and others indicate that high levels of income . inequality are 
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incompatible with the development of a stable democratic political system" (Muller, 
1995a: 982-983). 
2.4 Summary 
At this point, the major aspects discussed until now should be briefly summarised 
in order to enable the reader to understand the main ideas on which this Chapter 
relies. It has been offered a clarification of concepts used - middle class and 
consolidated democracy - to avoid misunderstandings. Consequently, middle class 
and consolidated democracy already are delimited terms. 
The link between democracy and middle class has also been presented, as were 
the different approaches to it. It has been shown that there is theoretical and empirical 
support for the idea that certain socio-economic prerequisites are indispensable for the 
stabilisation of democracy. One of them is social equality: The greater the social 
equality, the more stable the democracy in a particular society. This statement leads 
to the following: The larger the middle class, the greater the social equality. 
Consequently, it is possible to affirm: The larger the middle class, the more stable the 
democracy. 
Some studies refute this idea, saying that ~e stability of democracies is due to the 
economic development. Further studies confirm our hypothesis while even controlling 
for economic development. Actually, economic development itself can not guarantee 
stability of democracy as it is evidenced, for instance, in Latin America in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
It is also very important to properly operationalise the concept of democracy and 
social structure. Some studies do not find any link between democracy and social 
structure but they do when the operationalisation is done correctly. In this regard, for 
instance, Robinson and Quilan (1977) showed that Jackman's (1974) results were 
completely different once the operationalisation shortcomings (recognised by 
Jackman himself) had been corrected. 
The direction of the middle class-democracy linkage is also to be taken into 
account. Some authors maintain that it is social structure which affects democracy 
and others that democracy affects social structure. It has been encountered, and 
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empirically proved, that it is social equality which positively affects democracy. 
Accordingly, a large middle class in South Africa is to be considered a sign of the 
consolidation of its democracy, and as a sign of the reduction of its inequality. This 
should be noted in (some indicators of2) the political culture of the citizens. In. other 
words, if the middle class develops extensively, this should be reflected in a higher 
commitment to democracy. 
22 As said in Chapter 1, only those indicators more strongly related to democratic consolidation are 
analysed. This is amply explained in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3. Middle class operationalised 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous two Chapters the reader has been introduced to the background of 
this research. The way political regimes democratise and consolidate has been 
explained, the contexts that help these processes and those which affect democracy 
negatively were also explained. It has also been stated that democracies stabilise better 
under certain social conditions, namely with an extensive and well-developed middle 
class. This invites one to monitor the evolution of the middle class in South Africa. The 
operationalisation of the middle class is, then, the next step to be taken. However, the 
concept middle class is part of a wider one, class (see Chapter 2). Hence, it is better to 
explain the different approaches to operationalise such a concept. 
First of all, it has been noted in the previous Chapter that the term 'class' is vague 
and ambiguous and used in several ways. No definition is the definition. In actual fact, 
the definition adopted will be based on the needs of the researcher. 
From a purely terminological point of view the student of class and stratification 
can allow her/himself considerable - although not unlimited - freedom in the way s/he 
defines her/his area of investigation. However, there are other reasons why one way 
rather than another should be chosen and these reasons are connected with the 
predictive or analytic properties of the class concept. Much of the current theoretical 
discussion and many of its controversies can be subsumed under a limited number of 
choices or orientation problems. Should stratification theories be "uni-" or "multi-
dimensional"? Is stratification something inherently "continuous" or "discontinuous"? 
Should we concentrate on the so-called "objective" factors or on "subjective" factors? 
Should class phenomena be studied on the "community" or on the "mass society" level? 
These orientation problems will be the subject of a critical discussion. It will be 
shown that these decisions are not independent but interconnected in several ways. 
Besides, the main aspect to take into account when operationalising in social science is 
to ensure that the method is doing what it was committed to do. This takes us to the next 
point in this research: The idea of analytic validity. 
90 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2 Analytic validity 
In the present section the emphasis will be on research strategy in the field of class 
and stratification. Before the collection of data and their analysis begins, there are some 
decisions to be made. That is to say, these decisions do not follow from, but precede, 
and to some extent condition, the empirical fmdings of the study. In this sense they are 
a priori. Some of these decisions may be influenced by the results of earlier studies or 
by the investigator's general knowledge of the society s/he is investigating. 
If a certain definition of "class" is said to be very narrow or to emphasise the wrong 
dimensions or variables, it can be interpreted as a problem of neglecting some research 
problems - whereas the compatibility of the criticised definition with current usage may 
not be the point at all. If this is the case, the argument against the definition is an 
argument based on "analytic validity". 
Empirical results are, by definition, a posteriori, but the rules for their interpretation 
have to be "furnished" beforehand, a priori. Not until the data has been collected and 
processed can the researcher tell whether or not he has obtained a certain set of findings. 
But following the canons for empirical research in general, s/he ought to be able to say 
in advance, how he would interpret those findings. 
Consequently, analytic validity of a certain conception or definition of class seems 
to imply that such an interpretation is possible. As Evans (1996: 210) put it, the analytic 
validity of one social schema means that "the schema operationalises the . . . principles 
of the conceptualisation of the class structure [adopted]". In other words, analytic 
validity indicates that the researcher is measuring what s/he was supposed to measure 1. 
Some class or stratification theories or definitions have been criticised precisely on 
this aspect of analytic validity. For instance, the contemporary Marxist approaches (i.e. 
Wright, 1985; 1989c; Andersen & Hoff, 1989) have been criticised because they do not 
get to measure the real essence of Marxism, being it the class consciousness and class 
antagonism. Actually, they have been defined as Weberian and as functionalist as those 
so-called functionalist theories (i.e. Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993) they are suppose to 
1 For more details on analytic validity see, besides Evans (1992, 1996); the classic Cronbach & Meehl, 
(1955); Bohmstedt, (1983) or Prandy & Blackburn, (1997). 
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oppose (Gubbay, 1997: 73-77; Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992: 393, see also Crompton, 
1993). In this regard, those who follow Weber (i.e. Evans, 1992; 1996; Goldthorpe & 
Erikson, 1993) have not escaped from analytic criticism either (see for instance Prandy 
& Blackburn, 1997: 150). 
For a social research method of class operationalisation not to fall within these 
flaws and shortcomings, the researcher has to take several decisions. The first of them is 
to side with one conceptualisation of class, in general, and middle class, in particular. 
In the previous Chapter the main modus operandi in the field of social stratification 
was explained to the reader. The selection of a Weberian - functionalist - approach was 
made and argued, the main alternative being discarded, namely the Marxist approach. 
However, a brief summing up to reintroduce the reader to the agenda may be necessary. 
The history of sociology is imbued with a continuous debate over the importance of 
social class for understanding dynamics of social structure and social processes 
(Spector, 1995: 329). The two main approaches to address any issue in the field of 
social stratification are the Marxist - psychologist - and Weberian - functionalist. Both 
of them highlight the importance of the idea of class (Evans & Mills, 1999: 22). 
For Marxists, class structure is determined by a social division based on class 
interest. The class structure is characterised by class antagonism (Baker, 1992: 489). For 
Marxism, class structure refers to the differential distribution of three productive assets: 
property, skills and organisational resources. Owning or controlling each kind of 
resource makes it possible to exercise rights of appropriation and disposal over the 
surplus products (Western, 1994: 102; see also Wright, 1985). This theory implies 
conflict and antagonism between the different social classes. Individuals sharing the 
same class position feel themselves as part of a class (So, 1991: 39; Gubbay, 1997: 73). 
As a consequence the different classes are strongly related to each other2 as groups that 
are not individually decomposable (Crompton, 1993: 49-52). 
On the other hand, W eberian theory of class understands social structure as 
harmonic. Weberian class analysis begins by identifying inequalities in economic status 
2 A strongly relational class schema is one deriving from a theory about society as a totality which 
identifies relations between 'classes' as crucial to its dynamic (Crompton, 1993: 37; Gubbay, 1997: 76). 
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and the occupational structure and then exploring their consequences for their chances 
in life and action (Gubbay, 1997: 84). The awareness of class location subsequently is 
not relevant for class existence (Simpson, 1934: 829; Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992: 
381). Weberian social theory is neither politically nor sociologically ambitious 
(Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992: 385). Weber was a methodological individualist, which 
means, " ... that all social collectivities and human phenomena have to be reducible to 
their individual constituents, and explained in these terms ... " (Crompton, 1993: 29). 
In principle there are no grounds for naming one of these two main theoretical 
backgrounds as more valid or fundamental than other. The first one - Marxist - seems 
to be based on subjective and psychological attitudes, whereas the second - Weberian -
seems based on objective factors, usually in terms of certain variable/s established down 
by the researcher. 
In such a situation there is much in the argument that the specific manner in which 
classes are delimited by the researcher will have to depend entirely on which of the two 
main approaches is chosen, particularly, in the way the whole background of 
stratification is contemplated and in the intention or motive of her/his research. 
Against this background and as argued in Chapter 2, this study conceives the social 
structure in the Weberian way, leaving aside any psychological influence. The reason is 
that there is no intention to monitor any social struggle or awareness in South African 
society. The middle class is considered as a reflection of inequality (see Chapter 2) and 
not as a political actor~ Accordingly, the Weberian approach, as it is nominal (classes 
weakly related or not related to each other- see Crompton, 1993: 49-52; Gubbay, 1997: 
75), allows the researcher to focus exclusively on one class, if necessary - as it is the 
case. This study exclusively operationalises the middle class. Consequently, social class 
is understood as an individually decomposable group of people sharing the same 
(objective) characteristics within society. 
3.3 Operationalisation: Different approaches 
Having had the background of social stratification explained, the reader is now 
perfectly capable of understanding the different approaches of operationalisation of 
social class. These are now presented. 
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As indicated above, this study adheres to Weber's conception of class and, 
consequently, understands a social class as an individually decomposable group of 
people. But the fact that this study adheres to Weber's class theory does not imply that 
there are not other methods. Actually, some of them compete with each other. 
In attempts to understand the stratification of modern societies in terms of class, the 
primary concern is not with the subject evaluation that individuals and groups may 
make of each other. It is, rather, with certain social relationships in which individuals 
and groups are involved daily and which are believed to exert pervasive influence in 
their lives. One could say, using Goldthorpe's (1983) words, that class analysis begins 
with a structure of positions associated with a specific historical form of the social 
division of labour, which is usually seen as being constituted in two main ways: 
1. "By basic employment relationships which differentiate employers, self-
employed workers and employees; 
2. By varying employment function and conditions of employment which 
differentiate categories of employee - those in subordinate positions and those 
whose employment conditions imply some exercise of authority, expertise or 
skill" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 467). 
It can be deduced that these are the two main modus operandi in the field. For 
Edgell and Duke ( 1991) the main difference between them resides in whether the term 
class refers "exclusively to the social relations of production" or "technical relations of 
production" (Edgell and Duke, 1991: 22; see also Wright, 1980). 
To show the difference between these two main competing operational methods of 
class, Edgell and Duke refer to an engineer as an example. If this engineer "sells her/his 
labour power to a capitalist" s/he would be classified as a worker; if s/he is in charge of 
workers as a "controller of labour"; if s/he is self-employed, as "petty bourgeois"; if s/he 
employs other people, as a capitalist. On the other hand, if we were based on an 
occupational scheme, this engineer would be classified as a "higher managerial or 
professional 'middle class' ... " (Edgell & Duke, 1991: 23). 
Here, it is observed that the main difference relies on what is considered to be the 
main cleavage in the society. In the first example, the main cleavage is meant to be the 
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division between the owner and non-owner of the means of production. In the second 
one, it is supposed to be the skilled/non-skilled cleavage. Consequently, the decisive 
factor of this debate is to be found in the theoretical background of each approach. 
For Edgell & Duke (1991: 23) "the first scheme (called by them "social scheme") is 
essentially a relational one which emphasises conflict, whereas the second -
occupational scheme - is a hierarchical one, which emphasises shared values and, 
therefore, harmony" (see also So, 1991). Besides this, there are "occupational schemes" 
that contain both social and occupational categories such as Hall and Johns' (1950), 
Goldthorpe's work in 1969 (Goldthorpe et al., 1969) and in 1987 (Goldthorpe, 1987); 
Goldthorpe and Hope's (1974) one in mid-1970's. In all these studies, for instance, 
large proprietors and higher-grade professional and managerial workers are placed in 
the same top-ranking position. 
Most studies tend to define class in occupational terms, as well as assuming that the 
family is the basic unit in class analysis and that the class location of the family is 
determined by the occupation of the male "head" of household. Furthermore, these 
studies typically concentrate on people who are economically active on a full-time 
basis 3. 
At the beginning of this Chapter the Marxist method was rejected. It is of 
importance to note and present some of the shortcomings and flaws found within 
several attempts to operationalise the social structure in a Marxist way. The most 
important is that Marxist methods of operationalisation the social structure have not 
been able to capture the basic elements of the Marxist school of thought (led by Wright, 
1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1985, 1989b; see also Andersen & Hoff, 1989). 
The first criticism is that the method has been carrying too much "speculative 
baggage ab initio" (Simpson, 1934: 835). Its "psychological background" has also been 
object of criticism (Simpson, 1934: 829). In the same way, it has been said that Wright 
and his followers have not been able to capture the real essence of Marxism, as it 
concerns a class struggle, class consciousness and theory of exploitation (Goldthorpe & 
Marshall, 1992: 385, 393; Gubbay, 1997: 74). Based on occupation (Wright, 1980; 
3 For different approaches on this, see, for instance, Andersen & Hoff, (1989); Portocarero, (1989); 
Ishida, (et al., 1991) or Evans & Collins, (1999). 
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1985; 1989b ), the operationalisation of social class in the Marxist tradition assumes that 
those who control or own the means of production are automatically aware of their class 
location and have an antagonistic disposition toward those, who also have a class 
awareness produced by not controlling/owning the means of production (Goldthorpe & 
Marshall, 1992: 385). Goldthorpe (1996: 483) strongly argued that Marxist force of 
explanation is spurious. 
But the main criticism of Marxist operationalisation of social class (at least 
important in its relation to this study) is its treatment of the Middle Class. Marxists have 
not been able to accommodate the rise of the middle class (concretely the new middle 
class) into their operationalisation approaches. As Wright (1989c: 5) recognises "all 
Marxists share a basic commitment to a polarised abstract concept of class relations, and 
yet the concrete class structures of contemporary advanced capitalist societies look 
anything but polarised. The basic conceptual problem, then, is to figure out how to 
accommodate people such as professionals, managers, teachers and so on [middle class] 
within a Marxist class structural framework". The only solution found by him and 
followed by others is to "break up" the middle class and locate its components in several 
different classes at the same time. For instance, a manager would be a proletariat ass/he 
would be controlled by others and would not own means of production. However, at the 
same time, s/he would be a capitalist as s/he is controlling others (Wright, 1989c: 6; 
Kivinen, 1989: 55; So, 1991: 40). Besides, there is no explanation ofthe kind of class 
awareness those individuals would have. This embarrassing trick clearly indicates that 
Marxists have not acommodated the evolution of contemporary societies in which 
polarisation has decreased, precisely due to the emergence of middle classes. It also 
serves as an example of the difficulties with which Marxism has to deal nowadays in 
order to find accommodation in societies for which this theory was not created. Proof 
that this movement within Marxism is erroneous and that middle class should be 
accepted as a different social class is that, for instance, it is possible to find differences 
in vote intention between middle classes and working classes (Hoel & Knutsen, 1989: 
182). Ehnrenreich and Ehnrenreich (1979) maintain that the middle class 1s an 
independent class from others. A proof of this is that they have an antagonistic relation 
to other classes and that different studies show that satisfaction with life is vastly 
different between working classes and middle classes. Their access to the social 
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resources is also different (Marshall & Firth, 1999: 28)4 . 
Once the non-selected method has been discarded the selected one will be 
presented: a Weberian approach. This has also been called occupational scheme (Edgell 
& Duke, 1991: 23; see Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1993) or occupational hierarchy (Hoel 
& Knutsen, 1989: 181). This clearly indicates that Weberian or functionalist approaches 
are also based on occupation, as are Marxist approaches. The next step then is to show 
that it is possible to construct an operationalisation method based on occupation. 
3.4 Class and occupation 
In what follows, the possibility of building a type of classificatory foundation based 
on occupation is considered. 
It is not uncommon to speak of occupation as being one of the factors that 
determine class position or one of the variables in stratification. But when we look a 
little closer at the various factors or variables put side by side with occupation, they 
seem to be on a rather different level. By specifying a person's occupation, her/his 
mcome, educational level, status and so on are also specified, within fairly narrow 
bounds. A great number of occupations presuppose a prolonged formal education 
(doctors, lawyers, etc.). Thus, occupation will be inextricably connected with many 
other stratification variables (i.e. education or income) and cannot be divorced from 
them - or its separation is highly difficult (it is difficult to understand that a doctor does 
not have a degree in medicine). This all means that the index of class based on 
occupation will indirectly, but objectively, give ample information about many other 
characteristics related to social stratification. 
There is hardly any doubt that people rely heavily on their knowledge about another 
person's occupation when they form a status judgement. Parsons (1954: 35), already 
noted it long ago when said that "the most prominent structure of modem society is that 
organised around the work that people do'6 . Actually, those individuals who are 
permanently unemployed are defined as underclass (Buckingham, 1999: 49). All this 
may serve as a further argument in favour of the course adopted hereunder. 
4 For more critics on Marxist operationalisation see Clark & Lipset, (1991). 
5 In the same line see Goldthorpe & Erikson, (1993: 1-28); Evans, (1996: 209). 
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The question we have to answer is whether occupation provides a suitable empirical 
basis for different class theories or conceptions. In the Marxist class theory, occupation 
helps to delimit groups with different relations to the means of production (see Wright, 
1980; 1985; 1989a). Likewise, those who follow Weber will find in occupation a useful 
index of chances in life (see Goldthorpe, 1969; 1985; 1987; Evans, 1996; Evans & 
Mills, 1999). In other words both psychologists and functionalists have found in 
occupation a perfect analytic tool to analyse the social structure. Actually, several 
studies refer to social mobility or social status as occupational mobility or employment 
status (Ngo, 1992: 475; Portocarero, 1989: 359). 
Many sociologists and other social scientists have used occupation as an indicator 
of stratification and have identified their social classes by separating occupations into 
categories (upper class, middle class, and lower/working class). At this point it is 
necessary to state that occupation is intrinsically connected to status/social prestige, 
which is intimately connected to social structure 6 . 
The first complexity encountered by the social scientist who wishes to use this 
traditional method - occupational scheme - is that there are many occupational schemes 
to select from. In addition to the essential occupational schemes identified by 
Goldthorpe (see Goldthorpe et al., 1974), there are other occupational class schemes 
that are widely used, mainly in Britain. There is, for instance, the Registrar-General 
scheme (see Leete and Fox, 1977). This is an "official" (British) classification of 
occupations. A social grading of occupations was also developed by Kahan in a study 
of political attitudes (Kahan et al., 1966). This scale followed the definitions of 
occupational grades developed by market researches and has tended to dominate 
political science in the 1970s and market research in Britain ever since (Butler & 
Stokes, 1974; Monk, 1985)7 • 
Several critiques have been developed against the occupational scheme developed 
mainly by Goldthorpe, namely the Neo-Marxist criticism; the Feminist criticism and the 
Sectoral criticism. These are now presented. 
6 For various approaches in this line see, for instance, Juarez & Reyes-Ayala, (1994: 253). 
7 For a comparison among various points of view see Goldthorpe & Erikson, (1993: 28-64). 
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3.4.1 Neo-Marxist criticism 
Neo-Marxist criticism of occupational schemes is mainly focused on the fact that 
these schemes fail to recognise the capitalist nature of modem societies in at least two 
related ways: (i) the capitalist class, the most economically powerful, disappears from 
the class structure; and (ii) theories about the relationship between capitalist and 
workers can not be adequately examined by class schemes that emphasise position in a 
class hierarchy, and fail anyway to identify the dominant class in the relationship 
(Wright, 1985: 1-17). 
Another Neo-Marxist criticism concerns the vulnerability of occupationally based 
classifications to changes in the occupational structure. As a result of focusing on what 
a person does as work instead of on the relationships between classes, changes in the 
nature of work raise problems for occupationally based schemes. For Neo-Marxists, 
social processes such as enskilling and deskilling mean that it is imperative 
continuously to review and, if necessary, revise the relative position of occupations 
(Gubbay, 1997: 80-84, see also Wright, 1976). 
Differences between the two approaches also concern the differences in the 
conceptualisation. "Social" scheme theorists would talk about "proletarian class 
occupations" (Stanworth, 1984: 164), while occupational scheme theorists would talk 
about "conditions of employment" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 479). 
3.4.2 Feminist 
Feminist criticism of the occupational scheme is focused on what Goldthorpe 
(1983; 1984) called the "conventional view", which maintains the following: 
1. The family is the basic unit of social stratification and not the individuals. 
2. The position in the social stratification is given upon the position of the 
male "head" ofthe family. 
The feminist criticism is based upon the fact that the conventional view "effectively 
precludes examination of what should be recognised as one major feature of the 
stratification system as a whole: that is, sexual stratification, which, of course, cuts 
directly through the conjugal family. It follows then that not only are women rendered 
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largely invisible within the study of stratification, but furthermore that the existence of 
sexual inequalities becomes more or less disregarded" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 465). 
Parkin (1971: 14-15) argued that, in modem societies, the family is "the major unit 
of reward" and hence that "for the great majority of women the allocation of social and 
economic rewards is determined primarily by the position of their families - and in 
particular, that of the male head". 
In the same way, Wetergarrd and Resler (1975: 291) maintained that "it is men's 
occupation positions far more than women's ... that set the essential circumstances of 
life for most households, however much one may deplore this". For Goldthorpe (1983) a 
notable empirical illustration of this point would be the mortality rates among married 
women which vary far more sharply with their husband's occupational level than with 
their own (see Fox & Goldblatt; 1982: 31-33). 
The conventional view mainly means that families should be allocated to classes on 
the basis of the occupation of the 'head' of the household, who is usually male. The 
position of the family as a whole within the system of stratification derives from that of 
the family head, in the sense of the participation of the labour market. Generally, 
married women are required, by conventional norms, to take major responsibility for the 
performance of the work that is involved in maintaining a household and rearing 
children. This requirement, then, restricts their opportunities in various ways and makes 
them fall into a situation of economic dependence on their husbands, so that the 
possibility of any effective challenge to the prevailing norms is greatly reduced, in turn. 
This comes out "from a premise which feminists would presumably not wish to deny ... 
women still have to await their liberation from the family" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 469). 
From this standpoint, Goldthorpe (1983: 465; see also Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 
231-278) maintains that the family is the unit of stratification primarily because only 
certain members, predominantly males, have, as a result of their labour market 
participation, what might be termed a directly determined position within the class 
structure. Other family members, including wives, do not typically have an equal 
opportunity for such participation and their class position is, thus, indirectly determined, 
that is to say, it is derived from that of the family head. 
Hence, the existence of marked sexual inequalities implies that women as a 
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collectivity have interests that stand opposed to those of men. However, the restricted 
and conditional nature of women's participation in the labour market means that they 
can not be "usefully thought of'' as themselves constituting a class. For, as well as their 
own chances in life being mediated via their husbands' class position to a large extent, 
they, for the most part, are also deprived of the most basic capacity for class action, 
namely, that of being able to "cause serious disruption of their productive process" 
(Parkin, 1979: 15; see also Goldthorpe, 1983). This means that "what is essential to 
class analysis is the argument that family members share in the same class position, and 
that this position is determined by that of the family 'head' in the sense of the family 
member who has the greatest commitment to, and continuity in, labour market 
participation. That this member is usually a male is then an independent fact, which is 
accounted for in terms of the dependence imposed on women by the conventional 
separation of sex roles within the family. . . . Thus, in the case where no male, or no 
economically active or employed male is present, or where the family 'head' in the 
above sense is female, no difficulty arises in principle for class analysis in recognising 
and accommodating these circumstances. A truly problematic situation would be 
created only if it could be shown that the extent and nature of female participation in the 
labour market is now such that in the more 'normal' conjugal family it is increasingly 
hard to say whether husband or wife could better be regarded as the family 'head' and 
that in many cases there are in effect two 'heads' with, quite often, different class 
positions" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 470; see also Zelditch, 1955; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 
1992; Evans, 1996). 
3.4.3 Sectoral criticism 
Sectoral criticism of the occupational scheme concerns the argument that sectoral 
cleavage theory fits better with "class" (non-occupational) schemes than with 
occupational schemes (Duke & Edgell, 1984, see also Hoel & Knutsen, 1989 for a 
different approach). This is mainly because, in terms of the production sector, 
employers and the petty bourgeoisie are automatically classified as private sector. 
Therefore, the worker and the controller of labour classes can be divided neatly into 
public and private sectors. In view of the increased salience of sectoral cleavages during 
the 1980s (Dunleavy, 1989), the ability to accommodate both class and sectoral effects 
in the same model is a marked advantage (Duke & Edgell, 1984; 1983). 
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For Edgell and Duke (1991) the arguments in favour of a "class" scheme are 
strengthened by their political relevance in Britain since 1979 under the Thatcher era. 
During this period, the balance of class power between employers and workers altered 
in favour of employers. Over the same period, the patterning of public and private sector 
production and consumption altered in favour of the private sector. This obviously has 
implications for the class configuration (Hoel & Knutsen, 1989: 191). 
3.5 Stratification operationalised: Different choices 
For any system of stratification to overcome the limitations mentioned above and 
translate the abstract idea of class into a measurable term, accomplishing the "analytic 
validity" requirements, "social researchers need to make three interrelated choices" 
(Duke & Edgell, 1991: 32; Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 28-65). Those are ~) the 
conceptual scheme (occupational, non-occupational or both combined); (ii) the unit of 
analysis (should it be the individual respondent of the family/household); (iii) the 
degree of coverage of population (economically active population or all adult 
respondent regardless of whether they are currently economically active). 
3.5.1 The choice of a conceptual scheme 
The choice of a conceptual scheme involves a fundamental theoretical choice 
between diametrically opposed views regarding the nature of class in advanced 
capitalist societies. Occupational class schemes generally give primacy to the 
manual/non-manual boundary and then further subdivide according to varying levels of 
skill within each category. By contrast, non-occupational schemes- the so-called 'class' 
schemes - emphasise the owner/non-owner division and then further subdivide on the 
basis of control over labour, attempting to study the class conflict. Such schemes have 
the advantage of being compatible with sectoral categories (Carlsson, 1958: 42-58; 
Edgell & Duke, 1991: 21-46). 
Occupational schemes are weakened by the vulnerability to changes in the ranking 
of existing occupations and the inevitable introduction of new occupations. 
Comparisons across time are rendered highly problematic if the class scheme adopted is 
predicated on a changing occupational structure. Non-occupational schemes are less 
susceptible to this type of problem. Furthermore, occupational schemes are too 
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embedded in the occupational structure that may exclude large sections of the adult 
population, mainly the underemployed (the intermittently employed, who often also are 
women), the unemployed and the non-employed (i.e. students, housewives). However, 
the Marxist approach also suffers from these shortcomings (see So, 1991; 1995, 
Gubbey, 1997). 
In the same way some argue that, in v1ew of the extensive segregation that 
characterises the labour market in advanced capitalist societies, the occupational 
structure of women workers is different from that of men (Hoel & Knutsen, 1989: 184, 
see also Osborn & Morris, 1979; Evans, 1996; Ga11ie, 1988). More specifica11y, it has 
been argued that the manual/non-manual division has little relevance to women's work8. 
Marxist method (Wright, 1979b; 1985; Andersen & Hoff, 1989 to mention but a 
few) is based on owner/non-owner (they suppose that that cleavage automatica11y 
produces class awareness- see Chapter above) and Weberian method (Goldthorpe & 
Erikson, 1993; Evans & Mi11s, 1999 to mention but a couple) is based on manual/non-
manual (ski11ed/non-skilled). As previously stated, this study sides with the Weberian 
approach and consequently fo11ows the ski1led/non-skilled approach. This a11ows 
making clear a differentiation between middle class and working class, not having to 
accommodate middle class in any other class as Marxists tend to do (Wright, 1989: 5; 
Gubbay, 1997: 80). 
3.5.2 The choice of unit of analysis 
The second fundamental choice involved in operationalising the concept of class 
concerns the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis refers to the person or institution on 
which the analysis is performed (see Carlsson, 1958: 25-37, Goldthorpe & Erikson, 
1993: 28-64). Should the unit of analysis be the respondent/individual or the 
family/household? 
First, it can be argued that the respondent's attitudes and behaviour should logica1ly 
be analysed in terms of the direct experience of the respondent. Thus, in the context of 
the debate about women and class analysis, Stanworth (1984) suggested that the direct 
8 On this see Heath and Britten, (1984); Dex, (1985), and contradicting this idea, see Evans, (1992; 1996) 
and Evans and Mills, ( 1999). 
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employment experience of married women is relevant to an understanding of their class 
fate and class action. Therefore, wives' direct relationship to the class structure should 
not be denied on a priori grounds (see also Heath & Bitten, 1984). This is a matter not 
just of theoretical inconsistency, it is also of considerable empirical concern (see 
Delphy, 1981; Acker, 1973). This is in contrast to the conventional view advocated by 
Goldthorpe (1983: 465-67, see also 1984, Parkin, 1971; Giddens, 1973; Goldthorpe & 
Erikson, 1993: 1-65; 234-5; see also Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992) who claimed that the 
family/household is the unit of class analysis. The main argument in favour of a group 
measure is that the family/household acts as the basic unit of economic strategy in terms 
of consumption (on this see also Edgell & Duke, 1991; Marshall et al., 1988). 
This gives rise to another question to be addressed. If it is opted to use the family as 
a unit of analysis, how is class to be measured at the family/household level. Where 
there is only one adult in the household, the operational procedure is unproblematic and 
the same in fact as a respondent-based indicator. However, where there are two or more 
adults in the household, and if these adults are not in the same class, the problem is to 
select which should determine the household class measure. There are basically five 
possible solutions, namely ~) male head of household; (ii) joint classification; (iii) 
average method; (iv) the dominance principle and (v) multiple indicators. 
3.5.2.1 Male-head approach 
Acker (1973), Dex (1985), Stanworth (1984) and Wright (1989a), among others, 
reject the male-head indicator as it is sexist. Generally speaking, this alternative squares 
badly with an ideology of equality between the sexes but might still correspond well 
with the present situation (Erikson, 1984). This model was explained when the 
"conventional view" was criticisied. 
3.5.2.2 Joint classification 
In relation to joint indicator, such as in Britten and Healths (1983, 1984), it has been 
suggested that the 'utility' of this solution is undermined by the high instability of the 
employment situations of married women (Goldthorpe, 1984) and that they are 
"inherently problematic because work positions differ in several dimensions" (Erikson, 
1984: 503, see also Evans, 1996; Prandy & Blackburn, 1997). 
104 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.5.2.3 Average method 
The average method has also been criticised (Erikson, 1984). It is very difficult to 
find an average code as work position differs in several dimensions, making the. method 
dubious. For an average to be an acceptable indicator of distribution, the distributed 
characteristic must be additive. Work situations clearly do not appear additive and an 
average accordingly should not be used to indicate the class position of a family. As a 
result this method is not considered any further. 
3.5.2.4 Dominance principle 
The dominance principle - allocating household class on the basis of the highest-
class member - overcomes the male head of household problem (see Haug, 1973, 
Erikson, 1984). But this produces a secondary effect. As it is applied upwards rather 
than downwards, it produces a reduction in the working class. Also the dominance 
method requires a hierarchical class scheme with a clear order of dominance. 
In those families where there is only one person in the primary generation the 
problem seems simple. The family position is just made identical with the position of 
this person. Neither does it seem problematic to classify households of which only one 
member of the primary generation is gainfully employed. It is when members of the 
primary generation have independently determined work positions and these positions 
are different that problems arise (i.e. Sweden (see Erikson, 1984)). 
Trying to make a dominance-order index implies deciding upon a dominance 
relation for every pair of work positions. This means that we have to make an 
assumption about which of the two categories has the greater impact upon ideology, 
attitudes, behaviour and consumption patterns of the family members, provided that 
both are represented in the primary generation of a household. It is necessary also to 
consider which category has more importance for the opportunities of the children in the 
family. 
We can base our assumption about relations of dominance on the vanous 
dimensions in which the work positions differ from each other. We assume that 
categories of higher qualifications dominate categories of lower. By this we actually 
assume that the hierarchies of the organisation of production spill over and have effects 
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also in the families. For the same reason we assume that when both spouses are at the 
same level of qualification, non-manual categories dominate manual categories. Being 
self-employed also has many consequences for personal life. Finally, categories of the 
gainfully employed are supposed to dominate categories of persons out of the labour 
force, and among the latter, students are supposed to dominate others. 
In constructing dominance, we have only the characteristics of various occupations, 
not how firmly related the different family members are to the labour market. Our basic 
assumption, however, is that the market situation of families follows from the work 
situations of family members. It, then, seems reasonable to assume that the work 
situations of the family members that are most tightly knit to their work have the 
strongest influence on the situation of the family. We may, therefore, assume that the 
occupations of those who work full-time always dominate the occupations of those that 
work part-time. Within each category we use the same ranking order of occupational 
categories used for Dominance. This method implies the multiplication of the fmal 
categories and the results worsen rather than facilitate the social analysis. Hence, it is 
not considered any further. 
3.5.2.5 Multiple indicator 
Where the technique of analysis allows it, it is possible to include the class location 
of both the respondent and others in the household in the form of multiple indicators. 
This solution allows the influence of either or both to be displayed in the analysis. 
In this regard, Erikson (1984) thinks that, depending on whether we concentrate on 
the market situation or work situation, we should thus either classify households or 
individuals, respectively. But the two situations are not clearly independent from each 
other. In reverse, the market situation depends heavily on the individuals' work 
situation. Different families face similar market situations because their members have 
similar work situations and accordingly they should get class assignments on the basis 
of the work situations of the family members. 
As long as it is assumed that not only one member of each family is gainfully 
employed, no problem occurs (all families were assigned to the position ofthe gainfully 
employed member). But if two members of the family are gainfully employed and their 
work situations relate them to different classes, we clearly have a problem. To what 
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class should we assign the members of this family? Let's imagine that a woman is 
married to a man in a executive or higher managerial position, but is herself working as 
a clerk. If we investigate working conditions, authority relations at work, etc. we clearly 
must place her with other clerks. But if we study housing conditions, consumption 
patterns or child-rearing ideologies, such a classification would probably be rather 
misleading. In this case we ought to somehow consider her husband's occupation in 
assigning a class position to her and her family. It seems, therefore, as if two class 
concepts are needed, one work-related, with individuals as the unit of classification, and 
one market-related, with families as the unit of classification. From Erikson's 
perspective, the nuclear family is the basic element of the class structure of modern 
industrial societies, because of the dependence of family members upon each other and 
largely-shared conditions within the family. He suggests the use of work position for the 
work-related concept and the term class position for the market-related concept. Thus, 
work position is uniquely related to the individual. As occupations are the positions 
within the system of production, the different work positions identified should be 
formed by grouping together occupations with similar work situations (Erikson, 1984). 
The division into social classes basically results from the organisation of production 
in societies. A class assignment to a family should, then, be based as directly as possible 
on the positions of the family members in the system of production (i.e. on their 
occupations). This precludes the use of other bases for classification, especially the use 
of income and education. These latter variables are certainly important in the study of 
the stratification of societies, but they are so in their own right, not as direct indicators 
of class positions. By keeping them out of the index construction, we also make it 
possible to study the intercorrelations between class, income and education (Erikson, 
1984). It would allow, through a longitudinal survey, monitoring of the income 
evolution of a certain class, for instance. Clearly, Erikson adheres to the idea that the 
class position of a family should not be based on an independent coding, but rather be 
made a function of the individual members' occupations or, preferably, work positions. 
3.5.3 The choice of the degree 
The third choice in the operationalisation of class relates to the degree of coverage. 
In actual fact it pretends to sort out whether those who are "economically inactive" 
should be included or not. This involves the complicated question of the various 
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sociological meanings that can be attached to the notion of economic activity/inactivity. 
Typically, economic activity is divided into full- and part-time work, with variable 
boundary lines depending on the purpose of the research. Similarly, economic inactivity 
can range from the permanently inactive (i.e. retired, disabled) to the temporarily 
inactivity (i.e. students, housewives, unemployed). Interestingly, the practise of 
excluding unpaid housework dates from the 1881 Census in Britain (Hakim, 1980). 
A practical justification for opting for the economically active only rests on 
convenience and comparability: It obviates the necessity to decide what to do with the 
various inactive categories and there is a preponderance of previous research based on 
this option. A general criticism of all studies that exclude the economically inactive, 
irrespective of whether they use an occupational (Marshall et al., 1988) or non-
occupational scheme (Wright, 1985), is that this option invariably produces a restricted 
and therefore distorted view of the class structure. 
Erikson (1984) and Edgell and Duke (1991) are of the idea that all the 
active/inactive should be taken into account. Furthermore, they think that the potential 
political significance of such economically inactive groups should not be ruled a priori. 
They could be introduced into the analysis by their previous class location or they can 
be located using the same classification as the closest member of the household/family. 
However, for those who have never worked, it could be argued that "locations in class 
structure is entirely constituted by mediated relations" (Wright, 1989a: 41 ). 
3.5.4 Interrelations between the three choices 
Once the three choices are known, it is necessary to say that all of them are closely 
related to each other. 
It is important to recognise the interrelations and implications of the operational 
choices reviewed. The various procedures have different consequences for the shape 
and, hence, character of the class structure. For instance, economically-active 
respondent procedures provide a much narrower picture of what constitutes the class 
structure than do measurements of households as it leaves many people out of the social 
structure (housewives, etc.). In sum, different ways of operationalising class produce 
different pictures of the class structure and much depends upon the sociological 
questions that are being addressed. Thus, if the focus is on the production, the 
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economically-active respondent might be the more adequate unit of classification, 
whereas household appears to be a more appropriate unit of measurement when 
consumption is the research object. 
Sectoral theory, as previously said, refers to social divisions between those who are 
dependent on the public sector for their employment and/or for certain services and 
those who produce and/or consume in the private sector. Changes in the structure of 
production and consumption, especially since 1945, were considered to be of political 
significance (see Dunleavy, 1979; 1980a; Saunders, 1981; O'Connor, 1973 and Castell, 
1977). For instance, the conservative policy in Britain has favoured the private sector at 
the expense of the public one since 1979. This is thought to have heightened the 
political importance of political cleavage (see Edgell and Duke, 1983; 1991; Duke and 
Edgell, 1984; Dunleavy, 1989; Hamnett, 1989). 
There are two aspects of sectoral location. First, production sectoral location refers 
to whether the respondent works in the public sector or the private sector. Second, 
consumption sectoral location refers to whether the household consumption of services 
is totally/mostly private or totally/mostly public. 
On the relationship between class and consumption sector, this study sides with 
Dunleavy and Husbands' (1985) idea rather than Cawson and Saunders' (1983), in 
arguing that consumption sectoral locations are partially determined by household class 
position. 
In this regard, Dunleavy argued that "state intervention to provide collectively 
consumed services . . . radically changes the level of politicisation and the nature of 
consumption cleavages" (Dunleavy, 1979: 419). The consequent polarisation between 
the two models of consumption arguably constitutes an important basis for the growth 
of social and political cleavages, for instance between the users of public and private 
transport. Different consumption locations lead to conflicting interests with regard to 
government spending. In other words, the cuts in state spending on public provision 
represent an attack on those individuals/households who are dependent on collective 
consumption. In this sense the public spending cuts contribute to a potential for social 
and political polarisation (on this see Edgell & Duke, 1982; 1991). 
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3.6 Middle class 
The main aim of this study, as explained in the first two Chapters, is to monitor the 
consolidation of democracy in South Africa through an approach to the existing 
inequality in South Africa from a different angle: The size and the composition of the 
middle class. As previously shown, the size of the middle class is a reflection of the 
existing inequality, which affects democracy negatively. In other words, inequality 
decrease (increase of middle class) leads to the increase of the stability of democracy. 
Due to this, this study will not operationalise the whole social structure, but only the 
middle class. 
3.6.1 Middle class and occupation 
There is no major dispute on what occupations should compose the middle class. 
There is a basic line of division between so-called "White collar worker" and self-
employed (petit bourgeoisie). The former increased largely during the sixties. The 
second is a remnant ("relic") of the bourgeoisie that led the liberal revolutions of the 
19th century (see on this Marshall et al., 1988; Marshall, 1963; Glassman et al., 1993). 
There are numerous studies on its compositions although all of them are more or 
less similar. 
Cole (1955: 94-95), for instance, puts forward a very tentative, although ambiguous, 
classification of groups: "[T]he main body of heads of private business ... except the 
greatest concerned with manufacture or other commercial or financial occupations. The 
main body of salaried administrators, managers, technicians, and accountants including 
business publicity or co-operatively owned; and the higher salaried officers.... The 
members of the principal recognised professions whether salaried or working as 
consultants and remunerated by professional fees; including medical men, lawyers, 
ministers of religion, officers of the armed services, the upper range of the teaching 
profession, and the upper and the middle ranges of the industrial professions. The 
higher and middle grades of the Civil Service, the Local Government service, and of 
other public or semi-public administrative services; and the corresponding grades of 
"voluntary" social service employees. The big and middle shopkeepers; and the 
analogous groups of employed managers, accountants, and other officers employed by 
joint stock companies operating in these fields. The large and middle farmers and with 
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them the relatively small numbers of managerial salaried workers employed on big 
farms. The main body of clerks, typists, persons belonging to the lower supervisory 
grades in industry, transport, and other types of business, but falling below the 
managerial grades". 
Raynor (1969: 27-30, italics added), after analysing the middle class all over the 
world, establishes the composition of the middle class as follows: "The professional 
group (architects, lawyers, engineers, clergy, scientists, draughtsmen, librarians, 
teachers, nurses, musicians, doctors, accountants); the business group (restaurant 
owners, retail traders - as employers and proprietors -, and managers and 
administrators in manufacture, trade, transport, finance, etc., bankers, civil service 
administration grade) and the 'white collar group ' (clerks, insurance agents, typists)". 
Tezanos (1975), to give another example, does not deviate from this line. Actually, 
there is general acceptance on what occupations should be integrated in the middle 
class, namely professional, managers and clerks (new middle class) plus those self-
employed with similar income (old middle class). 
Wright (1989: 5; see also 1979b) includes the professionals, managers, teachers and 
clerks into the middle class, although this category is dissected into its components and 
relocated in other classes (see this Chapter, above )9• 
More recently, Glassman and his colleagues (Glassman et al., 1993) included the 
owners of small businesses (self-employed) and managers, professionals and White-
collar workers in the middle class. 
Goldthorpe referred to them as the non-manual workers including the petty 
bourgeoisie and White-collar workers (Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 38-39). Recently, 
Evans and Millans (1999) operationalised the social structure in Eastern Europe 
following the same functionalist approach as Goldthorpe and Erikson (1993). They 
referred to the middle class as service class (Evans & Mills, 1999: 32). 
9 For more Marxist operationalisations of middle class see Kivinen, (1989: 53-55). 
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In South Africa there have been some attempts to measure the social structure in 
general, and the middle class (mainly Black middle class), in particular. Both 
approaches, Marxist and Weberian, have been used. All of them use occupation as the 
indicator of class. However, in the end these studies come to be an analysis of the work 
force in South Africa. They are based mainly on analysis of the Manpower surveys 
conducted by the Ministry of Labour. Thus, the independent homelands were not 
included. The occupational composition also included professionals, managers and 
clerks (see Wolpe, 1977; Davies, 1979; Nolutshungu, 1983; Crakshaw, 1986; 1996). No 
study has been conducted more recently, to the author's knowledge. 
Since there is not any major dispute on this, and the occupations are clearly 
identifiable in most surveys (included those used in this study), this point is developed 
no further. Those managers, professionals, clerks and self-employed-propertied with the 
same income are computed into the middle class, as such following the functionalist 
approach (Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993; Evans & Mills, 1999). 
3.7 Data on occupation in South Africa 
South Africa, at the stage of writing this dissertation, somehow suffers from poverty 
of quantitative data with regard to both availability and comparability. When data is 
available, its comparability through the years is highly problematic. For instance, the 
population census conducted in 1991 did not include the so-called Independent 
Homelands, which makes it difficult to compare with the following census conducted in 
1996, which represented the whole country. This limitation is being reduced with the 
years, especially since 1994. The number of conducted surveys covering the whole 
country has increased since the first democratic elections. Another important factor is 
the establishment of data banks, like the South African Data Archive (SADA hereafter), 
established in 1993. Surveys are deposited here to allow other researchers to perform 
secondary analyses. 
After an extended search the following surveys were found to accomplish the 
necessary requirements of this study: 
• Population Census 1970. This census provided no income information for 
the Black population. In attempting to prove the same information for all 
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population groups, no information for old middle class is provided10. 
• Project on Social Movements in South Africa 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999 11 . 
These are part of more comprehensive surveys conducted annually by. the 
HSRC, the Omnibus survey 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999. The Social 
Movements section, used in this study, aims to monitor, as the name 
indicates, the evolution of the social movements; the relationship of the 
different population groups; its expectations with regard to the future, etc. It 
was provided by the University of Stellenbosch12 . Respondents were drawn 
from qualifying household members by means of multistage stratified 
cluster sample design. The data were collected in February of each year by 
means of structured interview schedule/questionnaire from MarkData. 
All these surveys are representative of the whole of South Africa, before and after 
the changing year of 1994. This research performs a secondary analysis on these 
primary data. This means that the data were not primarily created by the author. This 
could generate several problems of comparability as the questionnaires are not 
necessarily the same, or might not be representative of the whole country (in South 
Africa before 1994, most surveys did not include the so-called Independent 
Homelands). The questions utilised to operationalise the concepts used in this study, 
although not identical, are similar. All of them are representative of the whole country 
before and after 1994. This implies that neither the wording of the questions nor the 
representativity create any of the problems generally created in secondary analysis 13 . As 
a result the data used in this study allow controlling of any necessary aspect for the 
correct operationalisation of the involved variables (middle class and consolidated 
democracy). 
10 The old middle class is filtered economically to select only the middle incomers. As there is no income 
information this is not possible. This does not affect this study because the main focus of analysis will be 
done on the new middle class. This is amply explained in Chapter 5. 
11 As explained before 1996 and 1998 surveys are excluded due to problems with the biographical data 
(see Chapter 1, fn. 14). 
12 Prof. Rennie Kot:ll!, Political Science Department, University of Stellenbosch. 
13 On problems and virtues of secondary analysis see Hyman, (1972); Bulmer, (1982) or Kiecolt & 
Nathan, (1985). 
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3.8 Middle class operationalised: Methodology 
The reader may have been overwhelmed by a collection of different approaches, the 
bewildering list of available choices, different perspectives, etc. In this section all of 
them will be summarised for the reader and the model adopted in this research will be 
presented and motivated. 
In previous sections the reader was introduced to the main issues of social class 
operationalisation, the first being analytic validity. This means that the model used can 
do what it proposes to do, in order to overcome any limitations or shortcomings in this 
field. The researcher has to take, a priori, several decisions that will lead and delimit 
her/his research. The decisions taken in this study are now summarised. 
3.8.1 Selection of conceptual scheme 
This implies selecting a theoretical background for approaching the study of social 
science. The two main approaches are the psychologist or Marxist and the functionalist 
or Weberian, both of them mainly developed by Wright (1979b) and Goldthorpe 
(1987) 14 respectively. 
The Marxist approach was imbued with psychological aspects, such as class 
consciousness and antagonism between strongly-related-to-each-other classes. This 
implies that, in following this approach, any attempt to operationalise the middle class 
will be embedded in political propaganda, and will have to operationalise all the 
existing social classes (Crompton, 1993: 49-52; Gubbay, 1997: 75). 
On the other hand, Weberian approaches are free of psychological influence and 
ideological infection and classes are not, or only weakly related, to each other (see also 
Crompton, 1993: 50). This allows operationalising only one class: The middle class. To 
this, it is necessary to add that contemporary Marxists are still struggling with the notion 
of middle class (Wright, 1989: 5; So, 1991: 40, see also Kivinin, 1989). 
14 Although there are more and more recent references to both Wright and Goldthorpe, those quoted here 
are the benchmarks of their respective approaches. 
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3.8.2 Unidimensional or multidimensional operationalisation 
Another important concerned issue in researching stratification is the number of 
variables to take into account. Should middle class be operationalised uni- or multi-
dimensionally? This gives rise to the following question: Is occupation comprehensive 
enough to properly delimit "middle class" or should other characteristics such as income 
or education be taken into consideration? According to previous analysis, the answer is 
yes. The validity of this method based on employment has been amply analysed and 
confirmed by both Marxists and Weberians (see Carlsson, 1958; Foessa, 1994; 
Goldthorpe, 1987; Wright, 1980; Edgell & Duke, 1991; Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993; 
Evans & Millan, 1999, among others). 
Generally speaking, the fact that it is possible to affirm that middle classes are 
generally characterised by certain occupations, income and education does not imply 
that the income and education has be taken into account at operationalisation stage. 
Those features are empirical observations produced, secondarily, by the occupation 
issue. The income is derived from the occupation and the level of education is also a 
consequence - not to say a requirement - of the occupation15 . Furthermore, a careful 
observation of middle class individuals will also provide more information about them, 
such as dwelling, or even - going to an extreme - the fact that they have a microwave 
oven, and nobody would operationalise the middle class anywhere according to the 
existence or not of a microwave, type of dwelling, or possession of a certain kind or 
vehicle, although all these issues characterise the middle class. Actually, this will allow 
the research to test the evolution in time of those other characteristics. For example, it 
will allow examining the evolution of the income or level of education of the middle 
class through the years. 
Besides rarely used and strange operationalisations such as Germani's (1961) which 
was based on occupation and dwelling, there is no important method, to the author's 
knowledge, of operationalisation that is not based on occupation only. 
Subsequently, middle class, in this investigation, will be operationalised in terms of 
occupation, as successfully done in several studies (for comparison, see Juarez & 
Reyes-Ayala, 1994: 254-257, Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 45). Besides, and to 
15 No person without a post-graduate degree can become a professor, for instance. 
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strengthen this theoretical observation, the important correlation existing between these 
variables (Income and Occupation and between Education and Occupation) is now 
shown. 
The following is an empirical explanation of the relationship between Occupation 
and Income/Education, using the data from 1983 16 and 1999. The figures are 
chronologically presented- 1983 and 1999. The 1983 survey is composed of four files 
- one per population group - which makes the exposition of four figures necessary -
one per population group. In order to present the same information for each year, 1999 
data is also presented in the same way (one figure per population group). Each scatter-
diagram represents the relationship between Education & Occupation and Income & 
Education. The line that crosses each diagram is a graphic representation of a linear 
regression17 . The density of each point (number of "petals") represents the number of 
cases represented by each point (the more dense, the more cases represented by that 
point). 
Occupation has been indexed progressively according to the skilled/non-skilled 
cleavage on which this study is based. Zero represents the less skilled professions 
(unskilled) and the highest value (it varies from survey to survey) represents those 
occupations that are highly skilled (doctors, engineers, etc.). It is important to note, that 
to show the correlation between employment and education and income, those 
considered not economically active, such as housewives, students or the unemployed 
obviously do not appear, as those are not occupations. 
The income has also been indexed progressively from zero to the maximum (which 
also varies from survey to survey). 
Education has also been presented progressively. Zero once agam indicates no 
institutional education, and the maximum represents the highest grades of education 
possibly obtained (doctors, masters, etc.). 
16 See Chapter 4, section 4.3, for description of 1983 data set. 
17 This statistical procedure draws a line that best represent the relation between the variables. It shows 
how one variable evolves as the other does. For more details on this procedure see Noriisis (1994: 223-
278; 1997: 391-397). 
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The relationship is plotted by means of a scatter-diagram, which shows the 
dispersion and tendency of the relationship. The line that crosses each diagram 
represents a linear regression18 . Alongside each two graphics is a table that shows the 
correlation between the variables. Zero is the minimum and one, the maximum. 
18 Ibid. 
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1983 Data 
Figure 3.1 & 3.2 Black population, 1983 
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Figures 3.3 & 3.4 White population, 1983 
Correlation 
Occupation/Education 0.35 
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--~-----------------------, 
Figure 3.5 & 3.6 Coloured people, 1983 
Correlation 
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Figure 3.7 & 3.8 Indian population, 1983 
Correlation 
Occupation I Education 0.47 
Occupation I Income 0.36 
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1999 Data 
Figure 3.9 & 3.10 Total population, 1999 
Correlation 
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Figure 3.11 & 3.12 Black population, 1999 
Correlation 
Occupation I Education 0.51 
Occupation I Income 0.50 
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Figure 3.13 & 3.14 White population, 1999 
Correlation 
Occupation I Education 0.31 
Occupation I Income 0.19 
6 
5 • • • • • 
---
4 • 
3 • • • .. • 
2 
c 
0 1 :;:::; 
co 
u 
::J 
"0 
w 0 
0 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Occupation 
14 
12 .. • 
• • • • • 
10 • • • • 
• • .. • • -8 
• " • • • 
6 • • • • • 
.. • .. 4 
• • <l.l E • • 8 ~ 2 
0 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Occupation 
124 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 3.15 & 3.16 Coloured ~o~ulation2 1999 
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Figure 3.17 & 3.18 Indian population, 1999 
Correlation 
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These diagrams, in brief, imply that if you want to get a "good" job, you must be 
educated. It can also be said that a high skilled job implies high remuneration. The 
1999 figure for the Indian population seems to be erroneous. It is difficult to explain 
the negative correlation. This will be confirmed in the analysis of the middle class 
(there also are inexplicable figures for the Indian middle class- there quite obviously 
was a mistake when the 1999 data was coded by the HSRC ). 
The data presented also give information about the effects of the exclusion of the 
different population groups - from the citizenry during the former regime - with 
regard to income and occupation. For instance, in 1983 the correlation between 
income and occupation was only 0.10 for the Black population, and the income 
remained very low regardless of the occupation (Figure 3 .2). However, the correlation 
between occupation and income for the White population was 0.10, but the income 
remained high for any occupation (Figure 3.4). Of the four population groups, Blacks 
and Whites have the lowest correlation between income and occupation. This reflects 
the protection of the White population. Their income was high, regardless of the 
position they held. On the other hand, Blacks received a very low income regardless 
of their job. In this regard, the correlation between income and occupation for 
Coloureds and Indians were similar to the figures of the democratic period. 
In 1999 these figures changed drastically and the correlation between income and 
occupation now is 0.58 and between occupation and education it is 0.57 (total 
population). This implies that whoever wants to get a highly skilled job needs to 
obtain high levels of education and that highly skilled jobs imply higher incomes 
under democracy. However, the figures per population group indicate that the White 
population still remains somehow protected and that income remains high at all levels 
of education or occupation. Actually, both correlations retain the same value 
(occupation-income correlation was 0.10 in 1983 -high income at all levels - and 
0.19 in 1999- high income at all levels -; occupation-education correlation was 0.35 
in 1983 and 0.31 in 1999). This may indicate that the economic sector is still 
controlled by the White population. Still, White correlations are the lowest of all 
population groups. In this regard, the Black population correlations change 
significantly. The correlation for 1999 is 0.51 for education-occupation and 0.50 for 
income-occupation, coming close to the mean, which is 0.57 for education-occupation 
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and 0.58 for income-occupation. This confirms what was said above, that in the 
former regime, those politically excluded had difficulty in improving their standard of 
living, regardless of their education or skills. 
As these figures confirm, operationalising the middle class exclusively in terms 
of occupation allows later crosstabulations with different variables (such as income or 
education) to monitor the evolution of the middle class in these sectors. Consequently, 
the above explanation strengthens the argument that the middle class should be 
operationalised in terms of occupation. 
3.8.3 The degree of coverage 
The degree of coverage is based on the difference between the whole population 
and those who are "economically active". There is no single reason why those not 
economically active (the unemployed, housewives, students) should be removed from 
the statistics. Hence, this study includes all the whole population in its analysis. 
3.8.4 The unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis refers to the person or institution (individual or family) on 
which the analysis is performed (see this Chapter, above). The selection of the unit of 
analysis offers the social scientist the possibility of basing her/his research on the 
respondent or the household. The approach followed here is based on occupation, 
which means it is focused on the work location. This implies that the point of view of 
this study is the "production" and not the "consumption". Consequently, the unit of 
analysis in this study is the respondent (individual) and not the household. The 
household is the unit of consumption, whereas the individual is the unit of production 
(Marshall eta!., 1988: 85). This also facilitates the operationalisation, as the index 
does not have to be combined, which would result in a very large and complex model 
that would be difficult- not to say impossible - to analyse. 
3.9 The Middle Class in South Africa: 1970, 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999 19 
With all the necessary explanations given, the following step is the location and 
19 1996 and 1998 data are not analysed, as previously said (see Chapter 1, fn.14). 
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measurement of the middle class in South Africa. 
In this section, the middle class in South Africa is finally operationalised and its 
evolution through the years is surveyed. As there are two different middle classes 
(new and old middle class), there are two operationalisation processes, one for the 
new middle class and one for the old middle class. 
As previously said, new middle class refers to professionals, managers and clerks. 
Thus, the occupation variable is examined through the surveys and re-coded as 
follows: Those whose occupations fall into "professional", "manager" or "clerks" are 
automatically re-coded into "new middle class" -White collar workers. 
On the other hand, those whose occupations fall into "self-employed-propertied" 
are re-coded into "old middle class". But this later category - old middle class - is 
filtered by an economic filter (income) to avoid a bias in the results. This is so to 
include only those who have a similar standard of living, leaving apart those who fall 
within the same category of self-employed but into a different - higher or lower -
social class. Before proceeding with the operationalisation, the economic filter will be 
explained. 
3.9.1 The economic filter 
It has already been made clear that it is necessary to reduce the "contribution" 
from the "self-employed" category to the middle class to those with a certain income 
- similar to the income of the "new middle class". But, what filter would be 
appropriate? 
There are several ways to express the degree of income inequality in a society. 
The simplest way is to arrange whatever units are chosen (persons, families, or 
households) in order of rank, from poorest to richest, divide the hierarchy into fifths 
(quintiles) and compute the average income quintile. Then the shares or averages of 
rich and poor can be compared. 
Economists have devised several ways of making such comparisons with the use 
of a single index number. The most popular of these is the Gini index (or coefficient 
or ratio or number). While it simplifies comparisons, however, the Gini is not easy to 
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explain. Here's an attempt to do so with an example: 
Figure 3.19 Representation of Gini index, Lorenz curve and perfect egalitarian society (USA 
1968-1992) <U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993) 
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The graph plots the distribution of income in the United States in 1968 (a very 
egalitarian year) and 1992 (very un-egalitarian). The 45-degree line shows the income 
distribution in a perfect egalitarian society, where each 20 percent has 20 percent of 
income. The Gini index measures the gap between the actual line and the 45° line 
(called Lorenz curve). In the egalitarian society, the Gini would be 0.0, since both 
lines would match each other perfectly. Then, the higher the Gini, the greater the 
distance, and the more unequal the distribution of income. In a perfectly unequal 
society, in which one person (or household or family) had all the income, the Lorenz 
curve would look like a backward "L," and its value would be 1.0. In practice, the 
Gini usually falls between 0.20 and 0.45. For instance, in the annual report of the 
World Bank (1999 20 : 72), South Africa had a Gini index of 0.59, behirid only Brazil 
(0.61) and at the same level as Guatemala (0.59). In Europe, for instance, Denmark 
scored 0.24, Sweden, 0.25, and in North America the United States had a 0.41 Gini 
index. 
20 Data from 1993-1994. 
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As the graph shows and as many scholars pointed out, most of the difference is 
located "in the middle of the income distribution" (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615), 
between the second and fourth quintiles - middle classes income. According to 
Rubinson & Quilan (1977: 615, italics added), the lowest amount of inequality "is 
associated with large and economically powerful middle class groups. Thus, when we 
compare countries with regard to inequality, we are basically comparing their class 
structures and, particularly, the degree to which they are dominated by a middle class. 
It is interpreting inequality as an indicator of class structure that leads to the 
hypothesis that social inequality affects democracy [negatively]" (see also Paukert, 
1973 or Muller, 1995a). As a result, the economic filter will be applied as follows: 
The income is divided into five quintiles and both the highest and lowest 
quintiles, are removed. Hence, the economic filter will have its limits in the second 
and fourth quintile - representative of middle class income. However, this is not as 
easy as it seems to be. South Africa's previous regime, with its policy of apartheid, 
favoured the White population economically, politically and socially at the expense of 
the others, namely Black, Coloured and Indian (see, for instance DBSA, 1998: 8 and 
the discussion in Chapter 5). This is clearly evidenced in their different means of 
income: 
Table 3 1 Means of income in South Africa (HSRC '94 '95 '97 '99) .. 
' ' ' 
Population Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of 
Group income 1983 income 1994 income 1995 income 1997 income 1999 
(R/year) (Riyear) (R/year) (Riyear) (Riyear) 
Black 1000 7200-9588 5040-7630 5040-6948 9960-14988 
White 10000-15000 42000-47988 49920-69948 49920-69948 69960-99948 
Coloured 4000-7000 12000-14388 9960-14988 9960-14988 15000-19908 
Indian 1000-4000 21600-23988 13920-14988 19920-29988 30000-49908 
The large differences between White income and the others substantiate this 
argument. The White population, in terms of income, was and still is far ahead of the 
other population groups. The middle class is a social strata that, consequently, crosses 
the whole social spectrum and is composed (or at least it should be composed) of 
individuals from every population group. With these differences, however, it is 
expected to be composed mainly of the White population. 
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For those who formerly were excluded from the political system to accept and 
support the new democratic regime, these differences should be progressively 
reduced. Consequently the "income-mark" to "beat" is the "White mark". Hence, the 
economic filter will be limited by the second and fourth quintiles of the White 
population. This will be helpful to the pursuit of the main aim of this research: to 
measure the decrease/increase of the inequality within the South African society. In 
other words, to measure whether those formerly excluded are reaching the levels of 
the formerly favoured. The income quintiles of the White population is represented in 
Table 3.2. 
Table 3. 2 Economic filter to delimit the old middle class from the self-employed category (HSRC 
'94 '95 '97 '99) 
• • • 
2nd -4th quintiles 2nd -4th quintiles 2nd -4th quintiles 2nd -4th quintiles 
1994 (R/year) 1995 (R/year) 1997 (R/year) 1999 (R/year) 
White 42000-59988 30000-149988 49920-149988 69960-199908 
At this point it is finally possible to select those individuals that compose the old 
middle class. Those who fall into the self-employed category and have an income 
within the above limits are considered to be part of the so-called "old middle class" 
(petit bourgeoisie). That group will be added to the "new middle class" group, to 
finally configure the South African middle class in 197021 , 1994, 1995, 1997 and 
1999. 
3.9.2 Middle Class in South Africa: Its configuration 
The different population groups are not equally represented within the country. 
Due to this, the percentage of the middle class which corresponds to each population 
group, will yield little information. Actually, it may provide the reader with a 
confusing perception of the South African reality. Consequently, the percentage 
shown refers to the percentage of each population group falling within the 
corresponding category (old, new and total middle class, respectively) in South Africa 
in the respective year. As a result, the configuration of the South African society is as 
follows: 
21 Only "new" middle class. 
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Table 3 3 South African I!OI!ulation (0!.) (Census 1970 & HSRC '94 '95 97 '99) 0 
' ' ' 
Population Group 1970 1994 1995 1997 1999 
Black 70.2 71.6 70.0 70.6 70.4 
White 17.4 16.5 17.4 17.2 17.6 
Coloured 9.4 9.0 9.6 9.3 9.1 
Indian 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Once the economic filter has been selected the next step is the operationalisation 
of the middle class in South Africa. The structure of the occupation variable in each 
survey is exactly as follows: 
In 1970 the government conducted a population census. Regarding occupation, 
the question was: 
"Present personal occupation (kind of work done)" (1970: Question H.) 
The response categories were as follows: 
(i) Professionals and related workers 
(ii) Administrative and managerial workers 
(iii) Clerical and related workers 
(iv) Sales workers 
( v) Service workers (catering, accommodations) 
(vi) Farm, forestry, fishing, hunting and related worker 
(vii) Production and transport worker, labourer (including mining, quarrying) 
(viii) Unemployed 
(ix) Workers employed but not previously classified 
(x) a) Housewife 
b) Students 
c) Others not economically active and not classified 
The categories selected as "new middle class" are (i), (ii) and (iii). The 1970 
census did not provide any income-related question for the Black population. Thus, it 
is not possible to know the magnitude ofthe "old middle class". 
In 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999 the HSRC conducted its February Omnibus survey 
and prompted the respondent to give information about their employment situation. 
Concretely, the question was (the same for everyone): 
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"What is your current occupation?" (1994: Q. 7; 1995, 1997 & 1999: Q. Sa) 
The possible responses were: 
(i) Professional, semi-professional and technical occupations 
(ii) Executive and administrative occupations 
(iii) a) Clerical occupations 
b) Sales occupations 
(iv) Transport, delivery and communication occupations 
( v) Service occupation (protection, catering, etc.) 
(vi) Farmer, fishing, hunter and farm workers 
(vii) Artisans and apprentices 
(viii) Miners, quarrymen, production foremen and supervisors, operators, production 
workers and related occupations (also includes any unskilled worker not 
elsewhere classified) 
(ix) a) Housewives 
b) Unemployed- Fit for work 
c) Unemployed- Not fit for work 
d) Retired 
e) Students 
The categories selected for the NEW middle class are ~) Professional, senn-
professional and technical occupations (ii) Executive and administrative occupations 
(iii) a) Clerical occupations. 
The category selected for the OLD middle class is (iii) b) Sales occupations 
(filtered economically and work status (self-employed)). In this way, only the self-
employed and propertied (generally an owner of a small shop) with middle income 
are selected. The percentages are calculated and presented in the following tables. In 
order to gain clarity in the presentation, the three tables are presented in the same 
page. 
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Table 3 4 Old middle class (%) 
Population Group 1970 1994 1995 1997 1999 
Black Not av. 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 
White Not av. 5.1 2.8 2.4 1:2 
Coloured Not av. 1.9 0.5 0.4 0 
Indian Not av. 4.6 3.0 1.5 0 
Total Not av. 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group - and of the whole (total) population -
falling within the OLD middle class in each year. The 1970 Census did not provide income 
information of certain population groups. Ns are offered below. 
Ns 12747280 2250 2226 2220 2210 
Table 3 5 New middle class (%) 
Population Group 1970 1994 1995 1997 1999 
Black 1.2 3.0 3.0 3.9 5.8 
White 18.5 23.3 27.1 25.9 33.3 
Coloured 3.0 9.i 8.2 5.5 11.0 
Indian 6.1 18.3 1 17.61 13.1 19.3 
Total 2.7 7.4' 7.7 1 8.1 10.4 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group - and of the whole (total) population -
falling within the NEW middle class in each year. Ns are offered below. 1Updated from OHS22 
1994, 1995. 
Ns 12747280 2250 2226 2220 2210 
Table 3 6 Total Middle class (%) 
Population Group 1970 1994 1995 1997 1999 
NewM.C. Total Total Total Total 
Black 1.2 3.3 3.3 4.1 5.8 
White 18.5 28.6 29.9 28.3 34.5 
Coloured 3.0 11.1' 8.7 5.9 11.0 
Indian 6.1 21.5' 20.61 14.6 19.3 
Total 2.7 8.7 1 8.5 1 8.7 10.6 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group - and of the whole (total) population -
falling within the TOTAL middle class in each year. For 1970 only information about new middle 
class is provided as no income information was available for certain population groups. Ns are 
offered below. 1Updated from OHS 1994, 1995. 
Ns 12747280 2250 2226 2220 2210 
22 The October Household Surveys (OHS hereafter) are conducted by Statistics SA annually. Its 
reliability is very high due to the large sample. When possible, the data presented here has been 
verified on these surveys to increase the reliability of the results. For details on OHS see Orkin, (1998). 
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Although these results will be amply analysed in the following Chapter, it is 
important to make some comments. The main one is obviously that the middle class 
has increased since 1970 (at least the new middle class), but after 1994 the level stays 
at approximately 8 %. From 1997 to 1999 it seems to have grown. Further research 
will confirm or refute this tendency of the last two years. 
In general, the old middle class decreases. This is a normal process of the old 
middle class in advanced societies (see Glassman, 1997). The new middle class 
experiences an increase in the democratic period. However, as will be shown later, 
this is mainly due to the arrival of the Black population to the public sector and the 
protection that the White population still enjoys (low correlation between occupation 
and income and high income average). 
3.10 Summary 
In this Chapter the middle class in South Africa was operationalised according to 
the definition given in the previous Chapter. Different approaches were offered, 
mainly ranking from those who follow a psychological approach (Marxist, and Nco-
Marxist, mainly led by Wright) and those who follow a functionalist approach, 
derived from Weber, mainly led by Goldthorpe. Three main reasons are presented to 
discard the psychological approach: The first is that psychological factors are difficult 
to measure and recheck; the second is that this theory emphasises the conflict in the 
society (on which this study is not focused) and class awareness (this study considers 
the middle class as a reflection of the income inequality and does not focus on the 
political role the middle class may play); and the third - derived from the former - is 
that neither Marxist nor Neo-Marxist can prove that they measure what they intend to 
measure, namely class awareness and social conflict. They are based on occupation 
(as functionalist), highlighting the division owner-control vs. non owner-no control. 
But that division does not itself imply or explain any kind of conflict or class 
awareness. This leaves no room for any other alternative but functionalism, which is 
easy to measure and recheck and measures what it intends to measure. 
In the latter part of the Chapter, the data sets used were explained and the exact 
questions were given in detail as the method of operationalisation. Especial emphasis 
was placed on the "self-employed" category in order to include only those who are 
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regarded as members of the middle class. 
Finally, the results were calculated and plotted. These were difficult to interpret. 
In other words, the middle class seems to retain the same level, although it has .started 
to increase in the last two year-period. However, the new middle class seems to have 
grown in the democratic period. This could be promising for the future stabilisation of 
South African democracy. Later analysis (Chapter 5) will reveal that this increase is 
mainly produced by the arrival of the Black population to the public sector, 
"affirmative action" and the "protection" ofWhites within the economic sector. 
The next step to be taken is to operationalise and monitor the evolution of the 
consolidation of the democracy. 
137 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 4. Democratic consolidation operationalised 
4.1 Introduction 
In previous Chapters, the process of democratisation and the dangers that can lead 
to its breakdown were explained. The definition of the main concepts used in this 
study and the clarification of all aspects which may lead to misunderstanding were the 
main topics of Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the operationalisation and measurement of the 
middle class in South Africa were presented. The current Chapter focused on the 
analysis of the consolidation of democracy. 
The student of democracy, when testing or monitoring its consolidation, has to 
face the same unpleasant problems as when studying the social structure and, 
particularly, the concept of class. Ambiguity, different meanings- none of which are 
universally accepted -, and unclear definitions will be the starting point for the 
operationalisation of the concept of "consolidated democracy". If the defmition is not 
clear, its operationalisation will be more difficult. 
A wide scope of approaches to select from is always available, from those that 
focus on structural factors, such as economic development, to those that focus on 
cultural/values issues - the commitment to democracy at both/either elites and/or 
mass level -, passing through those that are based on institutional features, such as the 
party system, electoral law, the relation of the legislature to the executive or, going to 
an extreme, those that, ingenuously, attach the label of consolidated democracy to any 
system where at least two parties alternate in office. 
Most of these approaches have already been criticised. A certain party system, or 
a particular electoral system may help democracy to consolidate by, for instance, 
excluding - through the establishment of a minimum percentage of votes required, 
etc. - those parties, generally small, opposed to democracy from the political realm. 
But that does not imply that the consolidation of the democracy relies on any type of 
electoral law, or on any form of legislature. These political factors may accelerate or 
slow down the process, may create a favourable context for democracy to consolidate, 
but nothing else. 
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Consolidation itself rests on the belief that the democratic rule is the best - or the 
worst with the exception of any other form of government (Churchill's hypothesis 
(1947) tried before. Concretely, it relies on their attitudinal commitment to the 
democratic rule - for "better or worse" (Bratton and Mattes, 1999: 3). It could be 
argued that the commitment at the elite level is also of extreme importance. This is 
partially true. It is obviously true that any democracy needs committed-to-democracy 
elites, who, in the end and day-by-day, rule the country, but those elites might be 
tempted to revert the system into any authoritarian form if it does not accommodate 
them. This reversion of the system would have little chance of success if most of the 
citizens accept and vigorously defend democracy even in the face of critical situations 
such as serious economic setbacks. In this regard, Venezuela may well serve as a 
perfect example. General Hugo Vazquez tried to gain office by force, twice in the 
early 1990s, but he only received the strong opposition of the Venezuelan people who 
went to the streets to oppose the coup attempts. However, in 1999, the same person 
competed in general elections and won overwhelmingly over all the historical and 
conventional political parties, with his Polo Democratico (El Pais, 07-7-99; Mccoy, 
1999: 64-65). This example proved well enough that, when citizens show strong 
support for democracy and consider it "the only game in town", even when situations 
are most critical, with high rates on unemployment and corruption, economic 
recession, etc., elites will not have any chance to gain office other than by winning 
contested elections. 
As a result it is possible to conclude that democracy can only be considered as 
consolidated when it is regarded as the best and only one form of rule - at the level of 
the masses. This converts the democratic regime to a legitimate regime. Mainwaring 
( 1992: 306) stated it clearly when said that legitimacy "... is every bit as much the 
root of democratic stability .... " This line of thought is widely shared and supported 
(see Diamond, 1994a; 1996; 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996a; 1996b). 
In this regard and reconnecting with the so-called structural and institutional 
issues and their role in consolidation, it is possible to state that they can favour the 
process of legitimisation of a democracy. They can promote certain values in certain 
ways. For instance, regarding those structural factors, economic development may 
promote urbanisation and a better and more equal distribution of income, which may 
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produce an increase in education. This may also produce a better-educated population 
with higher levels of understanding and tolerance. In this way, the social structure is 
shaped in a pro-democratic form. 
This gives rise to the following proposition: If the commitment to democracy of a 
certain regime, at the level of the masses, is deviating from the pro-support trend, it is 
possible to conclude that democracy may be endangered, and provide a fertile soil for 
authoritarian ideas. This could be used speedily by antidemocratic leaders to put an 
end to the democratic form of government. 
Consequently, it is of great importance to monitor the commitment to democracy 
at mass level in South Africa. Testing whether the indicators of political culture -
most indicative of democratic consolidation - of South African citizens are 
developing in the direction given above will furnish the social scientist with a 
predictive analytical tool when surveying the South African democracy, in particular, 
or any democratic regime, in general. But, how? 
One of the best and most frequently used ways to follow the evolution of those 
indicators of democratic consolidation from political culture in South Africa is 
through the observation of its public opinion. 
The following surveys the evolution of some indicators of democratic 
consolidation in South Africa through the years - from 1983 to 1999. This is done 
through the examination of public opinion among the South African citizenry, 
especially during the last decade, during which the demise of apartheid gave rise to 
democracy. Although the final consolidation of democracy in South Africa, according 
to its political culture, may take a generation, there is no doubt that these years are 
decisive for the future stability and consolidation of the new political regime 
(Whitehead, 1989: 79). 
Due to obvious reasons of strategy and space, only those movements of opinion 
related to the main aspects concerned with democratic legitimacy are analysed. There 
would be little sense in having to monitor the evolution of public opinion regarding 
areas not related to democracy, for instance. This aspect will be explained later in the 
Chapter. 
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4.2 Public opinion: Its nature 
It is convenient to commence this section with an interpretative reference to the 
nature of public opinion. Before anything, it is necessary to take into account that 
public opinion is a collective phenomenon and not the sum of individual opinions. 
The citizen is perceived to be a political man according to Aristotle's meaning. Public 
opinion is a social and political phenomenon that lies somewhere between the social 
needs of people, political attitudes and their more visible public conduct - especially 
in voting- but not being any of these (see Foessa, 1994). 
Public opinion is the opinion of many on controversial questions that claim action 
from the political authority. In this sense, public opinion is synonymous to political 
opinion. Public opinion refers to those polemic matters for which, earlier or later, a 
solution will be demanded. 
Public opinion, though a political institution, is equivalent to neither the media 
messages nor the results of the value surveys. However, both of them - media 
messages and value surveys - are of public use and may reflect, help to know and 
conform to the public opinion. Thus, although public opinion is, in principle, 
something volatile and diverse, it is, in the end, susceptible to definition, measurement 
and control (Henessy, 1965: 19-80). That is the reason why, in this study, public 
opinion surveys are used to measure the citizens' support of the democratic 
institutions, - namely the political legitimacy of the democratic regime. 
Consequently, a quantitative longitudinal survey was used. It controlled the 
engagement with democratic institutions of the South African citizenship over the last 
16 years. 
Public opinion is not a collective phenomenon among many others only. It also 
"constitutes a basic institution within the democratic form of rule. It is of such 
importance than it can be argued that democracy is a regime of opinion .... When 
decisions are taken by force, the public opinion disappears" (L6pez-Pintor, 1994: 
578; see also Henessy, 1975: 21). 
Public opinion is particularly heterogeneous, ephemeral and elusive; it is "our 
social epidermis" (L6pez-Pintor, 1994: 579; see also Albig, 1956: 151-174; Henessy, 
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1975: 5-10). Due to this, it is necessary to refer to numbers and statistics as a 
quantitative representation of the phenomena on which this section is based. 
Nowadays, the evolution of social science research provides the social scientist with a 
bewildering and endless list of statistical procedures that, when used, may easily 
overwhelm the reader. In this regard, every possible effort has been made to reduce 
these to a minimum. However, every datum, graphic or statistical procedure used here 
is, in the author's opinion, unavoidable and strictly necessary. 
4.3 Public opinion in South Africa: The data 
This section uses the same surveys as for the operationalisation of the middle 
class, in Chapter 3, namely, HSRC '94 until '99. (See Chapter 3 for description.) 
However, as the operationalisation of a concept such as "consolidated democracy" 
deserves to have the attention focused on many characteristics, some other surveys 
have been added: 
• Inter-group Relations, Political Opinions and Recreational Activities Survey. 
This was conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC, hereafter) 
in August, 1983. This study was part of a comprehensive research project 
regarding inter-group relations in South Africa, attempting to asses the importance 
of aspects influencing inter-group relations among the four population groups. It 
provides information about the socio-political situation during the former non-
democratic regime. It is composed of four different files, one per population 
group. It was obtained through SADA 1 . The fieldwork was carried out in August, 
1983, on a random sampling representing all of the country. The method ofdata-
collection was through face to face interviews with a structured questionnaire. 
• ldasa Election Survey, 1994. This survey was conducted by the Institute for a 
Democratic Alternative in South Africa (ldasa, hereafter) in the aftermath of the 
first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994. It was on social, economical 
and political issues of South African citizenship. It has been provided, directly, by 
Idasa. 2 The fieldwork was carried out by Markinor between 26 August and 16 
1 Nieuwoudt, J. & Olivier, J. (1983) Intergroup relations, political opinions and recreational activities, 
Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council [producer]; Pretoria: SADA [distributor] 
2 Dr R. Mattes, Public Opinion Service , Idasa, Cape Town. 
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September 1994. Respondents in households were randomly selected. It was based 
on a semi-structured personal interview-questionnaire. 
• ldasa Election '99 Survey. This survey was conducted in September, 1998 by 
Idasa. It was also based on socio-political issues. Major interest was focused on 
the following (second) democratic election to be held the following year, 1999. It 
was supplied for this research, as the previous one, by ldasa 3. The fieldwork was 
carried out by Markinor in September, 1998. Respondents in households were 
randomly selected. It was based on questionnaires and interviews. The sample was 
drawn using a multi-stage, area-stratified probability sampling methodology. The 
sample was stratified by province, population group and community size. 
4.4 Political culture: Genealogy of a concept 4 
The peoples of different societies are characterised by enduring differences in 
basic attitudes, values and skills: In other words, they have different cultures. Through 
the years, economic, technological and socio-political changes have transformed the 
cultures in many ways, through issues that give rise to political conflict, people's 
religious beliefs, etc. Why do cultures change? Each culture represents a people's 
strategy for adaptation. Its changes respond, in the long run, to economic, 
technological and political changes; those that fail to do so are unlikely to flourish. In 
this sense, a culture is a set of beliefs and assumptions developed by a given group in 
its efforts to cope with the problems of external adaptation and internal integration 
(see Barnes, 1986, Schein, 1985; Inglehart, 1990). 
Consequently, culture entails a system of attitudes, values and knowledge that is 
widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation. While 
human nature is biologically innate and universal, culture is learned and may vary 
from one society to another. The more central and earlier acquired aspects of culture 
are resistant to change, both because it requires a massive effort ·to change central 
elements of an adult's cognitive organisation and because one's most central values 
become ends in themselves, the abandonment of which would produce deep 
3 Dr R. Mattes, Public Opinion Service , Idasa, Cape Town. 
4 Name borrowed from Gendzel, (1997). 
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uncertainty and anxiety (on the idea of culture in political culture theory, see, for 
instance, Eckstein, 1988: 801-803; see also Almond & Verba, 1963). 
If culture refers to certain attitudes, values and knowledge, then it is· to be 
understood that political culture will obviously refer to those attitudes, values and 
knowledge that are related to the political system. In this regard there is no doubt that 
"political culture is one of the popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is 
also one ofthe most controversial and confused" (Elkins & Simeon, 1979: 127)5• 
This section, which borrows its name from Gendzel (1997: 225), pretends to 
present the meaning of a concept which, due to its uncontrolled use and development 
seems, nowadays, to mean everything. As Welch put it (1993: 1) "due the 
overwhelming and vague use by journalists and the general public, it has ramified and 
expanded so much that, like the early anthropological idea of culture itself, it 
threatens to absorb everything in its vicinity". It has become such an elastic idea that 
everything, currently, may find a place within it (Gendzel, 1997: 226). Another 
important problem that has arisen and is probably derived from the above, is that "the 
categorisation of different types of political culture ... turns to be quite possible" 
(Welch, 1993: 1; see also Gibbins, 1989; Kavanagh, 1983; Patrick, 1984). To all of 
these it has to be added that "the lack of a clear definition of political culture threatens 
to obscure the idea to which it refers, rather than reveals it" (Baker, 1987: 59-65). 
Nowadays, there is a tendency within political science to "treat political culture 
like a familiar piece of furniture. Everybody is vaguely aware of its existence, but 
only rarely do they comment upon it. Generally, political culture appears as 
secondary, something which, while enriching our understanding of political life, is not 
deemed essential to our comprehension of it" (Street, 1994: 95; see also Barry, 1978). 
Besides these difficulties that are encountered, the idea of political culture is of 
great analytical utility, although it may need more discipline in using it. 
The concept of political culture evolved from centuries of generalising about the 
different faces of power in different places. Montesquieu's ( 1949) Spirit of laws, and 
5 For comparative and different approaches see Welch, (1993) or Gendzel, (1997) to quote simply a 
couple. 
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Rousseau's (1982) The social contract are all ancestors to the concept. For instance, 
Tocqueville (1969, Vol. II: 1) made political culture a core idea when he wrote that 
"in order that society should exist and, a fortiori, that society should prosper, it is 
necessary that the mind of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by 
certain predominant ideas; and this can not be the case unless each of them sometimes 
draws his opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of 
belief already formed". 
In this regard, American social scientists speculated about how this 
"psychological coherence" or a certain culture might affect politics earlier in this 
century. That was how the modem concept of political culture was born during the 
Cold War (Gendzel, 1997: 226-227). Likewise, Almond (1956), for instance, 
attempted to address the cultural differences between Britain and the United States 
and the totalitarian states. However, he went further and found that every political 
system was embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. He 
referred to this as the political culture. Gendzel (1997: 227) is ofthe opinion that, with 
that, "Almond offered a convenient catchphrase for such loosely conceptualised terms 
in comparative politics as attitudes, values, ideology and socialisation." He sided with 
Weber's theory of Protestantism as the culture engine of modernisation (see Weber, 
1961; 1964; 1968). This all suggests that political culture has explanatory usefulness 
for political science. If this is the case, it would be useful to know what the term 
means. 
In the most influential study on the topic, political culture is defined by Almond 
and Verba (1963: 13) as the "attitudes towards the political system and its various 
parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system". These attitudes "yield 
three orientations: i) cognitive, ii) affective and iii) evaluative. These attitudes refer, 
respectively, to individuals' knowledge of the system, their feelings towards it and 
their judgement of it" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 15). For Almond and Verba, political 
culture is to be regarded as a set of individual psychological states, which can be 
revealed through survey questionnaires. Political culture is seen as "a cross between a 
catalyst and a fertiliser, providing the conditions for change and sustaining the 
product of that change" (Street, 1994: 98). Consequently, "political culture may or 
may not be congruent with the structure of the political system" (Almond & Verba, 
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1963: 21 ). This gives rise to the idea that only a certain type of political culture - the 
civic culture - is appropriate to democracy. In other words, different cultures fit 
different regimes (Barry, 1978: 49-50). The civic culture "is a participant political 
culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent" (Almond & 
Verba, 1963: 31). But how does the civic culture achieve its functional or 
dysfunctional effect? The answer resides in the way the political culture links 
"micropolitics" and "macropolitics", and forges a bridge "between the behaviour of 
individuals and the behaviour of the system" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 32). These 
attitudes may not be purely political (and they are not as will be shown). In general, 
this pioneering research, studying the concepts of political culture, aimed to reveal 
"the relation between the attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who 
make up political systems and the character and performance of political systems" 
(Almond & Verba, 1963: 33). This civic culture - political culture committed to 
democracy- has been also labelled "civic republicanism" (Rice & Feldmanm, 1997: 
1144; see also Oldfield, 1990). 
In this regard the studies of political culture have been developed along two 
"different" branches: Behaviouralism vs interpretivism. The former has to do with the 
"development of a science of the political process" (Dahl, 1961: 767), " ... a major 
step forward in the nature of political science as science . .. toward a probabilistic 
theory of politics" (Almond, 1960: 4). A basis for distinguishing behaviouralism is 
perhaps that it combined the aspiration to make the study of politics scientific with a 
methodology that appeared to make the aspiration fullfillable: Quantitative and more 
precise survey methodology. The development of survey techniques facilitated what 
had previously been seen as a distant goal only, because it enabled truly comparable 
and cumulative research (Giddens, 1984: 333). Behaviouralism is to be seen "as a 
stage in the territorial expansion of political science as a discipline; that is the 
enlargement of its subject matter from constitutions to informal elite political 
behaviour, hence to voters' behaviour and, finally, to mass attitudes and behaviour 
beyond the realm of electoral participation" (Welch, 1993: 3 ). The concept of political 
culture was in the vanguard of the behavioural revolution. Although the term had been 
used previously (see Banard, 1969: 392; Brown, 1984: 1), Almond's characterisation 
of political culture as "the particular pattern of orientations to political action, in 
which every political system is embedded" (1956: 396) is generally regarded as "an 
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act of coinage" (Welch, 1993: 4). Actually, it played a key role in several subsequent 
studies which have assumed the status of classics of the behavioural tradition, such as 
Almond and Verba's classical study (1963; 1980) and Pye and Verba's _(1965). 
Political culture offers itself as an ideal token or catalyst for behaviouralism since it 
fulfils the tWo central aims to the approach: It can be defined so as to be measured 
quantitatively and it marks the ultimate expansion of the territory of political science 
into Anthropology. With this, the concept of political culture is "released" from the 
general concept of culture (Almond, 1956: 396). 
On the other hand, interpretavism is a reaction to behaviouralism itself. The 
intellectual sources of this approach are diverse but the main difference with 
behaviouralism resides in its methodological principles. The most significant 
influence on political cultural interpretivism is anthropologist Geertz (1975) and in 
particular his notion of "thick description", according to which behaviour is not 
usefully described "objectively" (see Clifford, 1975). In the end, the most important 
difference is the methodology to be used: Can the political culture be measured and 
analysed quantitatively or not? (Welch, 1993: 30-39; 64-74). Giddens (1984: 333) 
stated that, in the end, the difference is non-existent, as both methods will focus on the 
same thing and will get to the same conclusions. 
One of the first questions to which Almond and Verba's concept of political 
culture ( 1963; revised in 1980) was applied, was that of the relationship betWeen 
political culture and democracy, and this has indeed continued to be a major area of 
political culture research. Their study was the original entry and has remained a 
benchmark for much subsequent research. Two different projects are identified in that 
study, the first being a comparative explanation consisting of an attempt to explain the 
presence of stable democracy in some countries and its absence in others in terms of 
pre-existing political cultural conditions. It comprises comparative explanation with 
political culture as independent variable. The second is a sociological investigation of 
the social conditions under which democracy works. The motivation behind the study 
was the anxiety provoked by events in Europe in the first half of the twentieth 
century, concerning the future of democracy. The comparative study argues that civic 
culture is the type of political culture most conducive to stable democracy, and takes 
this argument to be verified by the fact which much of the study is intended to 
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demonstrate, that in the stable democracies of Britain and the United States political 
structures most closely approximate to this ideal, while they fall somewhat short of it 
in countries where there had been recent instability or a deficit of democracy. 
This pioneering research was widely criticised (see for instance, Welch, 1993: 30-
44), but, it has provided the model followed by subsequent research in the field (see 
Inglehart, 1990; Lagos, 1997 to mention but a couple). 
The last paragraphs serve as preface to the new section of the study, the relation 
between political culture and democracy. 
4.5 Political culture and democracy 
A defining characteristic of democratic regnnes is that they depend on the 
existence of widespread public support for survival (see Rose, 1996; Easton, 1965). 
The survival and effective functioning of democratising regimes depends on more 
than simply the aggregate level of public support. The trajectory of support over time; 
the distribution of support across significant societal subgroups; the rules and 
institutional mechanisms by which support is aggregated; and the number, nature and 
severity of the problems or stresses facing the regime are among numerous other 
important considerations (on this see, for instance, Przeworski, 1991 ; Rogowski, 
1974) 
The relationship of political culture to political regime is not new. It was used 
already by classic thinkers. For instance, Montesquieu (1969), Rousseau (1982) and 
Tocqueville (1969), share the idea that the diffusion of certain cultural standards 
throughout society is the basis for developing attitudes and behaviours that sustain 
political regimes. In this sense, the stability of any political regime would be highly 
conditioned by the presence of a political culture consistent with its own institutions. 
Monstesquieu (1949: 298-299) emphasised this link between political institutions 
and cultural norms through his tendency to subordinate the former to dominant 
cultural practices. Rousseau (1982: 49-50) also postulated a close relationship 
between the institutional regime and prevalent social norms when he said that "just as 
an architect observes and examines the ground before putting up a large building, to 
see if it will withstand the weight, a wise legislator does not begin by writing laws 
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that are inherently good but rather tries to judge whether the populace, at which these 
laws are aimed, will be able to tolerate them". He states that, once customs are 
established and prejudices rooted, "it is a dangerous and vain endeavour to. try to 
reform them; the populace can not even tolerate its evils being touched in order to get 
rid of them, just like those stupid and cowardly sick people who tremble at the mere 
sight of a doctor". 
Tocqueville (1969: 304), agreeing with Mostesquieu (1949) and Rousseau (1982), 
noted with reference to the relationship between institutions and political culture, that 
"the most fortunate situation combined with the best laws can not maintain a 
constitution notwithstanding customs, in that sense customs continue to back the most 
unfavourable positions and the worst laws". He also accentuates political culture's role 
in the stability of democratic order when stating that "it is precisely their custom that 
make Americans able to tolerate democratic rule". 
These classical authors have exercised a great influence on subsequent studies of 
empirical political theory, especially over the last thirty years. 
Besides the obvious importance of cultural approaches, rational choice models, 
based on economic variables have become the dominant mode of analysis, while 
cultural factors have been de-emphasised to an umealistic degree. This approach has 
made major contributions to our understanding of how politics works, but it 
underestimates the significance of cultural factors, if only because, while economic 
indicators are readily available for these models, cultural data generally are not. 
Rational choice models have fruitfully analysed the relationships between economics 
and politics, but left unexplored the linkages that culture has with both politics and 
economics. Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Kramer (1971) or Cameron (1978) are 
clear examples. 
The "threat" to political theory came from Marxism (until its demise as a political 
alternative) (Brown, 1979: 3-7) and from rational choice theories (Elster, 1989: 248-
249). In the 1980s, with the disenchantment of these approaches, political science 
witnessed a re-emergence of cultural theories, assisted by the development of the 
concept in other disciplines. This rediscovery, as Street noted (1994: 102), "was much 
more comprehensive than his predecessor, taking in a wider range of human 
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responses and a broader portrait of the political" (see also Robertson, 1985: 285; 
Rose, 1980: 116-117; Kavanagh, 1985: 46; Topf, 1989: 53-67; Girvins, 1989: 31-51)6. 
This line of thought unavoidably connects with the theory of nationalism. 
Nationalism implies the sharing of a particular political identity, which is represented 
and expressed culturally. This cultural identity then forms the basis of decisions to 
protest, fight, secede, or whatever (Beetham, 1991: 106 and Smith, 1991: 91-92; see 
also Malcolm, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Boyle, 1991). 
Nationalism is not the only aspect where the effect of political culture on politics 
is reflected. Religion, for instance, has "overweighed class as an influence on electoral 
behaviour" (Inglehart, 1990: 147). There is no question that economic factors are 
politically important but they are only part of the story. Inglehart (1988: 1204) argues 
that different "societies are characterised to very different degrees by specific 
syndromes of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively 
enduring, but not immutable, and can have major political consequences, one being 
that they are closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions. The examination 
of political culture is an essential supplement to the rational choice approach, and that 
the two sometimes focus on different aspects of the same phenomenon". 
Stable democracy is not a necessary consequence of economic development: It 
may encourage but does not guarantee the emergence of democratic institutions. If 
relationships between politics and economics are analysed in the long term, political 
culture is a crucial intervening variable. In large measure, cultural changes reflect the 
socialisation of enduring habits and attitudes. Once established, certain attitudes and 
customs may act as independent influences on politics and economics long after the 
events that gave rise to them. Thus, the long-term relation between economics and 
politics is complex. Rational choice and political culture explanations are not 
incompatible but complementary modes of explanation. 
In brief, the political culture literature argues that the evolution and persistence of 
6 Differing visions of political culture based, for instance in symbols, are offered by Thompson, (1990) 
and Merelman, (1991). 
7 On the effect of religion on vote, see Lijphart, (1979); on concrete religions such as Confucianism in 
East Asia or Catholicism in Latin America see Huntington, (1997) and Karl, (1991). 
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mass-based democracy reqmres the emergence of certain supportive habits and 
attitudes among the general public. 
In 1963, Almond and Verba's (1963) political culture research, The Civic Culture, 
represented a major step forward. Previous works that attempted to address the role of 
culture in politics relied on impressionistic evidence. Almond and Verba based their 
research on cross-national empirical data. As Street (1994: 96) stated it, "its focus on 
culture meshed with challenges to Marxist materialism and mechanical structural-
functionalism, while its empirical methodology clashed with an emerging doubt about 
positivism and individualism. Thirty years later, there are signs that culture is again 
becoming an important concern of political scientists. The collapse of Marxist 
regimes and the rise of nationalism have drawn attention to the way regimes 
legitimate themselves and the way citizens identify themselves, both processes which 
suggest an important mediating role for culture. Political culture is also implicated in 
the debate over the effect of mass communications on political behaviour" (see also 
Miller, 1991). 
However, the Civic Culture has not been free from critiques. It has been accused 
of not concentrating enough on how democracy should be properly defined, and how 
the values people share affect their political system. The definition of political culture 
which was used has also been criticised for being too wide (Lijphart, 1980: 37-56; 
41; Pateman, 1980: 64-68; see also Welch, 1993 for different suggestions). Other 
critics focused on the direction ofthe relationship. Concretely, some researchers argue 
that political culture is the result and not the cause of political regime (Pateman, 1980: 
84; Wiatr, 1980: 114; on this see also Barry, 1978; Muller & Seligson, 1994). 
Lijphart (1980: 49) contested this idea, stating that political culture is both cause and 
effect. This is supported by the idea that particular culture is not automatically 
embraced by those who encounter it. Much depends on the mediating institutions and 
their effectiveness in modelling a culture for which there were willing consumers 
(Thompson, 1990: 3-4; 216-219; 238; 265). 
Street, siding with Welch (1993) and others (see Almond and Verba, 1980), states 
Almond and Verba's (1963) view of political culture as inadequate. Other writers 
have, therefore, developed a fuller notion of political culture, which encompasses a 
wider range of spheres of social life and of states of mind, and which sees culture as a 
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discourse that people have to interpret and use. Culture refers to more than the 
attitudes that people hold towards politicians and political institutions. Rather, it is 
made up of a complex of feelings and images deriving from the home and work, from 
manifestos and popular culture. Linked to this version of culture and people's 
engagement with it, is the idea that it is constitutive of political activity. 
Against this background, political culture theory is considered to be one of the 
viable approaches to replace the long-dominant leaders of the field: formal-legalism 
and rational choice (Marxism model automatically discarded since the events 
following 1989) (Eckstein, 1988: 789; see also Eckstein, 1979). It is understood, then, 
that political culture shapes, and even determines the character and intention of the 
political action. Consequently, in this study the political culture in South Africa will 
be surveyed as it is essential for its democratic consolidation to know whether it is 
growing in the correct direction - in proper support of the new democratic 
institutions. 
4.6 Political culture: Measurement methodology 
This section is grounded in the previous one: The assumption that processes of 
change are dependent upon the political culture of the polity. The beliefs, values and 
attitudes of ordinary citizens structure both the pace and possibilities for change. 
Though cultural theory does not provide a complete explanation of political change, 
culture undoubtedly influences the process mightily. 
Concretely, the main purpose of this section is to determine to which extent 
democratic values are present in the South African political culture today. The 
purpose is not to describe the contemporary South African political culture8 but to 
determine whether the various attitudes pertaining to democratic values are organised 
within a democratic belief system and to present them over time to see what the 
tendencies were through the years. 
This analysis begins with a consideration of some of the key cultural requisites of 
8 As said before, this study is not a study of the political culture but of the consolidation of South 
African democracy. Otherwise a very wide range of indicators should be taken into account, some of 
which are not even related to democratic consolidation. 
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democracies. Then, it examines the values of the samples and their evolution through 
the years, in an attempt to identify the relatively more or less democratic attributes of 
the South African citizenry. Finally, the distribution of these values throughout 
important segments of the South African society is analysed in an effort to assess the 
implications of these values for the future of this democracy. 
Political theorists have long attempted to identify the particular cultural values 
that are conducive to the development of democratic polities (Dahl, 1971; 1989) and 
most would agree with the simple proposition that "the development of a stable and 
effective democracy depends upon the orientations that people have to the political 
process" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 498). 
Virtually every scholar who has researched processes of democratisation has 
ascribed an important role to political culture (Di Palma, 1990a; Huntington, 1984 to 
mention two not previously quoted). However, there is little agreement with regard to 
specific cultural attributes that are conducive to democratic development. While 
nearly everyone recognises that interpersonal trust is important (it facilitates coalition 
formation) and that healthy doses of political tolerance are essential, not everyone 
agrees that personal satisfaction with life, for instance, is crucial to political 
development. Thus, at the general level, there is a broad consensus that 
democratisation is affected by culture, but there is much less agreement on the 
specifics (Gibson et al., 1992). 
One of the most classical and influential thinkers in the field is Dahl. His list of 
cultural values conducive to democratic development is of particular interest to this 
study (Dahl, 1971: 127; see also 1989 and Gibson & Duch, 1991). Dahl identified (i) 
belief in the legitimacy of the institutions of democracy (public contestation and 
participation), (ii) beliefs about relationships of authority between government and 
governed, (iii) confidence in the capacity of the government to deal effectively with 
the country's problems, (iv) political and interpersonal trust and (v) belief in the 
possibility and desirability of political co-operation mixed with a belief in the 
legitimacy of conflict (see Dahl, 1989). In more simple words, a democratic citizen is 
one "who believes in individual liberty, and who is politically tolerant, who holds a 
certain amount of distrust of political of political authority but at the same time is 
trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights 
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against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports 
basic democratic institutions and processes. Though there are undoubtedly those who 
would quibble with this list, it would be largely on the need to supplement the roster 
rather than delete items from it ". Consequently, a democratic political culture is a "set 
of norms that (i) encourage the formation of individual and collective preferences; (ii) 
and the submission of those preferences to the political arena for satisfaction; (iii) 
within the context of support for a set of institutional arrangements for political 
decision making that is responsive to these preferences (Gibson et al., 1992: 332). 
This ·research focuses on support for basic democratic rights, liberties and 
institutions under the assumption that, in the absence of such beliefs, processes of 
democratisation may slow down or even break down. For instance, competitive 
elections are difficult to implement in the context of widespread beliefs that diverse 
political parties exacerbate and create conflicts in society. Similarly, to the extent that 
ordinary citizens are intolerant of political diversity, democratic openness and 
competition are impeded. Certainly culture does not completely determine structure 
and practice, but it is difficult to understand the possibilities for reform without 
consideration of the beliefs, values and attitudes of ordinary citizens. 
4. 7 Earlier research on political culture 
Putnam (et al., 1983) reached the same conclusions as Almond and Verba (1963) 
m a case study of Italy. Exploring the causal link between civic attitudes in the 
various regions in Italy and the efficiency and responsiveness of the newly formed 
regional governments, he found that the cultural legacy of the regions had a direct and 
powerful bearing on the quality of the fledging governments. The democratic future 
of nations with imperfect democracies and nations struggling to become democratic 
may hinge on the degree to which their citizens can be influenced to embrace civic 
principles. Likewise, the future viability of strong democracies may rest on whether or 
not they can continue to socialise their citizens to civic ideals. 
Inglehart (1975; 1988; 1990), following Almond and Verba (1963), delved into 
the topic. One of his main contributions is the analysis of the effect of "satisfaction 
with one's life" as an indicator of political culture and commitment to democracy (see 
Inglehart, 1988: 1205-121 0). He also takes interpersonal trust into consideration as an 
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important factor. 
Gibson and his colleagues (Gibson et al., 1992) also researched the political 
culture in the Soviet Union to test the possibilities for democracy to stabilise and 
focused on political tolerance, valuation of liberty, support for the norms of 
democracy, rights consciousness, support for dissent, support for independent media, 
support for competitive elections. 
Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) tried to address the question of mass support for 
political change in Russia. This study is not only based on the political culture of 
Russia with regard to undergoing political reform but also on the economic reforms. 
The researchers tried to assess Russian opinion toward freedom of speech, 
competitive elections, individual liberties, methods of protest and put forward a 
battery of economic questions to address the economic "feelings". The questions on 
economic issues are not presented here, as they are not part of our concern. In Eastern 
and Central Europe, this was of extreme importance as the economy was state-
controlled under the former regime. This was not the case during apartheid - albeit 
political exclusion had economic implications. 
Seligson and Booth (1993), also following Dahl (1971), tried to detect and delimit 
political culture that supports liberal and representative institutions: Support for a 
system of widespread political participation and support for the right of minority 
dissent. For them, "a democratic political culture is one both extensive and inclusive. 
Extensive cultures support democratic participation, while inclusive cultures support 
civil liberties for unpopular groups" (Seligson & Booth, 1993: 780). They monitored 
the "right to dissent" (meaning approval of civil disobedience, participation in forceful 
action) and "opposition to the suppression of democratic values" (meaning to prohibit 
demonstration, or/and meeting of groups that criticise the government). The study 
makes a comparison between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, countries with a similar 
political and social past but with different regimes. 
Putnam (1993) has perhaps made one of the best attempts at sorting through and 
organising the attitudes and behaviours commonly assigned to civic citizens. He 
grouped the attributes into four general categories: Civic engagement, political 
equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance and social structures of co-operation. His 
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findings were as follows (Putman: 1993: 87-89): 
Civic engagement. Citizens in a civic culture are interested in public affairs and 
participate in politics. They feel the obligation to actively promote the publiC good, 
which they define as more than the aggregate of individual interests. 
Political equality. Citizens "treat each other as equals in a civic culture. They are 
bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and co-operation, not by vertical 
relations of authority and dependency" (Putnam, 1993: 88). 
Solidarity, trust and tolerance. A civic culture is marked by citizens who respect 
and trust one another. Diversity of ideas and lifestyle is usually tolerated, even 
encouraged. 
Social structures of co-operation. Organisations abound in a civic culture, from 
labour unions to sport clubs and from political parties to neighbourhood organisations. 
Citizens are active members of many groups, exposing them to a variety of ideas and 
teaching them the rewards or co-operation and interpersonal trust. 
Obviously very few people in any society, if any, embody all of the components 
of a civic citizen completely. But some individuals embody more than others. The 
same is true of societies: Some resemble an ideal civic culture more closely than 
others. 
Rose and Mishler (1996) attempted the same research in post-communist Russia, 
and solicited citizens to asses the regime as a whole, as experienced it in its entirety, 
including its various institutions, leaders and policies as at the time. They simply 
asked respondents to compare the present regime to the former one and to say what 
they expected of the situation in five years on. 
Rose (1996; see also 1997) based his research on Eastern and Central Europe's 
political culture. He tried to approach it by letting people compare the new and the 
former regime (focusing on freedom at present and before; the economic situation and 
the regime in general). He also noted the necessity of an absence of important 
antidemocratic parties in the political realm (Rose, 1997: 96). 
Rice and Feldman (1997: 1143) referred to democratic culture as "civic 
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republicanism" 9 . Civic republicanism "understands virtue as involvement in self-rule 
guided by devotion to the common good" (Galston, 1991: 1). By many contemporary 
scholars this virtue is seen to be a vital prerequisite for effective democracy (see 
Kramnick, 1982; Lipset, 1963; Pocock, 1975; Sandel, 1982; Walzer, 1980; Wilson, 
1991). Armed with extensive public opinion data, these scholars have been 
investigating the relationship between civic attitudes and support for democracy. 
Essentially, Rice and Feldman (1997) tried to measure the support for democracy by 
focusing on involvement with politics (reading newspapers, talking about politics, 
etc.), and membership of independent organisations. 
In South Africa there have also been attempts to measure the evolution of 
political culture. For instance, Mattes and Thiel (1998) first focused on the "national 
legitimacy" (1998: 97), meaning "a near-consensual agreement on the identity of the 
state or 'people' that is to govern itself democratically" (they quoted this from Linz & 
Stepan, 1996a: 16). They believe that for them in order for the South African 
democracy to consolidate, people should be proud of being South Africans. This, 
however, is open for argument. For instance, Italians show a very low level of pride in 
being Italians - Germans are not particularly proud of being German either - and 
nobody is expecting Italian democracy to collapse (Orizo, 1991: 173-174; see also 
Rose, 1984). Subsequently, they asked people to compare their lives under democracy 
and apartheid, to assess democracy "when it does not work" and to assess their 
"satisfaction with personal life". As it will be shown later, this methodology of asking 
people to say whether they would 'support democracy when democracy does not 
work' is not operative in South Africa due to South African peculiarities of 
understanding democracy (this is explained below). 'Satisfaction with one's life' as an 
indicator also suffers several shortcomings (also explained below) which discard it as 
an indicator of democratic consolidation. 
More recently, Bratton and Mattes (1999) tried to address the question whether 
commitment toward democracy was intrinsic or instrumental in Africa. Intrinsic 
commitment is based on "appreciation of the political rights and freedoms that 
democracy embodies when valued as an end in itself' and instrumental commitment 
9 On "civic republicanism" see also Bellah, (et al., 1986); Green, (1985); Oldfield, (1990); Pangle, 
(1988) and Sandel, (1982). 
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is focused on the fact that the change of regime may be a means to other ends, "most 
commonly the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of living standards. 
Intrinsic support is a commitment to democracy for 'better or worse; as such it has the 
potential to sustain a fragile political regime even in the face of economic downturn or 
social upheaval. By contrast, instrumental support is conditional. It is granted, and 
may easily be withdrawn, according to the temper of the times. If citizens evaluate 
regimes mainly in terms of their capacity to deliver consumable benefits or to rectify 
material inequalities, they may also succumb to the siren song of populist leaders who 
argue that economic development requires the sacrifice of political leaders" (Bratton 
& Mattes, 1999: 1 ). They distinguish regime performance at delivering two distinct 
baskets of goods: An economic basket Gobs, ... ) and a political basket (civil liberties, 
political rights, ... ). In this sense, they side with Linz and Stepan (1996a: 42) when 
distinguishing between support and satisfaction (legitimacy and efficacy). 
They also side with Rose and colleagues, (Rose et a!., 1998) to operationalise the 
commitment to democracy by using "concrete terms and in the form of comparisons 
with plausible alternatives" (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 9). They ask respondents to 
express their ideas toward democracy as a form of rule (compared to others) and their 
satisfaction with democracy. Afterwards, they try to explain those results. 
The South African people characteristically misunderstand what democracy is. As 
a proof it is possible to show that "in 1995, South Africans were asked to choose from 
list of diverse meanings (both political and economical) that are sometimes attached 
to democracy. Topping the popular ranking, 91.3 percent of respondents [related] 
democracy to 'equal access to houses, jobs and a decent income' (with 48.3 percent 
seeing these goods as essential to democracy). This earthy image of democracy far 
outstripped all other representations: for example, regular elections (67.7 percent), at 
least two strong parties (59.4 percent) and minority rights (54.5 percent)" (Bratton & 
Mattes, 1999: 8). This leads to the following conclusions 10 : 
1. South Africans still have to undergo the bitter experience of realising that 
democracy is not the solution for their economic problems. 
1
° For more studies see Lagos, (1997); Rose, (1994) or Shin & Shyu, (1997). 
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2. Any research undertaken in South Africa which aims to assess the 
commitment of the people to democracy must avoid the word "democracy" as 
the respondent would not automatically associate it with a form of rule; it 
would rather, and principally, be seen as a method to deal with economic 
deprivation. As a result, any further analysis of any result obtained in such a 
way will be biased. 
At this point, it is worth presenting the main propositions from the existing 
literature regarding the measurement of the stability of democracy according to 
political values and ideas. 
The existing literature indicates that there are two main methods for measuring 
the commitment toward democracy, the first being by asking people whether they 
prefer one regime - undemocratic - or another - democratic - and to voice 
expectations concerning the general future and personal life (for instance Bratton & 
Mattes, 1999; Mattes & Thiel, 1998; Rose, 1997; Rose eta!., 1998 to mention but a 
few). The second is to operationalise the indicators of political culture related to the 
consolidation of democracy and to test whether they are pro- or anti- democratic 
(Almond & Verba, 1963, see also 1980; Inglehart, 1975; 1988; 1990; Gibson, Duch & 
Tedin, 1992; Seligson & Booth; 1993 to quote just a couple). 
As the concept of democracy is highly ethereal and difficult to discern -
especially in South Africa-, this study will avoid using the term "democracy" in this 
matter as much as possible. Rather, it will detect the indicators of a pro-democratic 
political culture and test to which extent they are present in the political culture in 
South Africa in the period covered by the study, 1983-1999. 
Notwithstanding the large scope of possibilities offered to the researcher there is 
no doubt, according to the concerned literature, that the main indicator for the 
measuring of the political culture and its commitment to democracy is composed of 
(i) trust, and (ii) tolerance. Actually, "nearly everyone recognises that interpersonal 
trust is important ... and political tolerance is essential ... [although] not everyone 
agrees that [for instance] satisfaction with one's life is crucial to democratic 
development". Moreover, no other indicator has received as much attention as these 
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two and there is no agreement on the importance of the others 11 (Gibson et al., 1992: 
332). 
These two concepts are now debated and the final selection of issues with· regard 
to measuring the political culture in South Africa is presented thereafter. 
4.7.1 Trust 
Trust is considered to be a necessary condition, both for civil society and 
democracy. In contemporary democracies the people do not rule directly but by 
depositing their trust with delegates and institutions that bear responsibility for 
aggregating the interests and preferences of the citizenry. These are officials such as 
members of Parliament or organisations such as trade unions, business associations, 
churches, and universities. The latter are part of the civil society and enjoy relative 
independence from the state. In this regard, political parties are especially important 
for the proper functioning of democratic government, creating two-way channels of 
communication between both the mass and elite/institutional levels (Rose, 1994: 18). 
Democracy requires regular competition between organised groups, each of 
which seeks to convince individuals that it represents and deserves their trust. In this 
regard, individuals may represent the starting line for building a civil society, but they 
are not the only component. The family, for instance, is the simplest, most basic and 
most trusted form of association. Beyond the family, friendship extends the network 
of trusted organisations. Even when citizens are dissatisfied with the government or 
the economy, most remain satisfied with their family and friends. After this, work or 
leisure somewhat extend the individual's trust network on the basis of both extensive 
and intensive observation. 
11 The extensive literature on political culture proves this. Tolerance and trust are the most investigated 
aspects when monitoring pro-democratic political culture. Actually many studies are exclusively based 
on Tolerance or Trust (Gouws, 1993; Rose, 1994 to quote a couple). Other indicators are also 
incorporated but these two are mostly present and regarded as the main ones (Gibson et a!., 1992: 332-
337). On tolerance see Stouffer, (1955); Prothro & Grigg, (1960); McClosky, (1964); Sniderman, 
(1974); Nunn, (et al., 1978); Sullivan, ~t al., 1982); Mueller, (1988); McClosky & Brill, (1989); 
Gibson, (1989; 1996); Duch & Gibson, (1992); Sniderman, ~tal., 1991); Gouws, (1991; 1996); 
Gibson & Gouws, (1999). On trust see Rose, (1994); Gibson, ~t al., 1992); Thomas, (1998); 
Humphrey & Schmitz, (1998); Scholz & Lubell, (1998); Zussman, (1997) to cite simply a few. 
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The institutions of civil society may be privately controlled, state-licensed or 
certified, partially or wholly state-funded or even state owned (i.e. many universities). 
The organisations of civil society do furnish and complete democracy, creating what 
Dahl (1956: 83) called the "separation of powers". They act as checks upon the 
emergence of too strong a state. 
Without trust, and without genuine representation, the bargaining process of any 
democracy will collapse (Rose, 1994: 20). During the Communist era in Central and 
Eastern Europe, there was "no social organisation outside the state". One of the main 
and urgent aims of the Soviet troops and communist parties after the World War II 
was to eliminate any organisation that might compete for authority and/or "trust" with 
the communist apparatus. Press, publishing houses, became "mouthpieces of the party 
line" (Rose, 1994: 21). 
Communism converted public opmwn to private opinion. Individuals held 
different views about government, politics, and Moscow's domination but there were 
no institutional means to collect or express such ideas. Official opinion was the only 
opinion that could circulate through the media. The party-state did not ask people 
what they wanted, but rather claimed to know what they were supposed to want. 
Individuals prudently confined their thoughts to their own private circles of relatives 
and close friends. In this way, face-to-face primary groups became a alternative for 
civil society rather than an integral part of it. 
Interpersonal trust is viewed as "part of an enduring cultural syndrome that is 
conducive to the viability of democracy .... The evidence indicates that given societies 
are indeed characterised by distinctive levels of interpersonal trust. This even seems 
to be true of specific regions within given countries" (Inglehart, 1988: 1211). 
Trust is not fixed, but shaped by the historical experiences of given peoples, and 
consequently subject to change. Almond and Verba (1963) found that the public of 
Britain and the United States - two long-established democracies English speaking -
was ranked higher than others (West Germany, or Mexico, for instance) on the level 
of interpersonal trust. 
It is maintained that low levels of trust make people "more likely to reject the 
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existing political system and support parties of the extreme Right or Left" (Inglehart, 
1988: 1214; Lagos, 1997: 127-128). Trust can be measured with regard to institutions, 
but also at the interpersonal level. Perceived low levels of honesty and law-
abidingness are tokens of low interpersonal trust. As Lagos (1997: 129) puts it, "these 
attitudes permeate society and affect human behaviour in numerous areas, breeding 
everything from aggressive driving to tax evasion". 
All important studies linking political culture and democracy present trust as very 
important: From the classic study by Almond and Verba (1963: 284-288), to the 
influential work of Inglehart (1990: 23-4, 36-37, 57, 396-402), passing through well-
known Rose (1994: esp. 18-23), Lagos (1997: 127-130), the work of Putnam (1993; 
see also Putnam et al., 1983) or Rice & Feldman (1997: 1145-1148). 
Clear examples of the results of the distrust in the traditional parties are, for 
instance, the rise of fascist parties such as Le Penn's National Front in France, or ex-
Communists in Russia or Central and Eastern Europe, or the neo-fascist Italian Social 
Movement (Inglehart, 1988: 1213-1214). Accordingly, this study will try to survey 
the South Africans' feelings of trust in the new democratic political institutions. To 
trust a democratic government requires the existence of a democratic government. 
Consequently, trust in the government will only be measured for the democratic 
period. 
4.7.2 Tolerance 
If trust is important, tolerance is not of less importance when monitoring the 
commitment toward democracy. Actually, "no single democratic value has received 
as much attention from empirical theorists as has political tolerance" (Gibson et al., 
1992: 337). Scholarly interest has been focused mainly on the question of whether 
citizens will tolerate the political activity of their most hated opponefits. Tolerance is 
typically thought to be "an essential ingredient of democratic politics. Without 
tolerance, widespread contestation is impossible, regime legitimacy is imperilled and 
numbing conformity prevails" (Gibson eta!., 1992: 337; see also Gibson, 1996: 3). 
This is especially important in a country like South Africa, due to the deep divisions 
of the society. Democracies like South Africa -being incisively divided - may risk 
becoming majority tyrannies. That is, of course, if they are to escape civil war" 
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(Gibson, 1996: 6) 12. It has also been argued (Sullivan et al., 1979: 781) that, although 
"a democratic regime may be divided by fierce conflicts, it can remain stable if 
citizens remain attached to democratic or constitutional procedures - the right to 
speak, to publish, to run for office - on an equal basis to all, even to those who 
challenge its way of life". 
Tolerance is, at least in a very instrumentalist way, an important value as it helps 
to maintain a stable democratic regime. But, what is tolerance? As Gouws (1996: 23) 
states, tolerance is "directly related to how willing people are to put up with their 
opponents. It entails the willingness to extend civil liberties to adversaries. It implies 
procedural fairness - a commitment to the rules of the game and willingness to apply 
them equally. Tolerance is the willingness to extend freedoms to those who are 
different" (see also Gibson, 1996: 5). Tolerance is consistently related to perceptions 
of threat. In other words, "the greater the perceived threat from a group, the more 
likely a person is to be intolerant of the group" (Sullivan et al., 1982: 251; see also 
Mueller & Seligson, 1988: 17). 
The first study on tolerance, to the author's knowledge, was performed in the 
United States in the 1950s by Stouffer (1955) and encountered high levels of 
intolerance to objectionable groups. This study has been used as a guide for 
subsequent research (i.e. McClosky, 1964; Nunn et al., 1978). 
Stouffer (1955) surveyed public attitudes toward communism and the extent to 
which Americans were prepared to extend political rights in the United States to 
communists and suspected communists - among other groups from the left (these 
groups were supposed to be relatively unpopular). Then, he analysed the effect of 
education, occupation, and gender on tolerance. 
This method was in use during the late 1970s and early 1980s when Sullivan and 
12 This is not to say that a democracy works only under no intolerance level. Actually, mature 
democracies also show a level of political intolerance. For instance, the United States shows a high 
level of intolerance. However, this level is constant. It does not increase over time. Add the fact the 
American society is intolerant of peripheral or extremist groups such as Ku Klux Klan or Black 
Panthers (Sullivan eta/., 1984). This indicates, firstly, that there is no universal or exportable minimum 
or maximum level of political tolerance (each democracy may have its own acceptable level of political 
(in)tolerance to run properly) and secondly, that the only positive indicator of political (in)tolerance 
when measuring democratic consolidation, is the evolution over the years of political (in)tolerance. 
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his collaborators (Sullivan et al., 1979; see also Barnum & Sullivan, 1989) tried to 
analyse whether the suspected decrease in intolerance in the United States was real or 
not, and for that they applied a different method. Instead of giving the 'target group' 
(communists in Stouffer's work) to the respondent, they offered a variety of 
possibilities, ranging from the extreme political right to the extreme political left and 
other social groups, such as homosexuals, etc. In their findings they discovered that 
the presumed decline in the level of intolerance was fictitious and the explanation was 
that Americans had found different target groups for their intolerance, - which ranked 
at the same level. They also analysed the effect of education, gender, rural/urban 
dwelling, etc. 
This method has substituted Stouffer's (1955) as it offers the respondent the 
possibility of choosing the "target group" (see for instance World Value Survey, 1995 
or Idasa Survey '94 or '98). Consequently, the intolerance towards the actual 'least-
liked' group can really be analysed. 
These two approaches have been adequateley analysed and contrasted (see 
Mueller & Seligson, 1988; Sullivan & Marcus, 1988; Gibson, 1992)13 . 
As tolerance seems to be the most important issue when monitoring the 
consolidation of democracy (no tolerance, no democracy) this research will monitor 
the evolution of political tolerance in the South African society as an indicator of the 
existing commitment toward democracy. Reference will be made to the pre-
democratic period (there is no need for undemocratic government to tolerate people 
with different opinions) to show its evolution. The "least-liked" group as explained 
above is selected as it allows the respondents to select their own "target group". 
These two indicators, tolerance and trust, therefore are the reference to 
democratic consolidation used in this study. Besides these main indicators, other 
references are to (iii) political and societal participation, (iv) satisfaction with one's 
life, (v) influence in governmental decisions. Thus, although the main indicators on 
which this study relies are political tolerance and trust, (as they are the most important 
13 For analyses on intolerance in South Africa see for instance, Gouws, (1991; 1993; 1996); Gibson & 
Gouws, (1998; 1999). Gibson, (1998: 41, fn. 4) offers an ample review of the literature on tolerance in 
general. 
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for the stability of democracy and there is no general agreement on the importance of 
any other - as shown above), some other indicators are also presented, but merely to 
expand the view of the political culture of South African society14. These 15 indicators 
added to tolerance and trust are presented exclusively on informative basis and they 
will not be developed in later analyses. This is so because, firstly, there is no general 
agreement on indicators to be analysed when monitoring consolidation of democracy 
from a political culture perspective, with the exception for tolerance and trust. 
Similarly, none of them would be as informative as tolerance and trust and the lack of 
them in a society would not be as negative as the lack of tolerance or trust in the 
South African democracy. These added indicators are now presented 16 : 
4. 7.3 General perception of personal life, general situation (past, present, future) 
Another indicator generally used when monitoring political culture and its pro-
democratic aspect is the general perception of one's life. This issue has been 
significantly developed by Inglehart (1988; 1990) and it has influenced subsequent 
research (i.e. HSRC surveys since 1994; Finifter & Mickiewicz, 1992 17). However, 
the basis on which it has been built up is not as solid as it seems to be. 
This indicator (general perception of personal life or general situation) is based on 
the differences of 'levels of satisfaction' encountered in cross-national research. In 
principle these differences are not a reflection of objective economic conditions. 
However, Inglehart found that these differences hinge on economic motives. Actually, 
there is a "tendency for life satisfaction levels to rise or decline gradually in response 
to short-term economic fluctuations". To really probe this empirically, "we would 
need survey data covering that past century or two in order to test this hypothesis 
14 As previously said this is not a study on the political culture of South Africa, but on the consolidation 
of its democracy. Thus, added indicators, after being presented, will not be analysed any further. They 
may relate to democracy, but not as tolerance and trust. Actually, nobody, to the author's knowledge, 
has ever argued that a democracy can break down due to a lack of political participation, for instance. 
However, it is common to find research alerting to the risk of democratic breakdown due to the lack of 
trust (Rose, 1994) or tolerance (Gibson, 1998). 
15 Those selected here have been chosen attending to availability and comparability basis. 
16 Actually, membership of independent organisations, as part of civil society, is of extreme importance 
for democracy (Kotze, 1996: I) and it is presented now. However, civil society can not develop 
froperly in the absence of important doses of tolerance (Gouws, 1993: 15) and trust (Rose, 1994: 18). 
7 This study, as many others, was carried out in Russia. Taken into account that the former regime 
implied a state-controlled economy. Consequently, the introduction of questions regarding general 
satisfaction does not engender any problem. 
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directly" (Inglehart, 1988: 1207-1208). As he recognises, there, as yet, is no "data 
base that would enable us" to empirically probe that relation "conclusively" 
(Inglehart, 1988: 1218). 
Consequently, although there may be some correlation between life satisfaction 
and stable democracy, there also is such a correlation between stable democracy and 
gross national product per capita. As a result, the efficiency of this index becomes 
doubtful. Hence, it will not be considered further, or used in this study. 
4.7.4 Participation in politics (vote, influence in government) 
Another important indicator for measuring the commitment toward a democratic 
form of government is the direct participation of the citizen in politics. A democratic 
citizen is a politically active citizen. This participation is not simply reduced to vote, 
rather, a committed-to-democracy citizen is aware of political issues. S/He reads, 
listens and watches news about politics. In his/her conversations with others, politics 
have a relevant (or at least not a non-existent) place. As a result, s/he is politically 
influenced and tries to influence politically, aware or/and unaware and directly or 
indirectly aware of or unaware of other citizens. 
The level and kind of participation is directly reflected in the political system. The 
presence of undemocratic parties in the Parliament, for instance, reflects the existence 
of an undemocratic sub-culture in the society (Rose, 1997: 96). 
Accordingly this study will monitor participation in politics - concretely, the 
vote, sympathy to parties and belief in the capacity of having influence in 
governmental decisions. The vote can only be fully exercised in a democratic period. 
Due to this, this index will only be analysed with reference to the democratic period 18 . 
4. 7.5 Civil society 
Political participation is not as simple as it seems to be according to the previous 
18 About the importance of political participation see Almond & Verba, (1963: 101-160); Rice & 
Feldman, (1997: 1147-1148); Gibson, (et al., 1992: 332) to quote simply a few. However, no scholar 
has ever said that a democracy has broken down due to the lack of participation. This shows that this 
issue is not as important as political tolerance or trust. 
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section. A democrat also participates in politics indirectly, that is, through different 
independent-from-the-state organisations (NGOs, Trade Unions, church, media, etc.). 
This implies that, besides political parties, a democratically elected government, 
democratic institutions, etc., a consolidated democracy also has to have a well-
developed network of organisations which participate in politics and control the 
actions of (and pressurise the) government, through which citizens exercise their 
rights of petition, pressure, etc. This automatically leads to the concept of civil 
society. 
An active and well-developed civil society is generally 19 considered to be an 
"essential characteristic of consolidated democracies" (Kotze, 1996: 1). In other 
words: No civil society, no democracy. 
In Africa, the liberation movements secured independence in the 1950s and 
1960s. However, stable democratic institutions were not always the result of these 
pro-independence struggles. Rather, internal disputes drove many countries into cruel 
civil wars (Angola and Mozambique are clear examples), ethnic unrest, military 
insurgency, long dictatorships (i.e. former Zaire), etc. In other words, multiparty 
elections were not enough to maintain democratic institutions, as they did not ipso 
facto institutionalise broad participation in political life. As Harbeson (1994: 1-2) put 
it, "civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate 
states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy 
relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new 
African governments a generation ago". 
Actually, the concept of "civil society" has "entered core terminology in the 
analysis of African politics essentially in the past decade" (Young, 1994: 33). In brief, 
civil society refers to "the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-
generating, [largely] self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal 
order or set of shared rules" (Diamond, 1994b: 5). It includes a wide web of 
organisations, such as economic, cultural, informational, interest-based, 
developmental, issue-oriented, and civic. They provide what Diamond (1994b: 6) 
called an "ideological market" (flow of information and ideas). Its primary aims are to 
19 For a contrasting view see Friedman, (1996). 
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survey and control the exercise of power by democratic states and to democratise 
authoritarian states. It is needless to show how important, for instance, the religious 
organisations in Kenya, Mali or Niger; or the organisation of teachers, civil servants 
and traders in the Republic of Benin; the trade union Solidarity in Poland; the student 
organisations in Mali; etc., have been in the struggle for democratisation (Gyimah-
Boadi, 1996: 119; see also Almond & Verba, 1963: 300-323)20 . 
This study will monitor the evolution of organisations in South Africa as an 
indicator of democratic consolidation. Although civil society is characteristic of 
strong democracies, it can also exist in non-democratic regimes. Consequently, this 
study will examine the situation both before and during the democratic period 21 . 
4.8 Apartheid and public opinion 
The period before 1994 was not democratic for most South Africans, who were 
long deprived of their political rights. Consequently, it is not possible to measure the 
commitment toward democracy in the country before 1994. Hence, this study will 
emphasise the evolution of the political culture in the country during the democratic 
period, that is 1994-1999. However, although it is not possible to assess democratic 
consolidation before 1994, as there was no democracy, every possible effort will be 
made to introduce every available indicator, such as tolerance or membership of 
independent organisations, for comparison. 
4.9 Political culture: Its measurement 
In this section the indicators explained and selected above are measured. The 
main indicators on which this study relies, namely, Political tolerance and Trust and 
the added secondary indicators, Use of violence [to pursue goals]; Influence [in 
government]; Vote [participation m politics]; and Partisanship [membership in 
organisation of civil society]. 
2
° For more details on civil society in Africa in general, see Harbeson et al., 1994 and in South Africa, 
in particular, see Kotze's, (1996) edited work and especially Gagiano & Du Toit's, (1996) contribution 
to the volume and James & Caliguire, (1996). 
21 This issue opens another door to strengthen the idea that political tolerance and trust are the most 
important indicators as the development of civil society has been found to depend to political tolerance 
(Gouws, 1993) and trust (Rose, 1994). Hence, if political tolerance and trust increases in democracy, 
the possibilities for development of civil society and democratic stabilisation increases. 
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4.9.1 Tolerance 
It seems important to clarify to the reader that these surveys were not created 
specifically for the measurement of tolerance and were conducted by different 
institutions, as explained before. Thus, the accuracy of the final figures may not be of 
the highest order. However, this survey aims to show the general trend 
(increase/decrease) of political tolerance over time and this is perfectly possible with 
this data. Actually, surveys designed specifically for this purpose, conducted before 
and after 1994, show similar trends (see Gouws, 1991; Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 
1999). 
Tolerance, as explained above, is an important ingredient for the democratic 
"cake". Actually, if opposition groups are not tolerated, political violence is likely to 
increase. The highest expression of this context is the civil war. In other words, 
without fairly high levels of political tolerance, chances of democratic survival 
decrease. In this regard support for violent methods is also of great importance. 
Consequently, this section presents the evolution of the level of tolerance since 1983 
until 1998 and the level of support for political violence during the same period. 
Tolerance is measured through the "least-liked" method as it allows the 
respondent to select the group liked the least. In order to provide a wider picture of 
the level of tolerance in the country, two indicators have been selected: One for social 
tolerance and one for political tolerance. 
The surveys used for this purpose are HSRC'83, Idasa'94 and ldasa'98. All of 
them have already been introduced in this Chapter. 
In 1983, the HSRC presented a battery of questions to people to measure their 
tolerance of those least-liked groups. This study has selected the following for 
comparative reasons: 
"I would accept them [least-liked population group] as neighbours" (Q.25d). 
The supposed-to-be least-liked groups are (i) Afrikaans speaking White (ii) 
English speaking White (iii) Coloured; (iv) Indian (v) Black (order presented here as 
in the questionnaire). 
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Respondent had to indicate whether they would accept Afrikaans speaking 
Whites, English speaking Whites, Coloured and Indians as neighbours. The possible 
answers were 'Yes', 'No', 'Don't know' (D'k hereafter). 
For this study, the group accepted the least was selected. For instance 16.8 % of 
Whites would accept a Black person as neighbour whereas 99.7 %of Whites would 
accept an Afrikaans speaking White as neighbour. Consequently, to measure tolerance 
the acceptance of the Black population was selected as it was the least-liked group 
(the White answer was selected as an example as it displayed the highest differences 
of acceptance from one population group to another)22 . 
In 1994, Idasa asked people to select a most opposed political party and then 
asked a battery of questions about that "least-liked political group". For reasons of 
comparability, this study selected the following: 
"Party member of this party [least-liked group] should have been allowed or not 
allowed to live in your neighbourhood" (Q.14c4). 
The possible answers were: (i) 'Definitely allowed'; (ii) 'Allowed'; (iii) 
'Uncertain'; (iv) 'Not allowed'; (v) 'Definitely not allowed'; (vi) 'Refuse to answer'. In 
order to make it comparable with other surveys, those answers have been re-coded as 
follows: Answer (i) and (ii) into 'allowed'; Answers (iii) into 'D'k'; Answers (iv) and 
(v) into 'not allowed'; Answer (vi) has been excluded (missing value). 
In 1998, Idasa asked the respondents to identify the party/ies disliked the most 
and to say whether they would participate in action to avoid them to do certain things, 
such as living in their neighbourhood. Concretely: 
"How likely or unlikely is it that you would take part in action with other people 
to prevent a member of those parties [the least-liked] from living in your 
neighbourhood" (Q.14.1). 
The possible answers were (i) 'very likely'; (ii) 'likely'; (iii) 'unlikely'; (iv) 'very 
unlikely' and (v) 'D'k'. Again, the responses have been re-coded for comparability, as 
22 It should be noted that, at the time of conducting this survey (HSRC '83), mixed residential areas 
were prohibited by law. This could have affected the final response of the interviewee. 
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follows: Answers (iii) and (iv) into 'allowed'; (i) and (ii) into 'not allowed'; Answer (v) 
remains 'D'k'. The results are chronologically presented in Table 4.1. The data has 
also been bar-plotted and presented in Figure 4.1. 
Table 4. 1 Allow least-liked to live in your nei~:hbourhood (%) (1983-1998) 
1983 1994 1998 
Yes 48.4 43.1 68.0 
No 51.04 42.4 22.9 
The entries represent the percentage (all the population groups) of the population allowing or not 
someone from their respective "least-liked" group to live in their neighbourhood. The 'uncertain' 
answer accounts for the difference to 100%. 
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The previous indicator measures social tolerance and not political tolerance 
(Sullivan et al., 1982: 237-240). Thus, another indicator of political tolerance is 
introduced. 
Another possibility allowed by the available data is the monitoring of the 
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recognition of the right to freedom of for the political opponents in democracy. The 
strength of this indicator for measuring democratic consolidation has been 
demonstrated by Gibson and Gouws (1998). 
The 1983 data did not include this question. However, it is possible to follow the evolution within 
the democratic period, which is the most important for this study. 
In 1994 Idasa introduced in its series of questions to measure tolerance the 
following: 
"Party member of this party [least-liked group] should have been allowed or not 
allowed to make a speech in your area that criticise the party you support" 
(Q14c2). 
The possible answers were: (i) 'Definitely allowed'; (ii) 'Allowed'; (iii) 
'Uncertain'; (iv) 'Not allowed'; (v) 'Definitely not allowed'; (vi) 'Refuse to answer'. 
Answers have been re-coded as follows: Answers (i) and (ii) into 'allowed'; Answers 
(iv) and (v) into 'not allowed'; Answer (iii) into 'D'k'; Answer (vi) is excluded 
(missing value). 
In 1998 Idasa asked the respondents to identify the party/ parties disliked the most 
and say whether they would participate in action to avoid them to do certain things, 
such as making a campaign speech in your neighbourhood. Concretely: 
"How likely or unlikely is it that you would take part in action with other people 
to prevent a member of those parties [the least-liked] from making a campaign 
speech in your neighbourhood" (Q.14.2). 
The possible answers were (i) 'very likely'; (ii) 'likely'; (iii) 'unlikely'; (iv) 'very 
unlikely' and (v) 'D'k'. Again the responses have been re-coded for comparability 
reasons as follows: Answer (iii) and (iv) into 'allowed'; Answers (i) and (ii) into 'not 
allowed'; Answer (v) remains as 'D'k'. 
The results are chronologically presented in Table 4.2. They have also been bar-
plotted and presented below in Figure 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Allow least-liked to 2ive political speech in your nei2hbourhood (%) (1994-1998) 
1994 1998 ·~ 26.8 69.3 
60.8 21.5 
Entries represent the percentage (all the population groups) of the population allowing or not 
someone from their respective "least-liked" group to live in their neighbourhood. The 'uncertain' 
answer accounts for the difference to 100%. 
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As was expected, political tolerance is also increasing. As said above, tolerance 
runs parallel (or should run) to the refusal for allowing violent actions to obtain 
political goals. The highest expression of this violence and intolerance is civil war. 
Subsequently, it is necessary to monitor the evolution of the acceptance of violent 
methods within the South African society. As tolerance increases, it is expected that 
approval for this violent method decreases. 
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In 1983, a high level of acceptance of political violence was expected. The 
African National Congress (ANC) was banned, the tricameral parliament (excluding 
Blacks) was established and several states of emergency were declared due to . social, 
political and labour unrest. Thus, a high level of acceptance of political violence was 
expected and a decrease, as democratisation progressed. 
In 1983, the HSRC asked people to give their opinion on the usage of violent 
methods to pursuit their goals. They asked: 
"What is your opinion on the use of violence in order to achieve political 
objectives in South Africa?" (Q. 27) 
The possible answers were, (i), 'Yes, in all instances', (ii), 'Yes, under certain 
circumstances', (iii) 'No' and (iv) 'Not sure'. For comparative reasons it was re-coded 
as follows: (i) and (ii) into 'Yes'; (iii) into 'No'; and (iv) into 'Not sure'. 
In 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, South Africans were asked by the 
HSRC to give their opinion about different kinds of actions, namely peaceful, more 
forceful and violent actions, meaning by violent actions those against people and 
property. A citizen committed to democracy would reject the violent actions. They 
were asked: 
"How positive or negative do you feel about violent actions?" (1994: Q. 75; 1995: 
Q. 5; 1996: Q. 52; 1997: Q. 49; 1998: Q. 50; 1999: Q. 49) 
The question is the same in all the surveys. The possible answers, being the same 
in all of them, are: (i) 'Extremely negative', (ii) 'Very negative', (iii) 'Negative', (iv) 
'Neither negative nor positive', (v) 'Positive', (vi) 'Very positive' (vii) 'Extremely 
positive'. Again for comparative reasons they have been re-coded as follows: Answers 
(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are re-coded 'No'; Answer (v), (vi) and (vii) into "Yes". Answer 
(iv) is re-coded into 'Not sure'. 
The results are presented in Table 4.3. Figure 4.3 below presents the results in a 
bar-plot. 
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Table 4.3 Sunnort for violent actions to nursuit noli tical ~:oals f%) (1983-1999) 
1983 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Yes 39.9 19.4 5.7 7.3 6.3 4.9 6.2 
No 59.7 71.7 87.9 82.9 87 92.2 91.1 
Entries represent the percentage for the whole population in South Africa, which 
supports one or the other alternative. The 'uncertain' answer accounts for the difference 
to 100%. 
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As expected, the support for violent action as a method to obtain political ends 
grows smaller parallel to the increase of tolerance. 
4.9.2 Trust 
The next item surveyed is trust in the political institutions. Concretely, this refers 
to trust in the democratically elected government. Trust is not a necessary requirement 
for a democracy to function, but it is a very important aspect to bear in mind. If 
Tolerance is a sine qua non condition, a 'nut' of the democratic engine, trust is the 'oil' 
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that lubricates the system23 . 
In the surveys conducted m 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 by the 
HSRC, people were asked about their trust in the government. The question was: 
"How often do you trusf4 the government to do what is right for people like 
you" (1994: Q. 84; 1995: Q. 58; 1996: Q. 59; 1997: Q.56; 1998: Q. 57; 1999: Q. 
56) 
The question is the same in all the surveys. The possible answers, being the same 
in all of them, are: (i) 'Not applicable'; (ii) 'Never'; (iii) 'Seldom'; (iv) 'Sometimes'; (v) 
'Mostly'; (vi) 'Always'. The importance of this issue is attached to the fact of whether 
people trust or not, leaving aside the intensity. Consequently, it was re-coded as 
follows: Answer (i) has been excluded (missing value). Answers (ii) and (iii) have 
been re-coded into 'No'. Answers (v) and (vi) have been re-coded into 'Yes'. Answer 
'Sometimes' remains unrecoded. 
The results are presented in Table 4.4. Figure 4.4 presents the results bar-plotted. 
Table 4 4 Trust in J;!Overnment (%) (1994-1999) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No 48.2 30.8 34.7 38.2 45.4 37.5 
Yes 20.5 35.8 29.2 22 21.7 32.5 
Entries represent the percentage of the whole population in South Africa, which supports one or the 
other alternative. The 'Sometimes' answer accounts for the difference to 100%. Ns are presented 
below 
Ns 2250 2226 2228 2220 2227 2210 
Trust in government is the first pessimistic indicator for South African 
democracy. Trust increased from 1994 to 1995 (government democratically elected) 
and went down until 1998. In 1999 it went up again and probably for the election 
effect25 . The present government was elected recently and enjoys higher doses of 
23 Trust in the new democratic government is measured here during the democratic period, as there was 
no democratic government to trust before. Besides, one study on the level of confidence in the political 
institutions reveals that the confidence in government of those politically excluded during the apartheid 
has increased whereas the confidence of those not excluded has decreased (see Van der Nest, 1999: 
181-182). 
24 Trust is not operationalised as it is directly stated as such in the question. 
25 The government was to be elected soon (survey conducted in February, 1999). Many promises were 
made. Consequently, it is normal that, at that time, trust, in general, was higher. 
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support. However, the 1999 level of trust is still below that of 1995. Future analysis 
will reveal whether this tendency remains or whether the election effect will 
disappear, as after 199 5. 
Figure 4.4 Trust in government (1994-1999) 
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4.9.3 Capacity of Influence 
Similarly, another important indicator that develops in the same realm as trust is 
the citizen's belief in their capacity to influence the government. In this regard this 
issue is also monitored to survey its tendency since the first democratic year, 1994. 
This indicator is not controlled before 1994, as there was no democratically elected 
government to influence. 
In surveys conducted in 1994, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 the HSRC, asked South Africans 
whether they thought that they could influence the government. The question was: 
"Do you agree or disagree with the statement: People like you can have an 
influence on governmental decisions" (1994: Q. 85; 1995: Q. 87; 1996: Q. 60; 
1997: Q.57; 1998: Q. 58; 1999: Q. 57) 
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The question is the same in all the surveys. The possible answers, being the same 
in all of them, are (i) 'Disagree very strongly'; (ii) 'Disagree strongly'; (iii) 'Disagree'; 
(iv)' Neither disagree not agree'; (v) 'Agree'; (vi) 'Agree strongly', (vii) 'Agree very 
strongly'. Consequently, it has been re-coded as follows: Answers (i), (ii) and (iii) 
into 'Yes'; Answers (v) and (vi) into 'No'; Answer 'Neither disagree nor agree', 
remains the same. 
The results are presented in Table 4.5. Figure 4.5 presents the same results in a 
bar-plot. 
Table 4 5 Peogle like vou can influence the ~:overnment (%) 0994-1999) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Agree 34.2 47.3 39.4 36.3 33.8 45.1 
Disagree 42.4 35.3 40.7 50.2 54.3 43.4 
Entries represent the percentage of the whole population in South Africa, which supports one or the 
other alternative. The 'Neither disagree nor agree' answer accounts for the difference to 100%. 
Ns 2250 2226 2228 2220 2227 2210 
------
The level of "belief in the capacity to influence" does not bode well for South 
Africa's democracy either. The level of 1998 is slightly lower than in 1994 but 
remains constant in general terms. However, from 1994 to 1998, the percentage of 
people that thought that they could influence the government remained, more or less, 
at the same level, but the percentage of people that thought they could not influence 
the government was increasing (at the expense of those who did not have a clear 
answer). Again, data for 1999 breaks the tendency, and once again the election effect 
may discredit the predictive value of this datum26 . 
4.9.4 Participation in politics. Vote for and proximity to parties 
Participation in politics is, as explained before, a· key issue in democracy. A 
committed-to-democracy citizen participates actively in politics, votes, supports 
parties and feels close to one or several of them. 
What follows is an attempt to approach to the difference between a vote for a 
26 Ibid. 
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party and proximity to a party. Citizens may decide to vote for a particular party even 
when they do not support that party. The reasons may vary. For instance, the 
performance of the supported party has not been as expected, and consequently the 
vote in the election may have a different direction, namely a different party or 
abstention. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between proximity, closeness 
to or sympathy for a certain political party and a vote for a particular party. 
Fi~:ure 4.5 People like you can influence in ~:overnmental decisions (1994-1999) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
I•Agree 0 Disagree I 
The latter may be seen by the individual as an obligation or a necessity to avoid 
something to happening. A clear example of this was encased in the political 
propaganda of National Party in the Western Cape during the general elections of 
1999. The message was: "Vote NP, stop the ANC" or "Vote NP, save the Cape". 
Clearly, this message does not attempt to gain votes to improve the lives ofthe voters 
but to stop their possible "deterioration" if they should vote for it. In this regard, a 
voter could be persuaded to vote for a party for which he or she does not have any 
sympathy. Another possibility is that the individual does not vote because he or she 
thinks that his or her vote does not have any chance of producing any effect. This can 
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be interpreted as "passive" support. 
On the other hand, the former (sympathy, closeness to a party) implies that the 
voter trusts the party he or she is voting for, is close to it and professes syinpathy 
toward it. He or she is not voting against something but for something. This can be 
interpreted as "active" support. 
Against this background, this study will examine whether South Africans feel 
close to the parties they vote for or not. This is obviously only measured in times of 
election. 
In 1994 and in 1998 Idasa conducted the annual surveys in which respondents 
were prompted to indicate whether they felt specially close to any party and the party 
for which they would vote. The questions were: 
"Regardless of how you actually voted on election day (in April), was there one 
particular political party which you felt especially close to? Which party? (1994: 
Q.13.a) 
Respondents were offered a list of parties, plus "No party" and "Confidential". 
Later in the survey, the respondent was asked to give details of his/her intention. The 
question was: 
"Thinking back to the actual Election Day, for which party did you vote" (1994: 
Q. 24.a) 
As previously, a list of parties was offered, plus "Did not vote" and 
"Confidential". 
In 1998 the question to measure the closeness to parties was: 
"Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party? 
(1998:Q. 6). Which party is that? (Q. 7). Which party do you feel closest to? (Q. 
8)" (this study is focused on the last question (Q. 8) as, in 1994, it was asked for a 
single party). 
As in 1994, a list of parties was offered, plus "No party". Later in the interview 
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the interviewed was asked to indicate their intention. The question was: 
"If there were elections tomorrow, which political party or organisation would 
you vote for?" (1998: Q. 58) 
As above, a list of parties was offered, also with the "D'k" possibility. 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below show the results of the existing closeness-to-party 
feelings in 1994 and 1998. It would have been of great interest to survey the closeness 
to the parties every year and not only in the election years, to discover whether people 
identify political parties with elections (closeness would increase in election period) 
or with political organisations permanently active. However, the data available for 
this research does not allow such an observation. Besides that, the results presented 
clearly indicate a decrease, both in voting intention (or the expressed intention) and 
sympathy for the parties from 1994 to 1998. It is also important to note that the 
percentage of people close to parties in 1994 - the first democratic elections - doubles 
the percentage in 1998. This means that many people had illusions in 1994 which 
might have been frustrated. 
The important difference between closeness and voting also indicates very strong 
feelings of "instrumentalism" accompanying the vote. 
Table 4 6 Do vou usuallv think of vourself as close of anv noli tical Dartv? (%) 0994) 
Percentage 
!Yes 88 
jNo (D' k incl.) 12 
jEntries represent the percentage of people supporting each option. 
INs= 2517 
Table 4 7 Do you usually think of yourself as close to anv DOli tical Darty? (%) 0998) 
Percentage 
Yes 44.4 
!No (D' k incl.) 55.6 
!Entries represent the percentage of people supporting each option. 
INs= 2200 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 detail the same result but also indicates the party to which 
people feel closest. 
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Table 4 8 Party felt especially close to (1994) . 
Percent 
~frican National Congress 57.6 
[National Party 15 
Inkatha Freedom Party 5.3 
Freedom Front 2.2 
Democratic Party 1.3 
Pan Africanist Congress 1.4 
~frican Christian Democratic Party 0.4 
Other 1.4 
Confidential 3.5 
Total 88 
No closeness 12 
Entries represent the percentage of people feeling close to each party. 
INs= 2517 
Table 4 9 Party felt especially close to (1998) 
Percent 
African Muslim Party 0 
African Christian Democratic Party 0.1 
African National Congress 34.9 
Conservative Party 0.2 
Democratic Party 1.3 
Freedom Front 0.3 
Inkatha Freedom Party 2.4 
National Party 3.3 
Pan Africanist Congress 1 
United Christian Democratic Party 0.2 
United Democratic Movement 0.5 
Other 0.4 
Refused 0.1 
Entries represent the percentage of people feeling close to each party. 
Ns=2200 
4.9.5 Vote for party 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the intentions of voters m 1994 and 1998, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.10 National level vote (1994) 
~~r-fr-ic-an_N_a_t-io-na_l_C-on-g-re_s_s-------------r------Pe_~~~:~nt----~~ 
~ational Party 16.4 
~nkatha Freedom Party 5.1 
Freedom Front 1.9 
Democratic Party 1.3 
Pan Africanist Congress 1.5 
African Christian Democratic Party 0.4 
Other 0.7 
No vote 3.9 
Confidential 8.2 
Entries represent the percentage ofpeop1e who voted for each party. 
Ns= 2517 
Table 4 11 National level vote 0998) 
Percent 
African Muslim Party 0.1 
African Christian Democratic Party 0.5 
African National Congress 51.3 
Azanian People's Organisation 0.5 
Conservative Party 0.5 
Democratic Party 7.2 
Freedom Front 1.1 
Inkatha Freedom Party 4.1 
Minority Front 0.1 
National Party 10.4 
Pan Africanist Congress 1.5 
United Christian Democratic Party 0.3 
United Democratic Movement 2.1 
Other Party 0.3 
Do not know 12.3 
Will not vote 3.5 
Refused 3.8 
None of these 0 
Entries represent the percentage ofpeop1e who intended to vote for each party. 
Ns= 2200 
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Finally, Table 4.12 presents the combination of both the results of feeling 
sympathy for and voting for a party in 1994 and 1998. Figure 4.6 presents the same 
results in a bar-plot. 
Table 4 12 Closeness and vote for oartv (1994 1998) 
-
1994 1998 
Closeness 88 44.4 
Vote 87.9 79.9 
Entries represent the percentage of people in South Africa who felt close or 
intended to vote/voted for a party. 
Ns 2517 2200 
Fieure 4.6 Parties in South Africa: Closeness and vote (1994-1998) 
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Although the manifested participation in elections remains high, the closeness to 
or sympathy for parties has dropped by a half. In 1994 those who voted for a party, 
according to these results, felt close to the party they voted for; in 1998 more or less 
half of those who intended to vote in the coming elections, felt close to a party. Many 
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people's hopes were probably frustrated. This is evidenced in the evaluation of 
government by the citizens. This evaluation was only positive during election time 
(see Mattes et al., 1999). 
This indicator does not bode well for South Africa either. People are participating 
in politics "instrumentally", as something they may have to do, but not actively and 
positively. 
4.9.6 Interest in politics 
The previous results indicate that closeness to parties has decreased. As closeness 
to party decreases, it seems necessary to observe whether people have interest in 
politics in general. This will allow testing whether people are becoming disenchanted 
just with the political parties or by the political system in general. 
It is obvious that the interest in politics increases in the electoral year as the most 
important political decision is made: the election of the government. Besides, it is 
important to know whether apathy to politics (re) emerges after that. As a result, this 
study will test whether people are interested in political issues in the country 
periodically, only during election years or not even then, the last one being the worst 
for democratic consolidation. 
The HSRC asks people annually whether they read, watch, listen and talk about 
politics and how often. In essence, respondents are prompted to say: 
"How often do you read newspaper reports .. .! watch television programmes .. .! 
listen to radio programmes .. .! discuss with other people ... on politics?" 
The possible answers (for all the questions and for all the years) are: (i) 'Hardly 
ever'; (ii) 'two or three times a month'; (iii) 'Once a month'; (iv) 'two or three times a 
week'; (v) 'One or more times a day'. If a committed-to-democracy citizen is involved 
with politics, that the more, the better. Consequently, this study is focused on the last 
option (once or more times a day). In other words, this study surveys how many 
people get information and discuss politics once or more times a day. Furthermore, as 
not everybody in the country have access to TV, radio or newspapers, the research 
will only focus on the possibility available to everybody, namely: 
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"How often do you talk about politics with other people?" (1994: Q. 5; 1995: Q. 
5; 1996: Q: 4; 1997; Q. 4; 1998: Q. 5; 1999: Q. 5). 
Table 4.13, below, shows the results. Figure 4.7 presents the same results but bar-
plotted. They imply that people in South Africa, during the first years of the 
democracy were more interested in politics during (or when close to) elections. 
Table 4 13 Talk about nolitics with other neonle once or more times a dav (%) 0994 1999) 
-
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Yes 7.6 7 3.5 7.7 9.4 6.1 
Entries represent the percentage of people who talk once or more times a day about politics with 
other people. 
Ns 2250 2226 2228 2220 2227 2210 
Fieure 4.7 Talk about nolitics with other neonle once or more times a day 0994-1999) 
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4.9.7 Membership of independent organisations 
Independent-from-the-state organisations are essential for the survival of the civil 
society. Committed-to-democracy citizens are to join these organisations,· which 
control and challenge the state when necessary and are an essential part of civil 
society. Consequently, the evolution of the membership of these organisations is also 
of great importance for the consolidation of the South African democracy. 
The evolution of membership can be surveyed both before and after the first 
democratic elections, that is, both during and before democracy. As said above, the 
existence of civil society under democracy is a condition for its endurance, but this 
does not imply that there can not be civil society under non-democratic forms of 
government. Consequently, this issue will also be examined in 1983, as far as the 
availability and comparability of the existing data allows it. Hence, partisanship is 
surveyed in 1983, 1994 and 1998. 
In 1983, the HSRC asked South Africans whether they belonged to any of these 
organisations. The question was: 
"Please indicate your membership of or association with any of the following 
types of organisations" (1983: Q. 10) 
The interviewed was offered four different types of organisations, namely, sport 
club, social club, welfare organisation and trade union. The alternatives were, in all of 
them, either 'Yes' or 'No'. 
For comparative reasons only Sport Clubs, Social Organisations and Trade 
Unions are taking into account. Table 4.14 presents the results. 
Table 4.14 Membership of or2anisations (%) (1983) 
Sport Club Social Club Trade Union 
Total I 20.5 I 15.7 I 6.6 / 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each 
organisation in 1983. For the total percentages the data have been weighted according to data from 
SARR's annual survey so as to include people from the so-called Independent Homelands. 
Ns = 3392 
In 1994, and 1998, the HSRC presented, within its annual survey, a list of 
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organisations to test the membership of the respondent. It ranked from political parties 
to hostel committees. 'Social club' is not included in the surveys after 1994 as such. 
Cultural organisations and political parties are added. The respondent was asked: 
"Are you a sympathiser or a member who regularly goes to meetings, or are you 
an office bearer of ... " (1994: Q. 61; 1999: Q. 39). 
The difference between simple membership and office bearer has not been taken 
into account for comparative reasons. Sympathisers are not considered to be 
members. 
Table 4.15 below shows the results for 1994 and Table 4.16 those for 1998. After 
1994 the HSRC eliminated the 'Sport Club' question, and added others. In substitution 
'Cultural organisation' and 'political party' were included for comparative reasons to 
the 1994 questionnaire. Others such as youth or women's organisations would leave 
out people on account of sex or age. This could bias the comparability through the 
years. 
Table 4 15 Membershin of or~:anisations (%) (1994) 
1994 Sport Org. Social (Civic) Org. Cultural Org. Trade Union Political party 
Total 15.6 6.6 11.13 7.8 19.0 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each 
organisation in 1994. 
Ns = 2517 
Table 4 16 Membershin of or~:anisations (%) (1999) 
1998 Sport Org. Social (Civic) Org. Cultural Org. Trade Union Political Party 
Total Not available 4.8 9.9 10.7 14.2 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each 
organisation in 1998. 
Ns= 2200 
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All the results are summarised and presented in Table 4.17. 
Table 4 17 Membershil! of or~:anisations {1983 1999) -
Social (Civic) Org. Trade Union Sport Org. Cultural Org. Political Party 
1983 15.7 6.6 20.5 Not available Not available 
1994 6.6 7.8 15.6 11.13 19.0 
1998 6.8 8.7 Not available 12.7 14.2 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each 
organisation in each year. 
Ns1983 3392 
Ns1994 2517 
Ns1999 2200 
The results leave no room for doubt. There is no important increase in any of the 
organisations. Actually, the only important movement is seen in the sport and social 
category and this simply shows a decrease. Trade Union membership is the only 
category showing growth. 
In this regard it is important to note that, in general27 , civil society in South Africa 
is not evolving properly. 
Non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, churches, trade 
unions and voluntary organisations in general compose the civil society. As shown in 
the tables, membership of organisations remains low. Only Trade Union membership 
grows. The reason for this may be that Trade Unions have played a predominant role 
in the democratisation of the country. Much of the pressure for democracy was 
applied, historically, from the Trade Unions (see Chapter 5 for their role in 
democratisation). 
The other organisations not only do not gain members, but are also losing leaders. 
With the coming of democracy many members of these organisations immigrated into 
high position in the administration, leaving many non-governmental organisations 
without qualified members to lead them. Many of the non-governmental organisations 
"have closed or drastically curtailed their operations. This has given rise to a general 
perception that the sector is shrinking" (James & Caliguire, 1996: 61). 
27 Obviously, civil society includes a wider and more complex net of organisations. This simply is a 
mere indication of the membership evolution- increase/decrease- of some of them 
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To this has to be added that all organisations that were struggling against 
apartheid, "now do not have any focus". Once apartheid disappeared, those 
organisations struggling for the abolishment of apartheid have no reason of existence. 
This has affected consequently their funding. Many NGOs relied on foreign funding, 
which with the arrival of democracy has been cut down (James & Caliguire, 1996: 
63). 
Finally, it is necessary to state that the new government's policy toward NGOs did 
not help to solve this problem. It rather finally strangled the sector. If any NGO wants 
to obtain foreign funds, it must obtain a permit from the government-appointed 
director of fundraising. However, there are no general guidelines or criteria for the 
permit to be granted. Thus, organisations depend on the personal criteria of the person 
in charge. This automatically opens the door for abuse. If an organisation is declared 
to be involved in politics, it is automatically prohibited from receiving funds (James 
& Caliguire, 1996: 64; see also Gyimah-Boadi, 1996; Breytenbach, 1998b). 
This simply indicates lack of autonomy in South Africa's civil society. The 
members of civil society organisations are decreasing and those that remain are 
chained by having to depend on arbitrary government decisions regarding funding 
and, hence, existence. 
In the end, this simply is another indicator that does not bode well for democracy 
in South Africa either. No civil society, no democracy. 
4.10 Summary 
In this Chapter the operationalisation of the consolidation of democracy in South 
Africa, based on some indicators of its political culture, was performed. 
Different approaches to political culture were offered and a final selection of 
attributes characterising political culture took place according to propositions from 
earlier studies, the peculiar South African characteristics and the availability and 
comparability of data. The attributes arrived at, were political tolerance28 and trust. 
Besides these, and on informative basis, some other indicators were offered. They, 
28 Social tolerance was also offered to strengthen the argument. 
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however, are less significant and there is no general agreement on their importance. 
Thus, these added indicators were presented according to availability and 
comparability but will not be analysed any further. 
The final picture obtained from of these findings has a dual orientation. On one 
side, political tolerance, refusal of political violence and voting favour democratic 
stability. This indicates that the "democratic mechanism" functions. Elections are held 
-peacefully - and governments are elected democratically. However, on the other 
hand, trust is decreasing, and so are the other indicators presented, namely closeness 
to parties, belief in the capacity of personal influence, membership of independent 
organisations (with the exception of trade unions- which is understandable due to the 
important political role they have played historically). 
Against this background, (social and political) tolerance and trust will be 
thoroughly analysed in the following Chapter to attempt to arrive at some conclusions 
on democratic consolidation in South Africa. The distribution of these values in 
subgroups (race, urban/rural, age, education, etc.) will be a point of major importance. 
Pertinent reference will be made to the other indicators to strengthen the argument, 
when necessary. 
At this point the only comment to be made is that two doors are open to South 
African democracy (one indicator points to positive and the other to negative 
progress). Then, further analysis is required. 
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Chapter 5. The South African middle class and democratic 
consolidation: Results analysed 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous four Chapters the background to democratisation, democratic 
consolidation, social structure, social class analysis, middle class and important aspects 
for the consolidation of democracy were presented to the reader. 
Both the third and the fourth Chapters concluded with findings that are difficult to 
interpret. The middle class has grown between 1970 and 1999, but since 1994, the year 
of the founding elections, to 1999, growth has been nearly non-existent (it only grew by 
two percent since 1997). 
On the other hand, the main indicators of democratic consolidation, political 
tolerance and trust, follow diverse trends. Political tolerance, an important ingredient for 
the existence of any democracy, is increasing. This is supported by the fact that the 
rejection of political violence is also increasing. This is understandable and reasonable. 
In 1994, the year of founding elections, there were more than 2000 deaths due to 
political violence. With those figures, if the political intolerance (understood as the 
acceptance of the disliked groups - see Chapter 4) had increased, there would probably 
not be any democracy to consolidate in South Africa. Tolerance is an important 
condition for the democratisation of the country. No tolerance, no democracy 
(especially taking into account the levels of political violence prior to 1994). However, 
there is no acknowledged minimum of political tolerance for democracy to exist. Hence, 
the only possibility is to show the trend over time. An increase in political tolerance will 
obviously favour democratic consolidation, whereas a decrease in political tolerance 
will impede it political competition becoming intractable and democratic institutions 
unstable. 
On the other hand, trust, a more substantive part of democracy, is decreasing. Trust 
1s not essential for the democratisation of the country, but it is for the proper 
consolidation of the democracy. If tolerance is a nut of the democratic machine, trust 
and the other indicators lubricate the system for a proper functioning ensuring enduring 
performance. 
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In this Chapter, the results presented in the two preceding Chapters (dealing with 
the middle class and the indicators of democratic consolidation) are presented for 
further analysis. Their distribution among the different population groups, age groups 
and other important cleavages is analysed. For instance, it will be important to know 
whether intolerance is more common in older people, more embedded in the past, or 
whether age does not seem to produce any effect. Of importance will also be the 
composition of the middle class. Is it equally composed of the different population 
groups or, is the White population leading ahead as is expected? If this is the case, how 
is it evolving over time? 
Firstly, the middle class results are presented again and analysed. The factors that 
shaped the middle class into its current form are also presented to explain its size and 
composition. In other words, the evolution of the labour and education policies in South 
Africa are explained. After this, the middle class is analysed according to its 
occupational components. 
Secondly, the results drawn from the analysis of the selected indicators of 
democratic consolidation are re-introduced. Their distribution through the different 
population groups, age groups, etc. is also analysed. 
At this point, it is important to focus on the considerations: In Chapter land Chapter 
4 it was explained that this is not a study of the political culture of South African 
democracy. The study uses two indicators of political culture relevant to democratic 
consolidation (tolerance and trust) to show the trends of democratic commitment over 
time, whether pro-democracy or not. As said in Chapter 1 and 4, this study regards a 
democracy as consolidated when its people consider it to be the best regime. This, as 
was explained, should be reflected in their political culture. Thus, the indicators of 
political culture related to democratic consolidation were surveyed and its evolution 
over time presented. Not all the indicators of political culture were examined, as this 
enterprise would demand analysis of too large a range of indicators that have nothing to 
do with the consolidation of democracy. The selected indicators were tolerance and trust 
drawn from previous research and propositions from the relevant literature (see Chapter 
4). Besides these, more indicators of political culture related to democratic 
consolidation were presented in order to provide the reader with a wider picture of 
existing political culture in South Africa. This, however, does not imply that those 
193 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
indicators are to be analysed in this Chapter, as there is no general agreement on their 
importance. Consequently, tolerance and trust, the two main indicators of consolidation 
of democracy, will now be analysed in detail, focusing on distribution by race, age, 
income, occupation and education. 
Initially, the analysis of the middle class is undertaken. 
5.2 Middle class results: A reminder 
The results from Chapter 2 are presented again. Table 5.1 presents the results for the 
old middle class. Table 5.2 presents the results for the new middle class and Table 5.3 
presents the results for the total middle class. The distribution through the different 
population groups is also presented in each table. In order to gain clarity in the 
presentation, the tables are presented on the same page. The surveys used were 1970 
Census, HSRC '94, '95, '97 and '99. 
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Table 5 1 Old Middle Class 
Population 1970 1994 1995 1997 1999 
Group 
Black Not Available 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 
White Not Available 5.1 2.8 2.4 1.2 
Coloured Not Available 1.9 0.5 0.4 0 
Indian Not Available 4.6 3.0 1.5 0 
TOTAL Not Available 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group - and of the whole (total) population - falling within the 
OLD middle class in each year. As explained in Chapter 3, there is no data available for old middle class before 1994 
as there either is no income question for certain population groups (census 1970) or the data is simply not 
comparable (does not include the former independent homelands). Ns are offered below. 
Ns 12747280 2250 2226 2220 2210 
Table 52 New Middle Class 
Population 1970 1994 1995 1997 1999 
Group 
Black 1.2 3.0 3.0 3.9 5.8 
White 18.5 23.3 27.1 25.9 33.3 
Coloured 3.0 9.zl 8.2 5.5 11.0 
Indian 6.1 18.31 17.61 13.1 19.3 
TOTAL 2.7 7.4 1 7.7 8.1 10.4 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group - and of the whole (total) population - falling within the 
NEW middle class in each year. Ns are offered below. 
1 Updated from OHS 1995 
Ns 12747280 2250 2226 2220 2210 
Table 5 3 Total Middle Class 
Population 1970 1994 1995 1997 1999 
Group Total (only Total Total Total Total 
new) 
Black 1.2 3.3 3.3 4.1 5.8 
White 18.5 28.6 29.9 28.3 34.5 
Coloured 3.0 11.11 8.7 5.9 11.0 
Indian 6.1 21.51 20.61 14.6 19.3 
TOTAL 2.7 8.7 1 8.5 8.7 10.6 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group - and of the whole (total) population- falling within the 
TOTAL middle class in each year. For 1970, the total is composed only by new middle class. For 1970 only new 
middle class data is offered. Ns are offered below. 
1 Updated from OHS 1994, 1995 
Ns 12747280 2250 2226 2220 2210 
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Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that there has been an enlargement of the middle 
class over a period of nearly 30 years. However, the total is still only 10.4% 1 of the 
population. In the democratic period it has grown by less than 2 %, although the main 
progress is located in the last two years, from 8.7% in 1997 to 10.6% in 1999. Further 
research will reveal whether the last datum (10.6%) is accidental, derived, maybe, from 
the margin of error in the survey, or if it is really growing. 
It is important to note the progress of the Black population in this regard, which 
registers at from 3.3% to 5.8%. This important advance of the Black population 
(proportionally the largest) seems, then, to be the main responsible factor for the 
enlargement of the middle class. This increase will be analysed later in the Chapter. 
The Coloured population seems to remain stable when comparing 1994 to 1999 and 
so does the Indian population. The White population also progressed from 1994 (28.6%) 
to 1999 (34.5%). Although progress is non-existent 2 between 1994 and 1997. 
The middle class has been presented by race. In the following section, the middle 
class is dissected into its occupational components. As the old 3 middle class in South 
Africa is following the same tendency as in many other countries (progressive 
shrinking) and the main pieces of labour legislation that have been passed affected the 
occupations that form part of the "new" middle class (professionals, managers, clerical 
workers) the main focus of this section is on the "new" middle class4 . 
5.3 Middle class analysed by occupation 
In this section the attention shifts to the occupation-based composition of the middle 
class. The race-based composition was presented both in Chapter 3 and in the 
1 There is no known pro-democracy growth of the middle class, or normal pro-democratic size 
information of the middle class. However, when, for instance, it is maintained (see Lipset, 1963) that 
stable democracies show a diamond-shaped social structure with a large middle class, it implies that most 
of the population falls in within middle class. The indicated 10 % (South African middle class size) does 
not represent most of the population. Further research will reveal whether it keeps growing or not. 
2 As previously said, data up until 1997 can be compared to the October Household Surveys. Thus, up 
until 1997, the figures can be checked against the OHSs, increasing, therefore, the reliability of the 
analysis. 
3 Those self-employed, propertied with middle income. 
4 On the shrinking evolution of the old middle class, see Glassman (1997); Glassman eta!., (1993). 
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introduction to this Chapter. Besides, further analysis is required to see where the 
advance (if any) is located, whether at the top (professionals) or at lower levels of the 
middle class (clerks). What follows is a dissection of the middle class according to 
occupation and race. The surveys used, as said above, were Census 1970 and HSRC '94, 
'95, '97 and '99. These were discussed in Chapter 3. 
Table 54 Middle Class 1970 (Occugational comoosition) 
Occupation Population Group 
New Middle Class Black Coloured Indian White 
Professional 0.6 1.2 1.6 5.4 
Manager 0.02 0.003 0.3 1.9 
Clerk 0.6 1.8 4.2 11.2 
Old Middle Class 
Total Middle Class (only new) 1.2 3.0 6.1 18.5 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group falli~~ 
within each occupation category. Information available for new middle cla 
only. Ns = 12747280 
Table 55 Middle Class 1994 (Occugational comoosition) 
!Occupation Population Group 
~ew Middle Class Black Coloured Indian White 
Professional 1.7 3.1 5.zl 10.1 
Manager 0 0.7 1.1 4.0 
Clerk 1.3 2.zl 9.91 8.8 
Old Middle Class 0.3 1.9 4.6 5.1 
Total Middle Class 3.3 7.9 1 21.5 1 28.6 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group falling 
~ithin each occupation category. Ns = 2226 
1 Upgraded from the OHS '94 
Table 56 Middle Class 1995 (Occuoational comgosition) 
Occupation Population Group 
New Middle Class Black Coloured Indian White 
Professional 1.8 3.1 6.51 11.11 
Manager 0.2 0.61 1.5 5.9 
Clerk 1 2.8 7.31 10.01 
Old Middle Class 0.3 0.5 3 2.8 
Total Middle Class 3.3 7.01 18.31 29.81 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group falling 
within each occupation category. Ns = = 2226 
1 Upgraded from the OHS '95 
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Table 57 Middle Class 1997 (Occuoational comoosition) 
!occupation Population Group 
!New Middle Class Black Coloured Indian White 
Professional 2.0 3.91 7.31 12.81 
Manager 0.61 1.6 1.8 6.i 
Clerk 1.8 2.3 6.5 12.3 
Old Middle Class 0.2 0.4 1.5 2.4 
Total Middle Class 4.6 1 8.2 1 17.1 1 34.2 1 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group falling 
jwithin each occupation category. Ns = 2220 
1 Updated on OHS '97 
Table 58 Middle Class 1999 (Occugational comgosition) 
!Occupation Population Group 
!New Middle Class Black Coloured Indian White 
Professional 3.3 4.6 0.8 15.8 
Manager 0.5 0.7 1.5 6.6 
Clerk 2.0 5.7 17.0 10.9 
Old Middle Class 0 0 0 1.2 
!Total 5.8 11.0 19.3 34.5 
!Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group fallin~ 
jwithin each occupation category. Ns = 2210 
Tables 5.4 to 5.8 indicate an important advance of the Black population from 1970 
to 1999 in the "professional" and "clerk" categories. However, if the comparison is only 
made between 1994 and 1999, the democratic period, the advance is at the highest level 
only: "Professional". The figure is doubled from 1,7% in 1994 to 3.3% in 1999, whereas 
the advance in "managers" and "clerks" categories is much lower (0.7% advance for 
clerks since 1994 and 0.5% for managers in the same period). Thus, the main progress 
of the Black middle class is at the highest level, whereas the advance is much slower in 
middle sectors, especially if taking into account the fact that, after 1994, the Black 
population arrived at the public institutions and the Black sector was pushed up with 
affirmative action. Thus, the real enlargement of the Black middle class has only 
occurred at the top level. 
The White population has tripled their participation at the "professional" level 
(from 5.4% in 1970, to 10.1% in 1994 and to 15.8% in 1999). At the "manager" level, 
the increase has also been considerable: From 1.9 % in 1970 to 4.0 % in 1994 and to 
6.6% in 1999. For clerical workers, the movement is not spectacular. In 1970, 11.2% of 
198 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Whites were working as clerical workers. This percentage went down to 8.8 in 1994 and 
it went up again to 10.9 in 19995 . This change from 1970 to 1994 may be due to the 
margin of error of the survey. In this regard, it is necessary to say that, at this level of 
analysis (small subgroups selected) the reliability of the data decreases. Besides, the 
main aim of the study is to show the trend and this indicates that the White middle class 
has grown at all levels (more than two percent in 5 years). 
For the Coloured population the growth is as follows. They advance at the 
"professional" level (from 1.2% in 1970 to 4.6% in 1999). In the "managerial" level, the 
progress is from none to 0.7 in 1999. At the clerical level the increase goes from 1.8% 
for 1970 to 2.2% in 1994 and to 5.7% in 1999. Thus, the Coloured middle class is 
growing both at the high and the lower levels. 
Indians start, at the professional level, at 1.6% in 1970, increasing to 5.2% in 1994 
and to 7.3% in 19976 . Their progress in this sector is the most impressive. At the 
managerial level, the growth is from 0.3% in 1970 to 1.1% in 1994 and to 1.5% in 1999. 
At the clerical level, the progress goes from 4.2% in 1970 to 6.5% in 19977. Thus, 
Indian middle class also grows both at the higher and lower levels - although the 
growth at the managerial level is nearly non-existent. 
Against this background, it is possible to affirm that the White middle class 
progresses the most. The Black population's advance is also important, although only at 
the top level. 
This enlargement of the middle class has obviously been produced by political, 
social and economical changes, both at the South African and at the international level. 
Both South African economic and political forces and international economy influenced 
the configuration of the social structure in general and the middle class in particular. 
These forces that shaped the middle class in South Africa to its current configuration are 
now presented to the reader. 
5 The figure for 1997 is 12.3%. Further research will reveal whether the figure for 1999 is "softer" and 
whether the share keeps growing, or whether the figure is correct. However, it is still larger than in 1994. 
6 The figure for 1999 might be wrong. Such a sharp decrease in such a short period of time is not really 
explainable. In the following years, this figure may b.e revised as new data is added and longitudinal 
surveys become available. 
7 The same goes for this figure but in the reverse way. It is difficult to understand such an important 
increase in such a short period of time. 
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The middle class was operationalised in terms of occupation. Occupation is a main 
ingredient of the labour market. Hence, the past and present situation of the labour 
market in South Africa will now be explained. It is also important to explain the 
enskilling process, which largely depends on the education system. It is then important 
to understand the functioning of the education system and its implications for the social 
structure configuration properly. These issues will be discussed next. 
5.4 South Africa's middle class: Evolution analysed 
In this section the reader is introduced to the labour market and the education 
system in South Africa. The different legislation policies, applied through the years and 
shaping the labour force - and consequently the middle class - are examined. 
The different labour and education policies have influenced the stze and 
composition of the South African middle class, producing its current configuration. 
Legislation has favoured the White population groups at the expense of the others (more 
strongly at the expense of the Black population). 
Industrialisation in South Africa began with the discovery of diamonds in 1870 and 
of gold in 1872. Before that time, South Africa was a mainly agrarian society. Any 
existing employment relations were regulated by the Master and Servants Act of 1841 
(Grossett & Venter, 1998: 30-32). 
Traditionally, because South Africa did not have a large enough skilled work force, 
European migrants were employed to do the work in this category (Marais, 1998: 8). 
As these workers were in high demand, they occupied a privileged position in the labour 
market (the rest was made up by Blacks and those Whites who were obliged to leave the 
land after the Anglo-Boer war). These workers' unions formed the first trade unions in 
South Africa, which were therefore skilled unions. The first regulation instituting an 
industrial colour bar, even if indirectly, was introduced in 1897. This regulation already 
prevented Blacks from becoming skilled as they could not become mine-engine drivers 
(Finnemore & Vander Merwe, 1992: 17-20). 
After this, the Anglo-Boer war came to an end in 1902. Many Afrikaans families 
were obliged to seek work in the industrial areas. This comprised a threat to skilled 
workers and in 1907, White mineworkers went on strike, because of the utilisation of 
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unskilled White persons (the so-called "poor White") 8 . To this, was to be added the 
danger of losing jobs in favour of cheaper Black labour. Realising that they could gain 
power by other means, many White workers joined the newly formed South African 
Labour Party and, later, the Afrikaner Nationalist Party (Hunter, 1965: 115-117; Nel & 
Van Rooyen, 1989: 50-60; on this see also Fine & Davis, 1990). 
This was followed by the 1911 Mines and Works Act, which, in essence, reserved 
thirty-two job categories for White mineworkers. These jobs were skilled jobs; thus 
Black, Coloured and Indian workers saw their chances becoming skilled decrease 
(Terreblanche & Nattrass, 1990: 8; Lipton, 1989: 19-20). 
From 1910 to 1920, Black wages declined. Income of most population groups 
decreased, except for White English speaking and wealthier farmers (also White). This 
obviously shaped the social structure (and consequently the middle class) in a pro- White 
way. Those whose incomes did not decrease, retained higher positions in the social 
structure (Terreblanche & Nattras, 1989: 8; see also Vander Berg, 1989). 
Afrikaners had for long resented the dominance of the English-speaking section, 
and especially the immigrant workers in industry (Hunter, 1965: 105-108). This led to 
the creation, in 1918, of the Afrikanerbond (also known as Broederbond9). One of the 
specific aims of this body was to capture a share of the wealth of the country for the 
Afrikaner group (O'Meara, 1983: 3; Marais, 1998: 17). 
The first comprehensive labour law was passed in 1924 in the form of the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. It concretised racial divisions through the exclusion of Blacks. With 
this, Blacks, who had no recognition in the political sphere, were now denied the right 
of legally exercising power in labour relations. In this way, racial segregation was 
already embedded in the industrial relations system long before the National Party 
legally entrenched the apartheid policy (Nel & Van Rooyen, 1989: 55-60; Marais, 
1998: 11). As Blacks were, in this manner, excluded from industrial bargaining and 
access to certain skilled jobs, their potential progress in the social structure, in general, 
and middle class, in particular, suffered an important blow. 
8 In 1929, the "Poor Whites" were estimated to number some 220 000 (more than one-tenth of the White 
~opulation) (Hunter, 1965: 116). 
On Broederbond see, for instance, Serfontein, ( 1979). 
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In 1933, the National Party and the South African Party joined to establish a new 
party, the South African National Party. Parallel to this, was created the Purified 
National Party (Bendix, 1989: 291). 
The 1930s brought important changes in the political and economical arena. The 
economic growth of the late 1930s boosted the industrialisation process, which 
accelerated urbanisation. However, most Blacks still remained living in rural areas 
(Marais, 1998: 12 10). 
The National Party came to power m 1948. This was a period of general 
dissatisfaction amongst people of all races (because of economic hardship, job scarcity, 
etc.). Actually, the 1946 strike (70 000 miners and 6000 iron workers), for instance, is 
"commonly portrayed as a land mark event announcing a crisis in South African 
capitalism" (Marais, 1998: 12; Fines & Davis, 1990: 11-18, Saul & Gelb, 1985: 12-16). 
Employment was scarce and the influx of Blacks to the urban areas led to unrest in the 
townships. This produced a demand for stricter influx control. Increased polarisation 
between the different population groups - also between Afrikaans and English speaking 
- characterised this period, which set the scene for the policies that were to follow 
(Marais, 1998: 10; Finnemore & Van der Merwe, 1992: 22-23; Adam, 1971: 37-52). 
The subsequent regulations caused further polarisation. It also included a system of job 
reservation whereby a particular occupation could be legally reserved for a certain race 
group. This Job Reservation clause became one of the most notorious provisions in 
South African labour legislation. The passage of these Acts entrenched racial division 
by separatist legislation more effectively than ever before (Nel & Van Rooyen, 1989: 
65; O'Meara, 1996: 19-38). This signified another important blow at expectations of 
growth for the Black middle class, as many skilled occupations were reserved for 
Whites 11 . 
These job reservation clauses were not the only limitation to Black, Coloured and 
Indian people becoming skilled. The whole education system was configured to 
entrench such a limitation. 
10 On Black urbanisation at that time, see also Smit (1985). 
11 On this can be consulted Wolpe, (1988); Cranksham, (1996a; 1996b). The second also offers an 
interesting review of studies in the field. 
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The apartheid policies of education began to be applied in an important manner in 
1953 with the passing of the Bantu Education Act. This Act removed education for 
Africans from provincial and rather haphazard control and handed it to the Ministry of 
Bantu Affairs. The Ministry of Education spoke of the "wrong type of education" for 
"Natives", which created a frustrated people with "expectations in life which 
circumstances in South Africa [did] not allow to be fulfilled". He continued: "I just 
want to remind . . . that if the Native in South Africa today in any kind of school in 
existence is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal 
rights, he is making a big mistake" (quoted in Bernstein, 1971: 43). 
Education, at that time 12, was compulsory for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, but 
not for Blacks. The total allocation to Black (Bantu) education was less that 0.4 % of 
South Africa's gross national product, whereas 4.5 % of GNP was destined for total 
education at all levels. Concretely, R 74 was allocated for each White child, R 17 for 
each Coloured child, R 26 for each Asian child and R 2, 39 for each African child 
(Bernstein, 1971: 50). These initial figures facilitate understanding of the subsequent 
evolution and different trends of different population groups in the social structure. If 
the investment in education and training was different for the different population 
groups, the opportunities of social and economic progress were also different. 
Stricter pass laws 13 were imposed by the National government. This worsened the 
situation, as Blacks became more aware of their lack of rights. Furthermore, with the 
economy still growing, the position of the Black employee in industrial society became 
more firmly entrenched. As Whites moved up in the occupational hierarchy, Blacks 
replaced them. This obviously permanently located the White population over the rest 
of the population groups in the social structure (Marais, 1998: 20; Davies et al., 1984: 
170-172; Bernstein, 1985: 85-103; Schlemmer, 1985: 104-113; Finnermore & Vander 
Merwe, 1992: 24). 
12 Figures refer to 1965. 
13 This "pass law" was already set down in 1922 by the Stallard Commission. As a result any Black man 
over sixteen years old had to carry a "pass" (reference book), which recorded permission to work and 
live in a particular White area. These pass laws (or influx controls) regulated the flow of African labour 
into the White areas and allocated labour to sectors and regions (Lipton, 1989: 18; see also Bekker & 
Humphrie, 1985). 
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In the sixties, one of the major problems of South Africa surfaced: The shortage of 
skilled workers. Actually, major interpretations of the crisis faced by the South African 
State and capital have also placed this problem of skill at the core of their arguments 
(see Saul & Gelb, 1981; Davies, 1979 or Sharp & Hatwig, 1983). 
Skills shortages surfaced in South Africa in the 1960s, largely as result of "the trend 
towards a rising organic composition of capital through mechanisation, reorganisation 
and rationalisation of the labour process to thereby enhance capital's national and 
international competitiveness" (Sharp & Hawing, 1983: 9). These shortages were 
aggravated by the shortage of Whites and a racist education system, which prohibited 
the production of adequately skilled Blacks (Chisholm, 1984: 7). 
During the 1960s, shortages of technicians, supervisors and artisans were met by 
floating the colour bar; shortages of clerical, administrative and sales personnel in 
circulation were overcome because of the availability of large amounts of foreign 
investment capital (Davis, 1979: 185). At the same time, to reproduce skilled labour 
power, the state began to place a major stress on vocational and technical education for 
Whites as well as on immigration (Sharp & Hatwing, 1983: 191)14. 
In the 1970s, apartheid reached its peak and arrived at a critical15 situation (Marais, 
1998: 37; Saul & Gelb, 1981: 3; Lipton, 1989: 281-306). The South African economy 
began to slide into recession (mounting balance of payment difficulties, growing 
inflation, etc.) The real growth rate, which averaged 5-7 annually during the 1960s, was 
zero in 1977. Increasing inflation, rising job losses and the removal of state subsidies on 
basic consumer items shaped the economical landscape (Morris & Padayache, 1989: 
76). 
The Bantu Labour Amendment Act, to keep Blacks out of skilled jobs, was another 
blow at Black middle class growth (Lipton, 1989: 35). It also was time of increasing 
mobilisation, strikes and general umest that threatened the government, then presided 
over by P. W. Botha. The government reacted extremely rapidly to the 1973 wave of 
strikes. In the same year, it passed the Black Labour Regulation Act. This gave Black 
14 For a detailed description of the South African apartheid education system during 1950s and 1960s, see 
Unesco, 1972: 33-118. 
15 Crisis here denotes not a "terminal breakdown" but a "turning point" (see Gibson, 1991: 2). 
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workers a limited right to strike. However, few unions representative of Blacks utilised 
those procedures. This in the end signified nothing "but suppression of the Black middle 
class [that] was unchanged, with continuing restrictions on entry to skilled jobs and on 
business and property rights" (Lipton, 1989: 37; see also Wolpe, 1977; Hindson & 
Crankshaw, 1990; 1996a). 
Those years, characterised by intensifying worker struggles and declining 
profitability, made by using earlier means of solving skill shortage problems impossible. 
The crisis of profitability forced capital to constantly introduce new technology to raise 
productivity. Thus, skill shortages were produced repeatedly. The political and 
ideological dimensions of the crisis necessitated reforming at least some aspects of the 
reproduction of labour power (Davis, 1979: 191). In this context, the only solution to 
the problems of skill shortages was to upgrade "the qualifications of significant sections 
of the Black population". This implied 'building up' a Black middle class committed to 
'free enterprise' (Chisholm, 1984: 9). 
By the 1970s, Whites were concentrated in the secondary and tertiary sectors 
(commerce and services) and the more skilled and White-collar sectors. Blacks 
dominated the primary sectors (agriculture, mining) and the low-wage and unskilled 
jobs: Coloured and Indians occupied middle position. This was created mainly by the 
job reservation policy (Lipton, 1989: 37 16). 
Also in the 1970s, Schools and Universities, "after a decade of near-silence, became 
key sites of resistance with the emergence of the South Africa Students' Organisation 
(SASO) and the Black Consciousness movement. Actually, Black students mounted a 
sustained attack on Bantu Education, on apartheid and, more explicitly, in 1980 at least, 
on capitalism between 1976 and 1981. On each occasion, albeit in different ways, they 
forged or attempted to forge links with workers" (Chisholm, 1984: 13). 
In 1973 it was announced that Blacks would be allowed to do skilled work. The 
"sacred rule that the hierarchical structure must be kept intact, with Blacks always 
working under Whites" was also abandoned (Lipton, 1989: 59). The possibilities of 
Black middle class growth were unleashed. However, this created a situation in which, 
16 On this see also Johnstone (1970) and Legassick, (1975). 
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at least under the law, all South Africans had an equal say in the industrial relations but 
within the political system, Blacks still remained outside the citizenry. This resulted in 
the politicisation of the trade unions, in particular, and the industrial relations, in general 
(Finnemore & Vander Merwe, 1992: 25; Nel & Van Royen, 1989: 67-71). 
These internal pressures were accompanied by international pressures. The threat of 
sanctions and disinvestment increased (on this see ILO, 1993). The result was the 
appointment of the Wiehahn Commission and the approval of the Industrial 
Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979. It recommended the abolition of "job reservation" 
and the legalisation of a non-racial trade union movement. This made union 
membership rise 17 (Marais, 1998: 51). The major impact of this act was Black South 
Africans were no longer excluded from the defmition of employees. The restrictions on 
Coloured and Indian businessmen were eased (Terreblanche & Nattrass, 1990: 15). 
Educational reform was crucial to the strategy of limited incorporation of small 
numbers of Blacks into middle class social strata. Education was a particularly sensitive 
and fertile area for state intervention since the desire for education and the frustration at 
the denial of both an adequate education and the fruits thereof had been a long-standing 
cause of bitterness. Reforms, which appeared to be real concessions, could defuse 
significant areas of opposition, at least in the short term. However, although the reforms 
were not merely cosmetic, they were implemented in a manner that left the roots of 
inequality in South Africa untouched. Actually, in education, these years of struggle 
were "most vividly demonstrated in the 1976 uprising and the school boycotts of 1980, 
which spread to every major and even some smaller towns in South Africa" (Chisholm, 
1984: 2) 
During the mid-1980s, the state started systematic repression of the unions. The 
Minister of Law and Order was given extensive powers such as the restriction of 
persons or organisations and the prohibition of attendance at gatherings and the 
publication of periodicals (De Villiers, 1987: 222-223; Marx, 1992: 149-169). In this 
regard, an estimated 33 000 people were detained during the several states of emergency 
that were declared during the late 1980s (Webster & Friedman, 1989: 22-25; 33-39; 
17 Since its formation in 1985, COSATU, for instance, has more than doubled its membership from 45 
000 to 921 497 paid-up members by 1990 (Alexander, 1990: 45). 
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Decker, 1990: 47). In 1986, the influx control measures were scrapped and the Black 
population was allowed to enter and work in urban areas without official state 
permission (Marais, 1998: 47, see also Morris & Padayachee, 1989 and Morris, 1991). 
The Department of Education and Training assigned high priority to the provision of 
technical education for Blacks within urban areas in the 1980s. Previously the majority 
of these training courses were offered in the Bantustans (Chisholm, 1984: 13). In the 
1980s these technical schools proliferated. In 1979 the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry 
into Labour recommended that restrictions on apprenticeship training for Blacks be 
lifted. Actually, a survey undertaken in 1982 by the University of Witwatersrand Centre 
for Continuing Adult Education revealed that the mining industry, the chemical, 
clothing, furniture, timber, paper, iron and steel industries and the Chamber of 
commerce were engaged in training Blacks at all levels. 
The strategic necessity for a class of Black middle-men in industrial relations was 
now emphasised constantly (Proctor-Sims, 1981: 196). By doing this, not only skill 
shortages were diminished, but the introduction of Blacks into management and 
supervisory positions, monitoring other Blacks, would also produce a class 
differentiation amongst Blacks. In other words, "skill[s] training [was] thus doing little 
more than socialising Blacks into values which schools are patently [able] to instil.. .. 
No wider education [was] provided ... the skills that [were] taught [t]here [were] 
narrow and limited to enabling the worker to relearn skills or competencies associated 
with maintaining machines" (Chisholm, 1984: 22-23). 
The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Commission of Inquiry, chaired by 
De Lange, was appointed in 1980 and reported a year later. It articulated a new 
meritocratic, non-racial, technicist educational ideology. This was to provide South 
Africa with an education system able to meet the necessary manpower needs in the 
country, being opposed to the racially divided departments of the present system. It 
proposed to allow academic schooling to Blacks, as long as they could afford it. This 
was not only an attempt of raising the enskilling level of the country, but also an attempt 
to "reform racial capitalism through co-option of the small Black middle class and 
increase control over the working class" (Chisholm, 1984: 6). 
When the Commission reported, the extent of the skills shortages was claimed to be 
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so great, that it could not be met by the White population which was already fully 
absorbed in employment, nor by White immigration which was not able to keep pace 
with the demand. For economic growth to be maintained, it was intoned, education 
would have to be revamped to enable the necessary education and training of some 
categories of Blacks. 
This whole process of increasing education and training produced another important 
effect in the South African economical landscape: The narrowing in the income gap 18 . 
Historically, there has been a serious income gap, mainly between Blacks and Whites. 
The slow increase of the White wage also helped to reduce this gap (Fallon, 1992)19. 
New urbanisation policies toward the Black population were also drafted. They 
aimed at creating class differences within the Black population through urbanisation 
policies (to create social differences between rural and urban Blacks) (Davies et al., 
1984: 122, see also Smit, 1985). Parallel to this, there was a reactivation of union 
organisation at a level not previously seen (Nel & Van Rooyen, 1989: 67-71; Finnemore 
& Vander Merwe, 1992: 25). Non-racial unions were allowed. This gave way to the 
emergence of the trade union federation COSATU (Congress of South African Trade 
Unions) in 1985 20 . The tricameral parliament was also established in the eighties (one 
legislature per population group, but Blacks being excluded). As the "Black" chamber 
was not created, protest and social unrest were re-boosted. Thus, the main intention of 
the reforms (to neutralise the opposition) was not reached. Rather, the openings "were 
used to revive old popular organisations, build new ones and strike fresh alliances 
around an increasingly unequivocal opposition against the apartheid system" (Marais, 
1998: 49, see also Swilling & Phillips, 1989). As a result of the rising unrest, the 
18 Between 1978 and 1988 the average Black monthly household income increased from Rl12 to R567-
an increase of 406 per cent. The comparable increase for Whites was 264 per cent (Schlemmer, 1991: 5). 
The 1996 Population Census survey revealed that Whites were still far ahead of the other population 
r,roups and especially the Black population. 
9 On income gap in South Africa see Biesheuvel, 1972; Horner, 1972; McGrath, 1989; Hofmeyer, 1990; 
Nattrass, 1978; 1990 among others. 
20 Although there are many unions (i.e. FOSATU - formed by twelve unions in 1979 - which was 
reluctant to get involved in political struggle (Lodge & Nason, 1991: 28), SACTU- an ANC sympathiser 
union that was willing to consider labour struggle as part of the liberation movement (Baskin, 1991: 28; 
Lodge & Nason, 1991: 28; Alexander (1990: 44)), this federation (of which FOSATU was a member) had 
a very important role to play. Mainly because unions were the only way Blacks had to participate 
politically. On unions in South Africa, see Habib (1997) or Wood (1998), on COSATU, in particular, see 
SPA (1996) or Alexander, (1990). 
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reforms were stopped and several repressive measures were approved to restore stability 
(Webster & Friedman, 1989: 22-25; 33-39; Dekker, 1990: 47; see also Saul, 1993; 
Bethelehem et al., 1989). This was accompanied by economic recession, job losses, an 
"emergence of a formidable array of popular organisations", the effect of international 
sanctions, the "absurdity of duplication state institutions (i.e. three chambers of 
parliament)", the recognition that "economic recovery was impossible without social 
and political stability" and the recognition of "the ANC as a force [with which] to 
negotiate a political transition" (Lipton, 1989: 328-338; Marais, 1998: 51-67). 
On 2 February 1990, President FW de Klerk announced the un-banning of and the 
lifting of the restrictions on several organisations (i.e. the AN C) and formal negotiations 
were launched (Gargill, 1990: 11; see also de Klerk, 1990). The fmal structure of these 
relations were still being negotiated 21 and the final picture would depend on the 
outcome of the constitutional negotiations and the general elections to be held on 27 
April 1994. In 1993, the main organisations opposing the regime (ANC, etc.) stated that 
"affirmative action" would have to be implemented to address socioeconomic 
inequalities. This implied the appointment of Blacks, Coloureds and Indians (mainly 
Blacks) in positions historically reserved for the White population. With this, positive 
expectations of the Black middle class flourished (Human, 1993: 1 0-12). 
In October 1994, the new Government of National Unity launched a strategic five-
year plan: Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 22 . This plan aimed at 
converting South Africa into a more just and equal society by creating 2.5 million jobs, 
build one million low-cost homes by the year 2000; provide electricity to 2.5 million 
homes, provide running water, provide the society with compulsory education, extend 
infrastructure through public works programmes and restructure the state institutions to 
reflect the racial, class and gender composition of soCiety" (Marais, 1998: 177 -198; see 
also Freund, 1994; Bond et al., 1996i3 . 
21 On the 1990s negotiation see for instance, the edited work by Friedman (1993); Morris (1993); Newitt 
& Bennun (1995) or Sisk (1995). On the meaning of political bargaining see Du Toit (1990). On the 
participants see for instance, Gagiano (1990). 
22 The plan was pacted by ANC leaders and COSATU in the early nineties. Several drafts preceded the 
final version. This plan was a condition from COSATU for their support to the ANC in the polls (Lodge, 
1999: 3-4). 
23 On the labour law changes that accompanied the RDP, see, for instance, Rudd & Van Zyl (1997: esp. 
4-5) or Kalula & Woolfrey (1995: esp. 29-70). 
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The RDP programme was followed by the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) plan presented in June 1996. The aims of this programme were 
"a faster fiscal deficit reduction programme; a renewed focus on budget reform; a 
reduction on tariffs; a commitment to moderate wage demands; an exchange rate policy 
aimed at keeping the real exchange rate stable; a consistent monetary policy aimed at 
preventing a resurgence of inflation; the gradual relaxing of exchange controls; the 
speeding up of the restructuring of state controls; tax incentives to stimulate investment; 
an expansionary fiscal programme to address services deficiencies and backlogs and a 
strengthened levy system to fund training" (Biggs, 1997: 48; see also Marais, 1998: 
160-17224). 
Affirmative action continued to be applied in the public sector, where it focused 
mainly on the Black population. In this regard, the Public Service Laws Amendment Act 
was passed in 1997. It aimed at ensuring that affirmative action positions or promotions 
in the public service could not be challenged in court. The beneficiaries of this 
affirmative action25 would be Black, women and the disabled (Office of Deputy 
President, 1997). 
In brief, these events reveal the situation in which labour relations and education 
policy have evolved historically in the country. These events have shaped the social 
structure, in general, and, in particular, the middle class. 
Obviously, the social structure (and consequently, the middle class) was shaped 
during the period covered from the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 until 
"Affirmative Action" of the post 1994 elections days. It developed from exclusion of 
Blacks, Coloureds and Indians from the socio-economic and political realm, to priority 
(mainly Blacks). It explains the low percentage of Blacks in the middle class in the 
1970s and its increase up until the late 1990s. It also explains the high percentage of 
Whites within the middle class at any time in the South African history. 
The explanation of the evolution of South African politics, in general, and the South 
24 For more details on GEAR see Stefanski (1997); LeRoux (1997); CDE (1997); Heintz (1997); Hirsch 
(1997) or Minford, (1997) to quote just a few. 
25 On affirmative action see for instance Schlemmer, (1991), Dept. of Public Service and Administration 
(1998); Adam (1997); Wohlmuth, (1996); Black (1996), LeRoux (1996) or Adam (1997) to quote a few. 
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African labour market and education system, in particular, facilitates understanding 
the extreme distance between the White middle class and the rest, especially the Black 
middle class. 
In the first and second Chapters, inequality was linked to middle class. Thus, at this 
stage, it is worth presenting some data regarding inequality in South Africa. According 
to the results presented for the middle class, inequality is expected to decrease in 
general terms. If the middle class has shown an increase from the undemocratic period 
to the democratic one, inequality, then, is expected to decrease. 
5.5 Measures of income inequality 
Figure 5.5.1 below shows the distribution of income in South Africa in 1990 
(external line) and 1995 (internal line). The horizontal axis represents the percentage of 
people in the country (households in the 12 main urban areas) and the vertical axis 
represents the percentage of income shared. 
In brief the figure shows that, in the 12 main urban areas, incomes have become less 
unequal in 1995, compared to 1990. The poorest continued to earn extremely little of all 
household income in the 12 main urban areas, both in 1990 and in 1995. For example, 
the poorest 20% of households earned 2% of all income in 1990 and the same 20% 
earned 2% in 1995. (This excludes small urban and non-urban households- Stats SA, 
1995: 48-50.) The external curve represents the distribution of the income for 1995, in 
deciles and the internal one the distribution of income in deciles, also for 1999. The 
straight diagonal line represents an ideal society with a perfectly egalitarian income 
distribution. If South Africa were a perfect egalitarian society in, for instance, 1995, that 
line (internal curve representing 1995) should match the diagonal line. 
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Figure 5. 5.1 Lorenz Curve South Africa 1990-1995 (Stats SA: 1995: 49) 
%income 
% households 
--x--x--: 1990 income distribution 
----o--o---: 1995 income distribution 
45° line: Equally-distributed income 
Among those in the middle range, however, an improvement in income distribution 
is becoming apparent: 50% of households were earning 13% of income in 1995, while 
the same proportion of 50% were earning only 10% of income in 1990 (Stats SA: 1995). 
It, therefore, seems as if the income, and hence life circumstances, of those 
households in the middle income range is improving. In other words, the middle class 
seems to be enlarging. This finding reinforces the results presented in the previous 
tables, when the middle class was analysed. 
Table 5.9 compares the South African Gini26 coefficients in 1990 and 1995 (total 
and by race). It indicates that overall Gini coefficient has decreased from 0,63 to 0,55. 
Among African, Coloured and Indian households, however, the gap between the poor 
and the wealthier people is growing. On the other hand, within the White population, 
26 The Gini index is an inequality indicator that measures the difference between people's income (divided 
into quintiles). The higher the Gini index (1 is the maximum) the higher the inequality in a society. See 
Chapter 3 for further details on this index. 
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the gap between the poor and the richer is narrowing. 
Table 59 Gini index in the 12 main urban areas in 1990 and in 1995 lStats SA· 1995· 50) 
GINI 1990 1995 
South Africa 0,63 0,55 
Black 0,35 0,51 
White 0,50 0,44 
Coloured 0,37 0,42 
Indian 0,29 0,46 
The average Gini index for South Africa has decreased from 1990 to 1995 
(expansion in middle classes)27 , but in 1995 the differences within the different 
population groups have increased. The loss of jobs, generally semi-skilled and unskilled 
jobs, had an important effect, as will be explained in the next section. The only group 
that is cutting down its internal differences is the White population. 
The last paragraphs connected the study, in general, and inequality in particular, to 
unemployment. Hence, the next step is to analyse the evolution of unemployment in 
South Africa. 
5.6 Unemployment in South Africa 
Together with the analysis of the middle class and its evolution, it is of great 
importance to monitor the evolution of the unemployed in the country. If the middle 
class is operationalised in terms of occupation, the evolution of the creation and 
destruction of employment is also of importance. The focus of this study now turns to 
that matter. 
Once again the main problem to be faced is the several and different defmitions of 
the concept of unemployment. 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA hereafter), previously known as the Central 
Statistical Service (CSS hereafter), recently revised its definition of the official 
unemployment rate in line with the main International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
definition, which is widely used. 
21 This datum confirms the hypothesis that middle class size reflects inequality. 
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According to this new defmition, the unemployed are those people within the 
economically active population who (a) do not work; (b) want to work, are available 
and fit for work and (c) have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of 
self-employment. The defmition used will affect the final unemployment figure. The 
question is whether those unemployed and willing to work are taking action to do so. 
The inclusion of this actively-seeking issue in the definition of unemployment gives 
different final figures. If the unemployed person is the person without a job, willing to 
work and actively seeking a job, the final figure will be smaller than if this condition is 
not taken into account. The size, therefore, varies according to the definition of 
unemployment used. If this condition (active job-seeking) is taken into account, the 
definition is considered a strict definition, if not is considered as an expanded definition 
(see Orkin, 1998: 1). The economically active population consists both of those who are 
employed and those who are unemployed and willing to work (Barker, 1999: 27). 
Among South Africa's grave socio-economic problems, unemployment is one of 
the most serious and intractable. It is the most important cause of poverty, it has 
replaced race as the major factor in inequalicy28 and it underlies or contributes to a wider 
range of other socio-economic problems (Schlemmer & Levitz, 1998: 1; Schlemmer & 
Worthington, 1996: 1; Lyster & Swiss, 1990: 383-392). 
The percentage of the working age population which was employed fell from 
around 38% in 1994 and 1995 to 34% in 1997. In 1994 and 1995, approximately 8 
million people were employed, while in 1996 and 1997 the number was nearer 7,5 
million (Orkin, 1998: 21)29 . 
The following two tables show the unemployment figures for South Africa. Table 
5.6.1 presents the data for unemployment, comparing data from public sector to private 
sector, from 1990 until 1996, according to the South African Reserve Bank (1997) 30 . 
Table 5.6.2 presents data for unemployment in South Africa according to the October 
28 As said before, the income gap between Black and White, for instance, is decreasing whereas the gap 
within the Black population is increasing. To this is to be added that a (small) Black middle class who 
will soon be differentiated from the Black lower class is being created. In other words, being Black does 
not automatically mean being poor, nowadays. 
29 The October Household Surveys have been re-weighted after the 1996 Population Census revealed that 
the Population was smaller that what, in principle, was believed according to the previous census in 1991. 
Thus, the accuracy of these figures is reliable (Orkin, 1998: 11 ). 
30 The data from the SARB comes from Statistics SA surveys. 
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Household Surveys 31 (OHS hereafter) 94-97. The data have been gathered from 
Statistics SA. 
Table 5 10 Non a~:ricultural 32 nrivate and oublic sector emnlol:ment 1990 96 . - -
Public Sector (Increase/ Private Sector (Increase/ Total Increase/ 
Decrease) Decrease) Decrease 
1990 1724591 3908714 5633304 
1991 1766131 2.4 3770630 -3.5 5536760 -1.7 
1992 1786913 1.2 3640010 -3.5 5426923 -2 
1993 1764710 -1.2 3550004 -2.5 5314714 -2.1 
1994 1773889 0.5 3506844 -1.2 5280733 -0.6 
1995 1783164 0.5 3532268 0.7 5315433 0.4 
1996 1817962 2 3438050 -2.7 5256012 -1.1 
Table 5 11 Unemolovment in South Africa 94 97 (October Household Survev 94- 97) -
Year Population Group(%) OHS 94-97 Ns 
Black White Coloured Indian 
strict 
(expanded) 
1994 (41.1) (6.4) (23.3) (17.6) 20.0 (31.5) 30000 
1995 20.8 (36.9) 3.7 (5.5) 15.7 (22.3) 10.3 (13.4) 18.1 (29.3) 30000 
1996 26.8 (43.7) 3.7 (5.3) 11.8 (18.2) 10.9 (14.9) 20.3 (34.3) 16000 
1997 28.2 (46.5) 4.0 (6.2) 15.3 (16.0) 4.8 (9.7) 21.9 (37.41) 30000 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group and of the total population being 
unemployed. Stats SA operates with two definitions. The official one (strict), officially used by the 
government and by ILO, and the expanded one (presented in brackets). Both results are offered. Ns are 
offered alongside the totals. 
31 Once again the availability of data becomes problematic. Besides, the October Household Surveys, 
conducted periodically since 1994 (on comparability basis), the Survey of Total Employment and 
Earnings (STEE) and the Survey of Average Monthly Earnings (AME) it has been impossible to find 
other sources of information related to unemployment for this study, as the surveys either are not 
periodically conducted or not comparable (mainly with pre-94 period) or it is not possible to obtain 
information on unemployment from them. This, for instance, is the case with the HSRC surveys, which, 
as they are focused on over 18-year-old people exclude people economically active (people between 16-
18 are also economically active but they are not included in the surveys) and give, therefore, mutilated 
information on unemployment. Besides, these surveys consider unemployed people as not economically 
active. There is no doubt that those unemployed, fit for work and willing to work, are part of the 
economically active population (Barker, 1999: 37). This leaves the OHS and the STEE and AME as the 
best sources of information on unemployment level available in South Africa. Many institutions such as 
the SARB use these surveys as source for unemployment analysis (see for instance, SARB, 1995, 1996). 
Others sources of information on unemployment, for instance, are the job advertisements in the media, 
but this only gives general impressions, not a detailed estimation of unemployment. 
32 Agricultural employment has also decreased. According to the CSS, it dropped a 7% (former 
homelands excluded) between 1988 and 1993 (SARB, 1997). 
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Figure 5.6.1 plots the tendency of job creation/loss (Statistics SA, 1998; 199933 ). 
Figure 5.6.1 Employment in SA (1994-1999) 
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The tendency of losing jobs in all sectors is evident. Actually, the only sectors 
where employment has increased is the finance and public sectors (see Table 5.10). This 
may help to understand why the Black population is more affected by unemployment, as 
they form the least skilled sector. Another important fact to point out is that there has 
been an important increase in the wages. The attention of the study now turns to that. 
5.7 Wages 
In the previous section the decrease in general employment was explained. In this 
one the evolution of wages is described. 
Figure 5.7.1 illustrates the tendencies of wage growth. The data have been gathered 
from SARB (1996, 1997; 1998; 1999). According to the figure, the year-to-year rate of 
33 This information is based on AME and STEE surveys conducted by Stats SA. They were launched in 
1998 on monthly and quarterly basis. Prior to them, Statistics SA conducted 17 discrete monthly or 
quarterly business/organisation surveys. These were substituted by these two. The surveys collect 
information on current indicators of employment and the contribution of salaries and wages to the Gross 
Domestic Product. 
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increase in remuneration per worker in the total non-agricultural sectors of the economy 
decelerated, on balance, from 18,2 % in 1989 to 11,9 % in 1994 and 9,4 % in 1995, 
before accelerating to 10,2 % in 1996 (South African Reserve Bank, 1999: 11 ). 
Figure 5.7.1 Evolution of wages SA (1994-1999) 
~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
The rise in the remuneration per worker in the private sector went from 10,0 % in 
1994 to 11,2% in 1995 and then slowed down to 10,7% in 1996. The rate of increase in 
remuneration per worker in the public sector slowed down from a rate of 14,9 % in 
1994 to 6,5 % in 1995 - the lowest rate of increase since 1972 - but accelerated again to 
8,9 % in 1996. The average compound rates of increase over the period 1989 to 1996 
for each sector amounted to approximately 12% per year (South African Reserve Bank, 
1996: 9; 1997: 11). These figures can be summarised as follows: 
There has been (and current data indicates that there still is) an important decrease34 
in employment (see Table 5.10) in all sectors with the exception of fmance and public 
34 For instance in 1995 there were about 8 069 000 people employed and in 1997, the figure drops to 7 54 
8 000 (Orkin, 1998: 32- figures refer to formal sector). 
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authorities in the period 1994-199935 . The decrease in those less skilled sectors (mining, 
electricity, trade, etc.) especially affects those less skilled workers, generally Blacks. On 
the other hand, the fact that there has been an increase in job-creation in the public36 and 
finance sectors, implies that those qualified Blacks are enjoying a highly remunerated 
position, whereas their counterparts who are less skilled are becoming unemployed. At 
the same time, a high wage increase can do nothing but worsen the situation, as it 
enlarges the distance in terms of wealth between employed and unemployed. This could 
lead to the frustration of many people, mainly Blacks and a change in their attitudes 
toward the government and the democracy in general. 
If those unemployed Blacks become aware of that situation, they may start 
wondering whether the situation is fair or not. The years of struggle for democracy may 
have produced only benefits for a qualified minoritY7 . This is especially important if it 
is taken into account that for most South Africans democracy is related to jobs and 
houses (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 11 ). However, several surveys reveal that Black people 
do not blame the government for this situation. Idasa surveys reveal that "the 
government received extremely negative public ratings in the area of job creation, with 
favourable ratings ranging between 36% and 26% from mid-1995 to 1997. That 
decreased even further by the third quarter of 1998, with an abysmally low 12% 
approving of government performance, [ w ]hile it recovered to 24% by April 1999 ... " 
(Mattes et al., 1999: 41). However, "[a]cross all dimensions, there is a fairly clear 
pattern: Evaluations of government performance tended to improve sharply in late 1998 
and early 1999. Of the 19 performance dimensions [that were] measured, ratings of the 
government were at their zenith in 12 of these areas by Aprill999. This suggests a clear 
success in the ANC's efforts to advance its cause in a convincing manner, run a broadly 
positive re-election campaign, and ultimately create a broad 'feel good' effect among the 
electorate" (Mattes et al., 1999: 44). In general, it can be said that the government, at 
least at the end of the legislature, was not blamed by most South Africans. 
35 This is based on OHS, AME and STEE surveys from Statistc SA and several estimations from the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 1998: 14; SARB, 1999: 12-13) 
36 In the public sector there are also other job-categories such as labourers, but the fact that in those low-
skilled sectors there has been job loss implies that the creation of jobs in the public sector has occurred at 
the high-skilled level 
37 The Gini index for Black population increased from 0.35 in 1990 to 0.55 in 1995. Thus, before the first 
democratic elections the inequality within the Black population was already enlarging. There is no 
information available for later periods yet. 
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However, a further analysis of the "consolidation of democracy" variable is 
necessary to state conclusions properly. At present, the only clear argument that can be 
maintained is that the middle class has experienced a small increase during the 
democratic period, with the White population benefiting the most, together with the 
Black population- at the top level of the middle class and helped by 'affirmative action'. 
5.8 Consolidated democracy: Trust and Political tolerance analysed 
In the previous section the middle class was identified and analysed. It was found 
that the middle class is growing. Once it was dissected by its occupational composition 
the growth was found to be mainly due to the Black entrance into the public institutions 
and forced by "affirmative action". 
In this section, the "consolidation of democracy" - in terms of political tolerance 
and trust - will undergo the same process. The results presented in Chapter 4 are now 
analysed in detail. In this section, the reader will be shown the distribution of those 
values throughout the population according to differences of race, age, income, 
education and occupation. These cleavages38 have been proposed by the relevant 
literature and selected for the following reasons: 
• Race: In a society like the South African society, with a past based on racial 
divisions, the monitoring of the differences at this level becomes crucial. South 
Africa's history has been marked a permanent struggle among different population 
groups for social, political and economical inclusion/exclusion (see section 5.3 
above). Thus, it seems to be important to view the distribution of tolerance among 
the different population groups (Finifter & Mickiewicz, 1992: 982-864; Gibson & 
Gouws, 1999: 513). 
• Age: Age is an important cleavage to analyse. Attitudes toward democracy are 
expected to be influenced by age. Actually, most studies assessing political culture 
in changing regimes encounter younger cohorts more tolerant than older ones, who 
generally are more embedded in the past. This has implications for democratic 
38 This selection does not imply that there are not other cleavages of importance. It simply means that 
these are the most important according to the literature. For others, such as male/female see, for instance 
Gouws (1999). 
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consolidation as, if it is so that younger people are more tolerant, tolerance could be 
expected to decrease with the passing of time (White, 1979: 182; Bahyr, 1987: 94; 
Gibson et at. 1992: 356-357). 
• Income: Those who benefit the most from a system are least likely to want to change 
it (Gibson et al., 1992: 355). Thus, if income increases among those least favoured 
sectors, tolerance, an essential part of democracy, is supposed to grow. This is 
especially important in South Africa, where democracy is understood as a system to 
facilitate "access to jobs and houses", in other words, to increase the standard of 
living (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 9). Thus, it is expected that those with lower levels 
of incomes show lower commitment to democracy and, hence, display a lower level 
of tolerance. 
• Education: Education is also expected to have an important effect on political 
culture. More highly educated people are expected to show higher levels of 
commitment to democracy (Pye, 1990: 9; Breytenbach, 1998: 3; on this. see also 
Gibson & Duch, 1992). 
• Occupation: Occupation 1s an important cleavage to take into account when 
"breaking down" the political culture into its components. Those with high-skilled 
jobs are found to be more committed to democracy and, hence, more tolerant 
(Finifter & Mickiewicz, 1992: 865) and because, as stated in Chapter 3, occupation 
serves as a primary indicator of class in general, and middle class in particular. 
As said in Chapter 4, this study relies on political tolerance and trust as the main 
indicators of democratic consolidation. In Chapter 3 it was explained that the idea of 
consolidation of democracy is a complex one and that it may involve many issues. It 
was finally determined and motivated that democracy can only be consolidated when it 
is regarded as the only system fit to rule the society. This had to be reflected in the 
political culture of the citizenry. Political culture refers to a very wide spectrum of 
issues, some of which did not even have any relation to democratic consolidation. 
Thus, only those indicators that best indicate the commitment toward democratic 
institutions were analysed. These were political tolerance and trust. The justification 
was done in Chapter 4. For instance, nobody is regarded as undemocratic because of 
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his/her lack of interest in politics -they may be called idiots39 but not undemocratic -
but those who are politically intolerant are seen as undemocratic (see for instance, 
McClosky, 1964). On the other hand, the lack of trust in the democratic institutions has 
been one of the main reasons for the break-down of democracy as occurred in Peru, 
through its own President in 1992, or, more recently, the coup staged by the army in 
Ecuador (El Pais, 22-01-00), or the lack of democratic consolidation in Russia (Rose, 
1994). Actually, there is no agreement on the importance of any other indicator of 
political culture when studying democratic consolidation (Gibson et al., 1992)40 . 
In other words, analysing the evolution of trust and political tolerance through the 
years and its distribution through the different social cleavages or rifts (race, age, 
education, income and occupation) will allow us to address the important question with 
which this section deals: The commitment to democracy in South Africa. The other 
indicators will be referred to when necessary, to strengthen the conclusions at which this 
study may arrive. 
Against this background, although aware of the complexities of political culture, 
this section is focused on the main aspects of democratic consolidation, namely political 
tolerance and trust. 
5.8.1 Political tolerance in South Africa: An analysis 
In Chapter 4 the main procedures for measuring political tolerance were explained. 
The 'least-liked method' was fmally selected because it allows the respondent to select 
his/her own least-liked group. Two indicators of tolerance were used to present the 
analysis. One measured whether people would allow those least-liked to live in their 
neighbourhood and another tested whether they would allow the least-liked to make a 
political speech in their neighbourhood. The first one measures political tolerance and 
39 In ancient Greece, those not interested in politics were called idiots. 
40 This is evidenced in the extensive literature pertaining to the field. Most studies investigating pro-
democracy political culture have tolerance and trust in common. Other indexes are also incorporated but 
these two are present and regarded as the main ones (Gibson et al., 1992: 332-337). On tolerance, see 
Stouffer, 1955, Prothro & Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Sniderman, 1974; Num et al., 1978; Sullivan et 
al., 1982; Muller, 1988; McClosky and Brill, 1989; Gibson, 1989; 1996; 1998; Duch & Gibson, 1992; 
Sniderman et al., 1991; Gouws, 1991; 1996; Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999. On trust see Rose, 1994; 
Gibson et al., 1992; Thomas, 1998; Humphrey & Schmitz, 1998; Scholz, & Lubell, 1998; Zussman, 1997 
to cite a few. 
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the second social tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982: 84-1 09). Longitudinal data on 
political tolerance are only available after 1994. This does not affect the intention of the 
study, as democracy was launched in 1994. The results are again presented in the 
following table. 
Table 5 12 Allow least liked to live in vour nei!!hbourhood . -
198341 1994 1998 
Yes 48.4 43.1 68 
No 51.04 42.4 22.9 
Entries represent the percentage of people willing to allow a member of a least-like group in 
heir neighbourhood. Ns are offered below 
Ns 3392 2517 2200 
Table 5.13 Allow least-liked to give political speech in your neighbourhood 
1994 1998 
26.8 69.3 
No I 60.8 I 21.5 
Entries represent the percentage (all the population groups) of the population allowing someone 
from their respective least-liked groups to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. The 
difference between them represents the 'D'K or uncertain'. 
Ns I 2517 I 2200 
As the tables show and as explained in Chapter 4, tolerance has increased since 
1983. In 1983, only 48.4% of people, according to the survey, were ready to allow 
least-liked people to live as their neighbours. In 1998 this percentage increased to 68% 
(22.9% for refusal). In the critical year of 1994, both acceptance and refusal dropped to 
43.1% and 42.4%, respectively. This might be interpreted against the political 
developments of that time. Before adopting a clear stand, be it of acceptance or refusal, 
people probably prefer to see the evolution of the political situation. South Africa in 
1994 had already been involved in negotiations on political transition, for four years, 
and the future was uncertain in that sense. Regarding the second table, the increase in 
tolerance is also important. 
The results will now be analysed further. The effect of the race, age, income, 
education and occupation is explained. The results are presented chronologically, 1983, 
41 In 1983, mixed residential areas were prohibited by law. 
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1994 and 1999. For 1983, the data set is composed of four different surveys, one per 
population group. Thus, all the results will be presented according to race. All the 
following tables for tolerance present the results obtained. 
The social and political tolerance values will be analysed for 1983, 1994 and 1998. 
For each year the results will be dissected according to race, age, education, income and 
education. For 1983, each cleavage is sub-analysed by race. The analysis starts with 
1983. There are no data available on political tolerance for 1983. As said before, this 
does not affect the main intention of the study as democracy was launched in 1994. 
Thus, for 1983, only data on social tolerance is offered. 
5.8.1.1 (Social) Tolerance in South Africa 198342 
The general results from 1983 are presented again in the table below. 
Before analysing these low levels of tolerance it may be necessary to remember that 
mixed residential areas were forbidden by law at this point in time. This could have 
influenced the respondent when answering. Although, on the other hand, it is also 
important to note that this low level of tolerance might be the reason for that law to 
exist. 
5.8.1.1.a Race 
Any later analysis (age, education, income and occupation) will also present the 
results according to race. However, a brief exposition of the general results according to 
the different population groups seems important. The following table shows the levels 
of tolerance toward the least-liked group by race. 
Table 5 14 Would vou allow "a least liked !lrouo" to live in vour neillhbourhood (1983) -
No Yes 
Black 47.5 52.5 
White 82.5 16.8 
Coloured 32.7 66.2 
Indian 34.4 53.9 
Entries represent the percentage of every population group supporting each option {Yes or No) 
INs= 3378 
42 HSRC '83 survey. For description see Chapter 4. 
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According to the figure the highest level of intolerance in 1983 was encountered in 
the White population, followed by Blacks, Indians and Coloured. 
What is important, is that all White, Coloured and Indian like Blacks the least, 
although intolerance is not highly concentrated in Black population. The following table 
shows those results: 
Table 5 15 Tarl!et l!rouo 0983) 
Target Group (When least liked group is ... ) 
Race of respondent Black White Coloured Indian 
Black 47.5 34.6 40.5 
White 82.6 76.3 77.2 
Coloured 32.7 32.2 20.8 
Indian 34.4 28.9 30.2 
Entries represent the percentage of intolerance of each population group (left) toward each population 
group (right top). I.e. (in bold) 82.6% of Whites would refuse to accept a Black person living in their 
neighbourhood. Ns = 3378 
White intolerance of Indians reaches 77 .2%, Coloureds, 76.3% and Blacks, 82.6%. 
Indian intolerance of Whites is at 28.9%, of Coloureds, 30.2%, and of Blacks, 34.4%. 
Coloured intolerance shows the following figures: 32.2% to Whites, 20.8% to 
Coloureds and 32.7% to Blacks. Black intolerance ranks as follows: 47.5 to Whites, 
34.6% to Coloureds and 40.5% to Indians. 
In general terms, the intolerance is not concentrated in a single target, although it is 
concentrated more on Blacks and mainly from Whites. There is not any one intolerant 
group (all groups show intolerance to all the others). The absence of a clear target group 
is called 'pluralistic' intolerance and it means that repression of the target group IS 
difficult (Sullivan et al., 1982: 82-109). 
5.8.1.1.b Age 
The second cleavage analysed is age. The tolerance values are analysed along the 
different age groups. The population groups are presented in order, according to the size 
of the population group, namely Blacks, Whites, Coloured and Indians. 
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Table 5 16 Tolerance bv a~e (Black 1983) 
• 
Age No Yes 
18-25 49.7 50.3 
26-35 45.4 54.6 
36-45 45.0 55.0 
46-55 42.5 57.5 
56-65 48.6 51.4 
>65 59.6 40.4 
Total Black 47.4 52.6 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusal 
-No) of each age group for Black population. Ns = 3378 
Table 517 Tolerance bv a~e (White 1983) 
• 
Age No Yes D'k 
18-25 76.1 22.8 1.1 
26-35 80.6 19.4 
36-45 86.0 14.0 
46-55 83.3 15.7 0.9 
56-65 90.2 9.8 
>65 78.4 18.9 2.7 
Total White 82.7 16.7 0.6 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusa 
-No) of each age group for White population. Ns = 3378 
Table 5.18 Tolerance by a~e (Coloured, 1983) 
No Yes D'k 
18-25 31.4 67.4 1.1 
26-35 33.9 66.1 
36-45 32.7 66.1 1.2 
46-55 32.4 66.7 1.0 
56-65 30.3 65.8 3.9 
>65 38.7 61.3 
Total Coloured 32.7 66.2 1.0 
Entries represent the percentage of the tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ 
refusal- No) of each age group for White population. Ns = 3378 
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Table 5 19 Tolerance bv a!!e (Indian 1983) 
• 
Age No Yes D'k 
18-25 37.2 56.0 6.8 
26-35 28.9 56.1 15.0 
36-45 30.7 58.4 10.9 
46-55 40.8 45.4 13.8 
56-65 48.3 37.9 13.8 
>65 40.0 50.0 10.0 
Total Indian 34.5 53.9 11.6 
Entries represent the percentage of the tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ 
refusal- No) of each age cohort for Indian population. Ns = 3378 
The tables reveal that for Blacks, intolerance decreases from youngest (50.3% 
acceptance) to middle-aged people (57.5% of acceptance for 46-55 years old) and 
increases again as the age increases (40.4% acceptance for people over 65). 
For Whites, the figure indicates that the intolerance is high at all ages, although the 
level of intolerance of youngest group is 76.1% which increases up to 90.2% for older 
people (56-65 years old). This level decreases again to 74.8%. This population group 
shows the highest level of intolerance. Before anything, it is important to remember 
that, when this survey was conducted, mixed residences were forbidden by law, 
although, it is also possible that these high levels of intolerance provide an explanation 
for the existence of that law. 
For the Coloured population, the figure shows that the tolerance of this group 
remains high at all levels of age, although the acceptance decreases slightly for the 
group over 65 (from 65.8% for people 56-65 years old to 61.3% for people over 65 
years old). 
The Indian population's figure reveals that the acceptance of the least-liked groups 
is higher among the younger age groups (58.4% for 26-35) than in the older sectors 
(50.0 %). Older people are more intolerant. 
In general, it can be said that young sectors of all groups are more tolerant than 
middle age groups. Intolerance increases in all groups (with the exception of Indians, 
with whom it decreases) when age is over 65. Intolerance levels of all groups remain 
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high, although the White population is the least tolerant. 
5.8.1.1.c Income 
Now the same process will be undertaken with the focus on income. Again, each 
population group is presented separately. Again, one figure per population group is 
presented. The income refers to Rands per year. 
Table 5 20 Tolerance bv income (Black 1983) 
• 
No Yes 
<3999 46.3 53.7 
4000-9999 54.3 45.7 
10000-20000 29.4 70.6 
>20000 100.0 
Total 47.0 53.0 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusal- No) 
at each income level for Black population (income =R/year). Ns = 3378 
Table 5.21 Tolerance by income (White, 1983) 
11<3999 
No Yes D'k 
84.1 15.9 
4000-9999 85.0 14.2 0.8 
10000-20000 83.0 16.5 0.5 
>20000 73.0 24.7 2.2 
Total 82.6 16.6 0.7 
Entries represent the percentage of the tolerance (acceptance-Yes/ refusal -
No) at each income level for White population (income =R/year). Ns = 3378 
Table 5 22 Tolerance by income <Coloured 1983) 
' 
No Yes D'k 
<3999 36.2 63.8 
4000-9999 17.5 77.6 4.9 
10000-20000 30.4 69.6 
>20000 100.0 
Total 32.2 66.8 1.0 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusal- No) 
at each income level for Coloured population (Income=R/year). Ns = 3378 
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Table 5.23 Tolerance by income (Indian. 1983) 
~<3999 No Yes D'k 40.6 45.7 13.8 
4000-9999 26.7 65.1 8.1 
10000-20000 12.5 78.6 8.9 
>20000 7.1 85.7 7.1 
Total 34.0 54.3 11.7 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance-Yes/ refusal- No) 
at each income level for Indian population (income=R/year). Ns = 3378 
The Black population shows a high level of intolerance in both low and middle-
income groups. The acceptance seems to increase at high levels of income, although the 
low Ns (3 and 2 for the two highest incomes respectively), somehow discredit the 
information provided. Up to Rl 0 000 of income the intolerance decreases as the income 
increases (over Rl 0 000, the low Ns discredit the reliability of the data, and, hence, the 
information provided). 
As shown, the White population has the highest level of intolerance. The White 
population has higher levels of tolerance at higher levels of income. The lowest income, 
however present the highest mark of acceptance, but, again, the Ns for this group is too 
small (i.e. 3 for no-income) to be significant. Thus, the reliability of the information for 
low-income Whites becomes dubious as for the high-income Black population. 
The Coloured population also tends to show the highest tolerance toward the 
highest income. At the mid-high level there is a decrease in tolerance, which increases 
at the high level. However, the low Ns (4 and 2 for the two highest respectively) again 
question the reliability of the information provided by the data at the high level of 
mcome. 
The Indian population follows the same trend. Tolerance decreases from no income 
to mid-low and increases as income increases. In general, it can be said that intolerance 
in South Africa in 1983 is higher at low-income levels, irrespective of the population 
group. 
5.8.1.l.d Education 
The following is the explanation of the same results according to the level of 
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education of the respondent. It is expected that those with higher levels of education 
show lower levels of intolerance. Following the same line, one table per population 
group is presented. The tables, as before, are analysed at the end. 
Table 5.24 Tolerance by education (Black, 1983) 
No Yes 
59.6 40.4 
Stand. 5 (primary school) 44.4 55.6 
Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent) 40.8 59.2 
Stand. 8 or 9 49.5 50.5 
Stand. 10 (Matric) 59.3 40.7 
Matric plus 1 or 2 years of further training 40.7 59.3 
More 55.6 44.4 
Total 47.5 52.5 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance - Yes/ refusal- No) at each 
education level for the Black population. Ns = 3378 
Table 5 25 Tolerance bv education <White 1983) 
• 
No Yes D'k 
Stand. 5 (primary school) 86.2 13.8 
Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent) 89.6 9.0 1.0 
Stand. 8 or 9 93.3 6.7 
,Stand. 10 (Matric) 80.5 19.0 1.0 
IMatric plus 1 or 2 years of further training 69.8 30.2 
More 67.5 30.8 2.0 
Total 82.6 16.8 4.0 
!Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusal-No) at each 
education level for the White population. Ns = 3378 
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Table 5.26 Tolerance by education (Coloured, 1983) 
~Non• No D'k Yes 40.0 57.1 2.9 
Primary school 35.2 64.2 0.6 
Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent) 29.4 70.6 
Stand. 8 or 9 33.3 65.5 1.1 
Stand. 10 (Matric) 30.0 66.0 
Matric plus I or 2 years offurther training 20.0 80.0 4.0 
More 100 
Total 32.8 64.5 2.7 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusal- No) at each 
education level for the Coloured population. Ns = 3378 
Table 5 27 Tolerance by education (Indian 1983) 
• 
No Yes D'k 
None 47.8 37.0 15.2 
Primary school 38.0 48.5 13.5 
Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent) 20.5 69.9 9.6 
Stand. 8 or 9 25.6 66.1 8.3 
Stand. 10 (Matric) 19.0 77.1 3.9 
Matric plus 1 or 2 years offurther training 4.5 86.4 9.1 
More 2.4 90.5 7.1 
Total 26.8 63.5 9.6 
ll;cntries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance-Yes/ refusal- No) at each 
ducation level for the Indian population. Ns = 3378 
Whites, Indians and Coloureds increase their levels of tolerance as their levels of 
education increases. However, there does not seem to be any relation between education 
and tolerance for Blacks. Once again, however, the low Ns for high education levels (9 
for "More") for the Black population discredits the reliability of the analysis. Most of 
the Black population has low levels of education. At that level (from "none" to "Stand. 
6, 7 or equivalent") the intolerance decreases as the education increases. Consequently, 
and as expected, it can be stated that the higher the education, the higher the tolerance. 
5.8.1.1.e Occupation 
The last cleavage to be analysed regarding tolerance in 1983 is occupation. It is also 
expected that those occupations that imply higher levels of skill and education show 
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higher levels of tolerance. 
Table 5.28 Tolerance by occupation (Black, 1983) 
No Yes 
Professional 41.0 59.0 
Manager and clerk 50.0 50.0 
Skilled worker 40.4 59.6 
Semi-skilled 52.6 47.4 
Unskilled 38.7 61.3 
Total 42.5 57.5 
Entries represent the percentage the tolerance (acceptance-Yes/ refusal- No) 
at each occupation category for the Black population. Ns = 3378 
Table 5.29 Tolerance by Occupation (White, 1983) 
72.7 26.1 6 ! .... , .......  No Yes D'k 
Manager and clerk . 85.8 13.0 1.1 
Skilled worker 84.8 13.9 1.2 
Semi-skilled 82.6 17.4 1.3 
Unskilled 100.0 
Total 82.5 16.4 1.1 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusal- No) at 
each occupation category for the White population. Ns = 33 78 
Table 5 30 Tolerance by occuoation (Coloured 1983) 
' 
No Yes 
Professional 24.6 75.4 
Manager and clerk 30.4 69.6 
Skilled worker 28.7 71.3 
Semi-skilled 25.3 74.7 
Unskilled 40.5 59.5 
jTotal 30.1 69.8 
Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance- Yes/ refusal- No) at 
each occupation category for Coloured population. Ns = 3378 
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Table 5.31 Tolerance by Occupation <Indian, 1983) 
No Yes D'k 
13.6 77.3 6 
Manager and clerk 23.1 69.4 9.1 
Skilled worker 32.2 52.7 7.5 
Semi-skilled 43.2 44.3 15.1 
Unskilled 58.6 41.4 12.5 
Total 30.7 58.7 10.6 
Entries represent the percentage oftolerance (acceptance -Yes/ refusal- No) at each 
occupation category for Coloured population. Ns = 3378 
An important aspect to take into account is the Ns agam. The wide distribution 
along the different occupations prevents high levels of accuracy (i.e. White unskilled 
7). This consequently reduces the accuracy of the analysis. Besides, it is possible to 
deduce from the tables that, for instance, both Indians and Coloureds in highly qualified 
occupations, generally, are more tolerant than those less qualified. For Whites, however, 
the intolerance remains high at all levels of occupation, although, for instance, 
professionals rank at the highest level of tolerance. For Blacks, again, the relation 
between occupation and intolerance again is the minimum. Professionals show the same 
levels of intolerance as "semi-skilled workers" or "unskilled workers". 
5.8.1.1.1 Tolerance in South Africa in 1983: Summary 
After surveying the existing (social) tolerance in South Africa and its distribution 
along the main cleavages - race, age, employment, income and education -, it can be 
stated that South Africa in 1983 was an intolerant society irrespective of race, although 
this was more concentrated in the White group. All population groups, however, show 
intolerance toward all others (although more to the Black population). 
Consequently, this pluralistic 43 intolerance (social) 44 prevents serious repression on 
the target group. Actually, there is neither concentration of intolerance from any group 
43 Although intolerance (social) is spread ail over the society, it is more concentrated in Blacks. 
44 For 1983, the results focus on social tolerance and not on political tolerance. However, other studies 
conducted in the early 1990s show that political tolerance was also high (see Gouws, 1991) and, as this 
study wiii show, political tolerance decreases from the pre-democratic period to the democratic one 
(Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999). 
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(no clear intolerant group, although Whites shows the highest level of intolerance) nor 
concentration of intolerance in any clear target (least-liked group). This makes 
intolerance in 1983 in South Africa to "be 'pluralistic', that is, there seems to be little 
consensus that a single group represents any overwhelming threat to the system" 
(Gibson et al., 1992: 339). This, in contrast to countries where there is a wide-spread 
agreement about what constitutes a major threat to society (i.e. Israel - see Shamir & 
Sullivan, 1983: 927-928 - or the United States in 1950 when communists were 
perceived to pose a serious threat45). This means that intolerance seems to be distributed 
so broadly that the threat "it poses to liberty is neutralised" (Gibson et al., 1992: 339; 
Gibson, 1988: 511-512). This type of intolerance "bespeaks a type of intolerance in 
[South Africa] that is unlikely to be mobilised for the purposes of repression" (Gibson et 
al., 1992: 339; on this see Sullivan et al., 1982: esp. 84-109). 
At first sight, those levels of intolerance suggest that democracy could not work in 
South African society in 1983. However, previous explanations might be a key to 
understanding the transition to the democracy that came to pass since De Klerk 
abolished apartheid in the early 1990s. With this consideration regarding the existing 
level of intolerance in South Africa in 1983, the analysis goes on to 1994, the year of 
the first democratic elections. 
5.8.1.2 (Social and political) tolerance in South Mrica, 1994 
Before analysing the situation that existed in 1994, it is important to stress that 1994 
was the year of the first democratic elections in South Africa. The country had been in 
transition for four years. More than 2000 people died due to political violence and the 
uncertainty about the future was a very important political factor. 
The data for 199446 will be analysed in the same way as that of 1983. After that, its 
distribution along the same cleavages (race, age, income, employment and education) is 
analysed. The reason was previously explained at the beginning of this Chapter. Data on 
political tolerance are available for this period. Thus, data for both social and political 
tolerance are offered. As with 1983 results, the cleavages will be those of race, age, 
45 On intolerance in the United States of communists see McClosky & Brill, (1983) or Mueller (1988) to 
quote a couple. 
46 Idasa 1994 elections survey. See Chapter 4 for description. 
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income, education and occupation. Race is the first one. 
5.8.1.2.a Race 
Before getting into a detailed analysis as with 1983, a general view of the situation 
relating to race is important. The following table explains the differences between races 
in 1983 and 1994. 
Table 5 32 Would vou allow "a least liked !!rouo" to live in vour nei!!:hbourhood? (1983 94) - -
Year White Black Coloured Indian TOTAL 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
1983 82.5 16.8 47.5 52.5 32.7 66.2 34.4 53.9 48.4 51.0 
1994 40.0 44.2 41.6 44.3 34.9 51.9 7.1 64.3 43.1 42.4 
Table 5 33 Would :£OU allow "a least liked !!rouo" to !!:ive a oolitical soeech in vou area? (1994) -
Yes No D'k 
Black 24.1 66.1 9.8 
White 39.6 50.6 9.8 
Coloured 27.9 60.5 11.6 
Indian 57.1 42.9 
Total 27.6 62.5 9.8 
Regarding social tolerance (first table), both the acceptance and refusal figures 
decrease (with the exception of the Coloured population), which might be explained by 
the uncertainty about the future. As said above, the tricameral parliament was approved 
in 1983 with the exclusion of Blacks, and the social and political unrest increased. 
Several repressive measures were applied to calm down the situation. In the liberation 
of Nelson Mandela and the un-banning of the ANC 1990 were announced and the 
country had been involved in political negotiations for four years. In essence, the future 
was uncertain. This context of uncertainty may have influenced the decrease of both 
acceptance and refusal. People might have been waiting to see what the future was 
going to hold. 
Social tolerance data show that the White population has came to greater acceptance 
of the mixed composition of South Africa in these 11 years, although the intolerance 
level still remains high. The Indian population, together with Whites, reveals the largest 
increase in tolerance (43.7% decrease of intolerance for Whites and 26.2% for Indians). 
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Coloured intolerance does not decrease and many of those who were ready to accept 
least-liked individuals as neighbours came to be uncertain about it (17.4%). The Black 
population has decreased its level of acceptance (12.1%). At the same time, the rejection 
of the least-liked individual has decreased but in small measure only (4.6%). The Black 
population has taken over as the most intolerant group. Still, the White population's 
intolerance level remains high. The Indian population is the most tolerant. 
Against this background, it can be stated that the effects of the transition and the 
uncertainty about the future made South African society, in general, reluctant to tolerate 
those least-liked individuals. It is important to note the important decrease in White 
intolerance. With the high level of intolerance shown in 1983, the transition would 
probably have not have been achieved through a political pact, following the model of 
Brazil in the late 1960s, Spain in the mid-1970s or Poland in the late 1980s. 
Table 5 34 Distribution of (in) tolerance (1994) 
Least-liked group (political party) 
Respondent ANC NP IFP FF DP PAC ACDP Other More than Confidential None 
one 
Black 4.1 21.6 31.6 3.8 0.6 4.6 0.2 4.3 0.9 6.3 22.2 
White 41.8 5.2 0.4 2.1 0.8 27.4 0.5 6.2 0.9 5.6 9 
Coloured 22.9 10.3 5.8 5.3 0.3 8.2 0.5 6.2 0.6 8.9 30.9 
Indian 9.8 8 3.9 78.3 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each population group targeting supporters of each party as 
least-liked in 1994. 
The distribution of the target group is shown in the table above. Whites 
concentrated their intolerance on the ANC and the PAC. Blacks concentrated it on the 
IFP more than on the NP. This can be interpreted as a shift in target group. There is no 
concentration on "White" as in 1983 (or on a White party). Above all, Indians seem to 
have learnt "to put up with their political enemies" best, as their response shows a very 
high level of tolerance. However, the strongest concentration is also on the AN C. Thus, 
White, Coloured and Indian people are concentrating their intolerance on a Black party 
(in 1983 it was in Black people). 
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5.8.1.2.b Age 
The next cleavage to be analysed is that of age. Its effect on the existing levels of 
social and political tolerance is presented in the tables below. 
Table 5 35 Would ~ou allow "a least liked groun" to live in vour nei2hbourhood? (1994) -
Yes No D'k 
18-25 40.3 44.7 15.0 
26-35 43.4 42.4 14.3 
36-45 46.4 38.4 15.2 
46-55 42.9 41.9 15.2 
56-65 50.5 38.5 11.0 
>65 35.6 53.4 11.0 
Total 43.1 42.4 14.4 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a 
member of the "least-liked" group to live in their neighbourhood.Ns = 2517 
Table 5 36 Would vou allow "a least liked l!rouo" to l!ive a oolitical soeech in vou area (1994) -
Yes No D'k 
18-25 28.0 62.1 9.9 
26-35 28.4 63.4 8.2 
36-45 25.6 63.5 10.8 
46-55 28.1 60.7 11.2 
56-65 28.4 63.8 7.8 
>65 27.4 58.9 13.7 
Total 27.6 62.6 9.8 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a 
member of the "least-liked" group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. 
Ns = 2517 
Both tables can be summarised as follows: Social and political tolerance seems to 
decrease with age until 56-65 years of age, but older people still are more intolerant 
(people's memories are more closely connected to apartheid experiences). Maturity 
seems to make people more tolerant, although, at over 65, people, who probably are 
more embedded in the past, become more intolerant. 
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5.8.1.2.c Income 
The explained cleavage to be explained now is income. The distribution of social 
and political tolerance values through the different income levels will be analysed. The 
figures are based on Rands per month. 
Table 5 37 Would vou allow "a least liked 2:rouo" to live in vour nei!!:hbourhood? (1994) -
Yes No D'k 
<3499 40.5 44.9 14.6 
3500-9999 46.4 36.9 16.7 
10000-19999 49.3 35.8 14.9 
20000 or more 66.7 16.7 16.7 
Total 43.1 42.4 14.4 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category 
willing to allow a member of the "least-liked" group to live in their 
neighbourhood. Ns = 2517 
-Table 5 38 Would vou allow" a least liked 2:rouo" to 2:ive a nolitical sneech in vou area (1994) 
Yes No D'k 
<3499 23.9 65.2 10.9 
3500-9999 37.6 56.7 5.7 
10000-19999 43.9 50.0 6.1 
20000 or more 66.7 33.3 
Total 27.3 62.9 9.7 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category 
willing to allow a member of the "least-liked" group to give a 
:political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517 
Both tables show that income seems to influence the level of tolerance. The higher 
the income in South Africa in 1994, the higher the tolerance. Probably, those who earn 
higher incomes have higher levels of education and, therefore, higher levels of 
understanding and tolerance. They also may feel less threatened. 
5.8.1.2.d Education 
Now results are presented according to the level of education. The results are 
presented in Tables 5.39 and 5.40. 
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Table 5.39 Would ~ou allow "a least-! iked groun" to live in ~our nei&:hbourhood? (1994) 
~ .... I Yes I 34.5 No D'k 41.4 24.1 
primary 40.4 41.6 18.0 
std6 42.0 42.0 16.0 
std8 39.0 45.4 15.6 
std9 40.5 48.3 11.2 
stdlO 43.0 44.6 12.4 
>std9 + dipl 48.4 38.2 13.4 
degree 62.9 21.6 15.5 
Total 43.1 42.4 14.6 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each education level 
willing to allow a member of the "least-liked" group to live in their 
neighbourhood. Ns = 251 7 
~ 
Table 5.40 Would ~ou allow "a least-liked groun" to ~:ive a oolitical speech in ~ou area? (1994) 
Yes No D'k 
none 20.7 58.6 20.7 
primary 29.3 55.3 15.4 
std6 18.4 71.7 9.9 
std8 21.2 67.3 11.5 
std9 20.8 71.8 7.4 
stdlO 29.6 61.9 8.5 
>std9 + dipl 35.2 58.7 6.1 
degree 54.6 40.2 5.2 
Total 27.6 62.5 9.8 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category 
willing to allow a member of the "least-liked" group to give a 
political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517 
Once again, there is an important tendency to the increase of tolerance as the level 
of education increases. More educated people have higher levels of understanding and, 
hence, show higher levels of tolerance. 
5.8.1.2.e Occupation 
As with 1983 data, the following cleavage to be analysed IS occupation. The 
following table offers the results: 
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Table 5.41 Would you allow "a least-liked group" to live in your neighbourhood? (1994) 
Yes No D'k 
51.5 33.3 15.2 
Manager 64.3 24.5 11.2 
Clerk 44.5 40.9 14.5 
Skilled worker 41.3 43.7 15.0 
Semi-skilled worker 20.0 75.0 5.0 
Unskilled worker 41.3 42.3 16.4 
Total 44.8 40.7 14.5 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each occupation category willing to allow 
a member of the "least-liked" group to live in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517 
Table 5 42 Would von allow "a least liked grouo" to give a oolitical soeech in von area? (1994) -
Yes No D'k 
Professional 47.1 50.0 2.9 
Manager 47.2 50.0 2.8 
Clerk 24.1 63.0 13.0 
Skilled worker 27.1 62.1 10.8 
Semi-skilled worker 33.3 66.7 
Unskilled worker 22.2 65.7 12.0 
Total 29.4 60.9 9.7 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a 
member of the "least-liked" group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. 
Ns = 2517 
The tables presented above clearly show that professionals and managers have 
·higher levels of tolerance than those in less skilled occupations. Higher levels of 
education in high skilled occupations probably have an important effect. Thus, the more 
skilled, the more tolerant (both socially and politically). 
5.8.1.2.1 Social and Political tolerance in South Africa in 1994: Summary 
After analysing in detail the intolerance level in 1994, it can be said that the 
transition period has had an important influence on the tolerance levels, as evidenced by 
the tables. The uncertainty about the future makes people wait to see what the future in 
the new political and social context brings. Thus, levels both of acceptance and of 
refusal decrease. Important to note is the progress in tolerance of the White and Indian 
populations. 
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The pluralistic (social) intolerance of 1983 is turning into more concentrated 
intolerance (both social and political intolerance). In 1983, the Black population was the 
main target group, although it was not the only one and the difference was not large. In 
1994, generally, White, Coloured and Indian populations was intolerant of Black 
organisations (ANC) and the Black population of the IFP (also Black). Thus, the Black 
population is becoming the target group. 
Again, the more noticeable influence on tolerance seems to come from education. 
The more educated, the more tolerant. Once the main doubts about the future disappear, 
tolerance is expected to increase. This will be tested in the following section of the 
study: The analysis oftolerance in 1998. 
The political tolerance indicator follows the same trend and its analysis by race, 
education, occupation and income show the same results as those for social tolerance. 
5.8.1.3 Tolerance in South Africa, 1998 
The latest data available on tolerance for this study is from 1998, four years after 
the first democratic elections. Politics in South Africa had been developing peacefully. 
The Government of National Unity gave way to a government entirely composed of the 
ANC and the second democratic elections were close47 . 
The presentation follows the procedure as used for 1983 and for 1994. The general 
results are presented in a table, below, with comparable data from 1983 and from 1994. 
After that, as previously done, the same cleavages are analysed, being race, age, 
income, education and occupation. 
The tables below show the evolution of both social (Table 5.43) and political (Table 
5.44) tolerance. Both follow similar trends: Increase. After four years of democracy 68 
% of respondents would allow a least-liked people to live in their neighbourhood and 
69.3 %would allow the least-liked to make political speech. The data sets do not reveal 
who is the least-liked group. However, other studies specifically conducted for 
measuring tolerance in South Africa show that the least-liked group remains the same as 
in 1994. The Coloured, Indian and White populations like the ANC the least and the 
47 The field work was conduced in September, 1998 and the elections were held in June, 1999. 
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Black population, the IFP (Gibson & Gouws, 1998) 48 . 
Table 5 43 Would xou allow "a least liked erouo" to live in vour nei!!hbourhood? (1998) 
-
1983 1994 199849 
Yes 48.4 41.7 68.0 
No 51.04 41.0 22.9 
Table 5 44 Would vou allow "a least liked erou12'' to !!ive a oolitical soeech in vour area? (1998) -
1994 1998 
Yes 26.8 69.3 
IJNo I 60.8 I 21.5 II 
5.8.1.3.a Race 
Before getting into a detailed analysis like for 1983 and 1994, a general view of the 
situation according to race is important. Thus, race will be the first cleavage analysed. 
The following table presents the results of intolerance by race. 
Table 5 45 Would vou allow "a least-liked erouo" to live in vour nei!!hbourhood? (1998) . 
Yes No D'k 
White 83.9 12.6 3.5 
Black 61.8 26.8 11.3 
Coloured 86.5 11.9 1.6 
Indian 89.4 9.2 1.5 
Total 68.1 22.9 9.0 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group willing to tolerate (Yes) or 
not (No) a member of the least-liked group living in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 
48 As was said in Chapter 4, these surveys were not created specifically for the measurement of tolerance. 
Besides, the main intention of the study- presenting the evolution over time- is possible and those other 
studies made specifically on tolerance in South Africa confirm this tendency (Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 
1999). The increase in tolerance may not be as clear as the tables indicate. However, other surveys 
conducted specifically for this reveal that tolerance has increased from the pre-democratic period to the 
democratic period (see Gouws, 1991 and 1998). Thus, the intention of the study is to show the trend over 
time and compare the pre-democratic period with the democratic one. In this sense and regardless of the 
exact level, there is a trend of increase in social and political tolerance. This trend, although, less marked, 
has been confirmed by studies specifically created for testing tolerance. 
49 ldasa election'99 survey. See Chapter 4 for description. 
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-Table 5 46 Would vou allow "a least liked grouy" to !!ive a uolitical soeech in vour area? (1998) 
Yes No D'k 
White 84.5 12.3 3.2 
Black 63.3 25.0 11.7 
Coloured 86.5 11.8 1.6 
Indian 89.7 9.7 0.6 
Total 69.3 21.5 9.3 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of 
the "least-liked" group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 
A quick look at the tables immediately reveals that tolerance has increased 
significantly in all population groups (most notably among Whites, especially compared 
to 1983). However, Blacks still remain the most intolerant group. It is probable that, the 
high level of unemployment in the country, mainly affecting the Black population may 
led to frustration and increase in intolerance. The political disputes between the ANC 
and the IFP may also lie behind this low level of tolerance within the Black population. 
5.8.1.3.b Age 
The first dissection, as above, will be made along age categories. Tables 5.47 and 
5.48 present the results. 
Table 5.47 Would you allow "a least-liked grouy" to live in your neighbourhood? (1998) 
Yes No D'k 
18-24 65.0 27.2 7.8 
25-34 65.0 26.1 8.9 
35-45 70.3 21.7 7.9 
45-55 70.5 18.3 11.2 
55-64 68.3 21.7 10.1 
>65 75.6 14.1 10.3 
Total 68.1 22.9 9.0 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each age group willing to tolerate (Yes) or not (No) 
a member of the least-liked group living in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 
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Table 5.48 Would you allow "a least-liked grour!" t o give a political speech in your area? (1998) 
~18-24 I Yes I No 63.8 27. 2 D'k 9.0 
25-34 70.1 22. 6 7.3 
35-45 68.5 22. 5 9.0 
45-55 71.0 17. 11.9 
55-64 69.1 19. 8 11.2 
>65 81.3 10. 0 8.6 
Total 69.3 21. 5 9.3 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each i ncome group willing to allow a member 
n their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 of the "least-liked" group to give a political speech i 
The tables reveal that the acceptance 
age increases. Besides, tolerance is higher 
of least-liked individuals grows larger as the 
at all ages the, compared with previous years. 
The following cleavage to be analysed is in come. 
5.8.1.3.c Income 
The Tables 5.49 he results for the total population and its and 5.50 present t 
distribution according to the level of inca me: 
Table 5.49 Would you allow "a least-liked groun" to live in your neighbourhood? (1998) 
Yes N 0 D'k 
<3999 64.9 24 .2 10.9 
4000-9999 77.4 18 .3 4.3 
10000-19999 87.0 9. 9 3.1 
20000 or more 83.2 12 .4 4.4 
Total 67.8 22 .6 9.7 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each i ncome level willing to tolerate (Yes) or not 
eir neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 1(No) a member of the least-liked group living in th 
Table 5.50 Would you allow "a least-liked groun" to give a political speech in your area? (1998) 
Yes N 0 D'k 
<3999 66.2 2 2.6 11.1 
4000-9999 77.6 1 9.1 3.3 
10000-19999 87.2 1 0.0 2.8 
20000 or more 87.0 1 0.1 2.9 
Total 69.0 21 .4 9.7 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each i ncome level willing to allow a member of 
their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 the "least-liked" group to give a political speech in 
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The tables clearly show a tendency of growth. The richer, the more tolerant. This 
probably is the result of a higher education. Those with high levels of education may 
have better-paid jobs. Education, as suggested before, promotes understanding of the 
differences and, hence, tolerance. 
5.8.1.3.d Education 
The next cleavage to be analysed is education: Tables 5.51 and 5.52 present the 
result for both social and political tolerance in 1998. 
Table 5.51 Would you allow "a least-liked group" to live in your neiJ:hbourhood ? (1998) 
Yes No D'k 
55.8 15.1 29.0 
Some primary school 64.2 25.7 10.1 
Primary school completed 66.4 24.7 8.9 
Some high school 67.6 25.8 6.5 
Matric 72.0 22.5 5.4 
Further education 81.0 14.2 4.8 
Total 67.9 23.1 9.1 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each education level willing to 
tolerate (Yes) or not (No) a member of the least-liked group living in their 
neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 
Table 5 52 Would you allow "a least liked !!roup" to give a nolitical sneech in your area? (1998) -
Yes No D'k 
INo schooling 59.2 16.0 24.8 
Some primary school 65.2 22.5 12.3 
Primary school completed 65.5 25.0 9.5 
Some high school 69.9 22.8 7.3 
Matric 72.9 22.7 4.5 
Further education 79.3 14.9 5.8 
Total 69.1 21.6 9.3 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level willing to allow a 
member of the "least-liked" group to give a political speech in their 
neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 
The tendency is clear again and for both social and political tolerance. The more 
educated, the more tolerant. This has been explained previously. 
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5.8.1.3.e Occupation 
The last cleavage to be analysed is that of occupation. The table below presents the 
tolerance results for the whole population distributed along the different occupations. As 
with previous analysis, it is expected that more skilled professions (professionals, 
managers, etc.) will show higher levels of tolerance. 
Table 5.53 Would you allow "a least-liked group" to live in your neighbourhood? (1998) 
li~P,-o-re-ss-ion_a_I------~---Y-7:-.:--~----1-:-~----~----:-::----~! 
Manager 81.2 5.3 13.5 
Clerk 77.0 18.9 4.1 
Skilled worker 75.8 17.7 6.5 
Semi-skilled worker 80.1 19.9 
Unskilled worker 69.1 16.4 14.5 
Total 74.8 17.3 7.9 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each occupation category willing to tolerate (Yes 
or not (No} a member of the least-liked group living in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 
Table 5 54 Would von allow "a least liked grouo" to !!ive a oolitical soeech in vour area? (1998) -
Yes No D'k 
Professional 85.6 13.8 0.6 
Manager 85.2 8.0 6.9 
Clerk 74.8 19.6 5.6 
Skilled worker 71.9 18.5 9.6 
Semi-skilled worker 80.0 18.5 1.5 
Unskilled worker 68.4 20.5 11.1 
Total 74.1 18.9 6.9 
Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of 
the "least-liked" group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200 
The tables reveals that highly qualified or skilled occupations tend to be more 
tolerant than those less skilled occupations (semi-skilled occupations somehow break 
that tendency. This might be due to margin of error of the survey). Again a higher level 
of education of those high skilled jobs may be the responsible. 
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5.8.1.3.1 Tolerance in South Africa in 1998: Summary 
After analysing the existing tolerance in 1998, the first thing to point out is the 
remarkable decrease in the general level of intolerance in South African society, 
especially among the White population. This important decrease in intolerance explains 
the peacefulriess of the first years of democracy. 
The largest decrease has occurred among the White and Indian population groups. 
Black society stands out as the most intolerant in spite of the fact that apartheid has 
made place for a multiparty and non-racial democracy and the fact that the ANC won 
the first democratic elections 50 overwhelmingly and was sure to win the second one. 
This might be explained by the fact that their target group has changed (from White 
Afrikaans speaking to IFP). 
Concretely, intolerance has passed from being a "normal" phenomenon widely 
spread out through the whole society, along all population groups, to be a characteristic 
of the Black, young, low-skilled and low-educated population. Unfortunately, 1998 data 
do not provide information about the distribution of intolerance. However, as said 
before, different studies on tolerance in South Africa confirm that the least-liked groups 
remain the same (the ANC for the White, Coloured and Indian populations and IFP for 
the Black population) (Gibson & Gouws, 199851 ). 
All population groups have a level of acceptance of the least-liked group of over 
80%, whereas the Black population has an average of 61% (the value for the total 
population is 68%, obviously pushed down by the Black value). 
Thus, in summarising, it is possible to state that the first requisite for democratic 
consolidation in South Africa, namely the acceptance of the diversity and plurality 
within society, has been reached, although it is necessary to alert that sector in which 
intolerance is becoming concentrated (intolerant group easily recognisable). 
Once the levels of tolerance have been explained in detail, the next section to which 
this research shift the attention to is the other indicator of political culture, namely trust. 
50 The second survey used (Idasa Election '99 survey) was conducted (September '98) before the second 
democratic elections also overwhelmingly won by the ANC. 
51 This study offers more accurate figures. 
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5.8.2 Trust in South Africa 1994-1999 
As said in the introduction to this Chapter the second index selected for analysing 
the consolidation of the South African democracy is trust. If tolerance refers . to the 
procedural part of democracy, trust refers it to the substantive one. With tolerance, fair 
and periodic elections can be held and democratic governments can be appointed, but it 
will be very difficult to sustain democratic institutions if citizens do not trust them. 
Without trust, free participation becomes non-existence, the free expression of 
minorities is dubious. If those minorities fear repression, their involvement in the 
political system is not probable. This may produce aggressive forms of nationalism 
(Rose, 1994: 18-19; see also Schmitter, 1994)52 . 
In other words, a distrusted democratic system has few chances of survival. Hence, 
the monitoring of the evolution of trust over time in the democratic government seems 
to be essential. 
The general results of the analysis performed in Chapter 4 is presented agam. 
Afterwards, the distribution of these values along race, age, income, education and 
occupation will be observed. As said in Chapter 4, to trust a democratic government 
implies the existence of a government democratically elected. Thus, trust is only 
surveyed for the period after 1995 53 . 
The surveys used for detailed analysis are HSRC '95 to HSRC '99. These surveys 
have been described in Chapter 3. 
52 On the importance of trust for democratic consolidation, see also Diamond (1994a); Harik, (1994). 
Moreover, Inglehart (1990: 32) has empirically demonstrated a correlation between trust and democracy. 
Actually one of the reasons given to justify the lack of legitimacy of democratic institutions and, 
therefore, the breakdowns of Latin American democracies, is the high level of distrust (Lagos, 1997: 128; 
see also Karl, 1991 ). Eastern and Central Europe and Russia seem to suffer from the same problem (see 
the already quoted Rose, 1994: 28-29; see also 1997 and Fish, 1994). For Southern Europe see, in this 
regard, for instance, Pridhman, (1990) for a concrete case in that area (Spanish case) see Montero et al., 
p997). 
3 HSRC '94 survey was conducted before the elections. Thus, the government was not democratic yet. 
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Table 5 55 Trust in !!overnment 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No 48.2 30.8 34.7 38.2 45.4 37.5 
Yes 20.5 35.8 29.2 22 21.7 32.5 
Entries represent the percentage of people m South Africa showing trust in the 
government in each year 
INs 2286 2157 2228 2220 2227 2210 
Table 5.55 indicates that 1994 shows the lowest trust in government 54 . After that 
the first democratic elections were held and the trust in government increased. Since 
then, trust in government has done nothing but decrease55 . In 1999 it increased again, 
obviously helped by the election effect, but trust in government still remains lower than 
in 1995. Consequently, the analysis of the evolution of trust will be focused on the 
period 1995 - a democratically elected government already - to 1999, the last point 
with available data. 
5.8.2.1 Trust in government in South Africa: 1995 
As said before, 1994 data were collected before the elections. Thus the analysis 
begins from 1995, to ensure that people were giving their opinion on a democratically 
elected government. The values are now analysed by race, age, income, education and 
occupation. The first cleavage studied is, as with tolerance, race. 
5.8.2.1.a Race 
As with tolerance, the first close look at the indicator (trust, in this case) is by race. 
The results are presented in Table 5.56. 
54 The survey, HSRC' 94, was conducted before the first democratic elections, and thus was still a no 
legitimate government. 
55 Actually the level of trust in 1998 is closer to the 1994's figure, when the government was not 
democratic. · 
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Table 5 56 Trust in the ~::overnment bv race (1995) 
No Yes D'k 
Black 22.6 45.6 31.8 
Coloured 43.9 16.0 40.1 
Asian 46.9 14.1 39.1 
White 54.0 9.9 36.1 
Total 30.7 35.8 33.5 
Entries represent the percentage of each population group showing trust in the 
government. Ns = 2157 
Expectedly and according to the table, the population group that shows the least 
trust in the government is the White and the Black population group trusts it the most. 
After one year of democracy, the exact figures are: 45.6% of Blacks trusting the 
government; 9.9% ofWhites show trust in the government, 14.1% oflndians and 16.0% 
of Coloureds. Now the same results will be offered by age: 
5.8.2.1.b Age 
The following table presents the results of the investigation into trust in government 
by age for the whole country. 
Table 5 57 Trust in the ~::overnment bv a!!:e (1995) . 
No Yes 
18-25 26.8 39.1 
126-35 30.5 34.7 
136-45 29.7 35.3 
46-55 32.5 34.5 
56-65 36.7 33.1 
>65 42.1 33.3 
Total 30.8 35.8 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each age cohort showing trust in the 
government. Ns = 2157 
The table does not leave any room for doubt. Young groups trust the government 
more than older ones do. In general, it can be stated that young people of all races 
(exception for the "18-25 year group") tend to trust the government more than older 
groups. Consequently, general trust is to be expected to increase with the passing of 
time. The next analysis is concerned with income. 
249 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5. 8.2.1.c Income 
First a general view of how income influences trust in government is offered in the 
table below. 
Table 5 58 Trust in the I!Overnment bv income (1995) . 
No Yes D'k 
<2499 25.7 42.3 32.0 
2500-12499 41.5 20.3 38.2 
12500-24999 68.8 9.4 21.9 
>25000 50.0 20.0 30.0 
Total 29.3 37.8 32.9 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level trusting the government. 
Ns = 2157 
The table indicates that, at low-income levels, the trust is higher than at high-
income levels. This, as said before, may be the effect of the level of education lying 
behind the occupation, which will be analysed now. 
After analysing the effect of income on trust in detail, it is possible to state that the 
general trend is to increase the confidence as the income grows. The next issue to 
investigate is the possible effect of education on trust. 
5.8.2.1.d Education 
The following table shows the results for the whole population: 
Table 5 59 Trust in the government by education (1995) 
No Yes D'k 
None 27.2 43.3 29.4 
Std.1 -Std .. 4 25.1 40.6 34.3 
Std. 5 - Std. 9 29.4 37.5 33.1 
Std. 10 42.5 21.9 35.5 
Further 42.7 17.9 39.3 
Total 30.8 35.9 33.4 
lEn tries represent the percentage of people at each education level trusting the 
!government. Ns = 2157 
The table indicates that trust decreases when education does. In other words, those 
educated do not seem to trust the government. This is somehow normal in mature 
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democracies (Zussman, 1997). 
5.8.2.1.e Occupation 
Table 5.60 presents the results for occupation. 
Table 5.60 Trust in the 20vernment by occn(!ation (1995 
No Yes D'k 
Professionals 37.3 20.9 41.8 
Managers 46.4 17.9 35.7 
Clerks 41.2 11. 8 47.1 
-----;--------------~1 
Skilled workers 39.2 29. 8 30.9 
Semi-skilled workers 33.6 32. 8 33.6 
-----;--------------~; 
Unskilled workers 27.6 36. 9 355 
____ _, ______________ ~! 
Total 34.1 30. 7 353 
Entries represent the percentage ofpeop1e at each educatio n level trusting the government. 
Ns = 2157 
The figure shows that those in less skilled oc cupations tend to indicate more trust in 
ated with each occupation level may be government. Again, the level of education associ 
the responsible. 
5.8.2.1.1 Trust in South Africa in 1995: Summ ary 
After analysing the level of trust in the dem ocratic South African government it is 
s year (the first measurement with a 
he measurements 56 (1995-1999). The 
he Black population, with low, or mid-
possible to state that the level of trust in thi 
democratic government) is the highest of all t 
highest concentration of trust in encountered in t 
low income, and low levels of skill. 
The next step to be taken is the exposition o f the same results, in the same way, but 
for 1999. 
56 Refers to total measurement. 
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5.8.2.2 Trust in government in South Africa, 1999 
The table below presents, again, the trust values in South Africa in 1999 and its 
evolution since 1995 - the previous year analysed. 
Table 5 61 Trust the !!Overnment (1999) 
199557 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No 30.8 34.7 38.2 45.4 37.5 
Yes 35.8 29.2 22 21.7 32.5 
Entries represent the percentage of people in South Africa showing trust in the 
1
government in each year. Ns are offered below 
Ns 2157 2228 2220 2227 2210 
In these four years the trust in the government has experienced a decrease of 3.2%. 
If the result is observed by year, trust did not stop shrinking until 1998. In this year it 
went down to 21.7% (nearly 14%). The fact that, the second elections were held in 1999 
and the government was subsequently elected, may have served as a legitimisation for it 
and produced an increase in the general level of trust. These values are now analysed by 
race, age, income, education and occupation. 
5.8.2.2.a Race 
The results are presented in the following table. Below it, can be found the same 
result from 1995 for easier comparison. 
Table 5.62 Trust in government by race (1999) 
IJPopulation groups No Yes D'k 
Black 29.6 38.7 31.7 
Coloured 48.4 22.5 29.2 
Indian 69.6 7.4 23.0 
White 69.1 8.8 22.1 
Total 37.5 32.5 30.0 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group who trust (Yes) 
or distrust (No) the government. Ns = 2210 
57 As said before, the 1994 survey was conducted when the government was still undemocratically 
elected. 
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Table 5 63 Trust in !!:overnment bv race (1995) 
Population group No Yes D'K 
Black 22.6 45.6 31.8 
Coloured 43.9 16.0 40.1 
Indian 46.9 14.1 39.1 
White 54.0 9.9 36.1 
Total 30.7 35.8 33.5 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group who trust (Yes) 
or distrust (No) the government. Ns = 2210 
Tables 5.62 and 5.63 show the decrease in trust suffered by the government. Most 
notable is the decrease of Black trust (from 45.6% to 38.7%) On the other hand, small 
advances have been produced from the other population groups. This indicates that for 
Whites, Indians and Coloureds the Black government was not as bad as expected and 
for the Black population it was not as good as thought. 
The trust values are now observed according to age, mcome, education and 
occupation. Responses related to age will be looked at first. 
5.8.2.2.b Age 
The distribution through age is offered now. 
Table 5 64 Trust in !!:Overnment bv a!!:e (1999) 
Age No Yes D'k 
18-25 32.0 34.0 34.0 
26-35 39.1 33.2 27.8 
36-45 40.6 30.8 28.6 
46-55 35.8 29.7 34.5 
56-65 39.0 37.0 24.1 
>65 39.0 31.3 29.8 
Total 37.5 32.5 30.0 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each age group who trust (Yes) or 
distrust (No) the government. Ns = 2210 
Table 5.64 indicates in contrast to fmdings from 1995, that the age does not seem to 
have any influence on the trust of citizens in their government. Trust increases and 
decreases at all ages. Trust seems to decrease from younger groups to middle-aged ones, 
when it increases again and decreases after 65 years old. Distrust is, therefore, more 
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spread out along all ages. At this point it can be said that there is no continuity with 
1995, when age was influencing trust more. 
5.8.2.2.c Income 
The following issue to investigate is income. Table 5.56 presents the results 
Table 5.65 Trust in government by income (1999) 
No Yes D'k 
<2499 32.5 37.3 30.2 
2500-12499 42.5 30.5 27.0 
12500-24999 52.1 15.2 32.7 
>25000 72.2 27.8 
Total 35.5 35.0 29.4 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level who trust (Yes) or distrust (No) 
lthe government. Ns = 2210 
The table reveals a decrease in trust as income increases. Those who are richer, 
show lower levels of trust. Again, better-paid jobs may imply higher levels of education. 
This might be the reason. 
The following issue to be studied is education: 
5.8.2.2.d Education 
The table represents the results for the whole population. 
Table 5.66 Trust in government by education (1999) 
No Yes D'k 
23.0 41.0 35.9 
Std 4 or less 36.9 31.4 31.6 
Std. 5 - Std. 9 35.1 36.9 28.1 
Matric 42.8 25.9 31.3 
Further 53.1 18.4 28.6 
Total 37.5 32.5 30.0 
Entries represent the percentage of people at each education level who trust (Yes) or distrust 
(No) the government. Ns = 2210 
Once again, as in 1995, the tendency in Table 5.66 is clear. The highest educated 
show the lowest level of trust. 
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5.8.2.2.e Occupation 
The last cleavage to be studied is occupation. Table 5.67 presents the results. 
Table 5.67 Trust in government by occupation 0999) 
No Yes D'K 
48.5 20.4 31.1 
Manager 64.8 8.6 26.6 
Clerk 58.4 12.9 28.7 
Skilled worker 42.8 31.2 26.0 
Semi-skilled worker 22.7 47.4 29.8 
Unskilled worker 38.8 33.6 27.6 
Total 42.3 29.9 27.8 
Entries represent the percentage of people of each education level who trust (Yes) or distrust 
(No) the government. Ns = 2210 
The table indicates, as in 1995, that people in low-skilled occupations show higher 
levels of trust in the government than those in high-skilled occupations. 
5.8.2.2.1.1 Trust in South Africa in 1999: Summary 
After analysing the evolution of trust in 1999, the first thing that calls for attention 
is its decrease compared to 1995 (although there is an increase from 1998, probably 
produced by the election effect58 - the 1999 survey was conducted before the election). 
The figure in 1998 is closer to the 1994 figure when there was no democratic 
government- the 1994 survey was conducted before the elections). 
In 1999 it is more difficult to "locate" those who trust than in 1995. Distrust is 
spreading throughout society. Although still, education and occupation are still seen as 
important areas of cleavage. 
It is important to note that those young Black individuals with low incomes who 
were trusting the government in 1995, now show a lower level of trust than those with 
higher levels of income. In other words and in brief, in 1995 trust was a characteristic of 
poor and low-skilled Black people. After 4 years, even those are losing their confidence 
in the government. 
58 On this see Mattes (eta!., 1999). 
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5.9 Middle class and democratic consolidation analysed: A summary 
Before providing some concluding remarks for this Chapter, it seems to have worth 
to provide the reader with the most important results developed in this section. 
The Chapter commenced with an introduction that explained the work to be done. 
The middle class results presented in Chapter 3 were repeated for further analysis, as 
were the results of the investigation into political culture presented in Chapter 4. Out of 
all the indicators analysed in Chapter 4 with regard to political culture, only two were 
selected for further analysis: Tolerance and trust, as they are the most important. This 
was motivated according to the existing literature in the field. Other indicators were 
added to these in Chapter 4 to provide the reader with a wider picture of the political 
culture of South Africa. There is no general agreement on their ability in measuring 
democratic consolidation. 
The middle class was analysed in terms of occupation and population group. As 
explained in Chapter 3, no data is available for "old" middle class in the pre-94 period 
(either the data is not comparable - independent homelands are not included) or there is 
no income information for certain population groups (for Blacks in Census 1970, the 
last before the homelands became independent). Thus only new middle class was 
analysed for that period. This did not affect the aim of this research as all the labour 
legislation developed, historically, in South Africa was focused mainly on skilled 
occupations (since Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924 to affirmative action, 70 years 
later). 
The analysis of the middle class revealed that the new middle class had grown since 
1970. Since 1994, in the democratic period, this, as it was shown, was due to the entry 
of the Black population into government, and to affirmative action. This occurred 
mainly in the public and fmance sectors. This (affirmative action and Blacks entering 
politics) seems to be responsible for the important advance (doubled since 1994) of the 
Black middle class (mainly located at the top - professionals). Besides, the White 
middle class showed the most progress, especially since 199759 . 
59 The data from 1994 to 1997 were checked against the October Household Surveys to increase 
reliability. After this period there were no data available to check against. Further analysis will reveal 
whether this tendency is correct or due to small error in 1999 survey. 
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Once the middle class had been analysed in detail, the evolution of the historical 
conditions that affected the social structure in general and the middle class in particular 
was explained. Even before the first comprehensive labour legislation was passed 
(Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924), the Black, Coloured and Indian populations were 
excluded politically and economically, until democracy was installed in South Africa in 
1994. After this, the so-called "affirmative action" intended to introduce the previously 
excluded people (Blacks, Coloureds and Indians, although mostly Blacks) into those 
positions historically reserved for Whites (skilled occupations). 
After this, it was shown that unemployment was increasing in the country at a 2% 
average rate since 199460, affecting mainly low-skilled occupations and Blacks. Only 
public and fmance sectors were creating jobs. At the same time, wages were increasing 
at 10% on average. Further analysis of inequality revealed that, as a result of this 
increase in salaries and unemployment, the "gap" between the richer and the poorer was 
growing bigger within all population groups (except Whites), although the general 
inequality level seemed to decrease61 , confirming, hereby, the figures for the middle 
class (increase in middle class - although very small and due to Black entrance into 
politics - increase in equality). 
With this picture of a small increase in the middle class, the Chapter turned to the 
explanation of the evolution of the "consolidation of democracy" in the country. 
As was said before, only tolerance and trust were analysed. For tolerance, two 
indicators were offered in Chapter 4: "Allow disliked person to live in your 
neighbourhood" (social tolerance) and "Allow least-liked group to give political speech 
in your neighbourhood!' (political tolerance). The results gathered in Chapter 4 were 
analysed by race, age, income, education and occupation. These cleavages were selected 
according to the propositions from earlier studies in the field and aspects peculiar to 
South Africa 62 • The first analysed was tolerance and then trust. The results were 
chronologically presented. It was explained that mature democracies (i.e. USA) also 
operate with high levels of political intolerance. Thus, zero-intolerance level was not a 
60 This tendency of job loss has existed, at least, since 1990, according to the SARB (1997). 
61 Data available up until 1995 only. 
62 Not all studies on political culture emphasise race. This, according to the literature on South African 
political history, is a very important cleavage to take into account. 
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must. Consequently, the main aspect to monitor is the evolution of trust over time. 
The main fmdings were that in 1983 tolerance ranked very low in the South African 
society. South Africa was, according to the survey, a very intolerant society at all levels 
and toward all levels (all population groups were intolerant and there was no clear target 
group). However, educated people seemed to show higher levels of tolerance. The fact 
that intolerance was spread throughout the society (no target group could be detected 
easily) makes it "pluralistic" (Sullivan et al., 1982: 83-109). This, according to previous 
studies is a "good" sign as it makes repression difficult. This probably might be a key 
aspect to understand the - in the end, peaceful -transition to democracy that occurred in 
the country. 
In 1994, the first democratic elections were held and the country had been involved 
in political negotiations for democracy for four years. The future was uncertain. The 
main findings were that the White population had increased their level of tolerance 
considerably. Education, again, seemed to have made people more tolerant. The main 
target groups at which intolerance was directed, were the ANC, for the Coloured, Indian 
and White populations, and the IFP, for the Black population. 
The data for 1998 showed that tolerance had increased significantly. In 1998 
however, older groups seemed to show higher levels of tolerance - probably more 
embedded in the past - than levels of tolerance encountered in the youth. Again, as in 
1983 and 1994, those who were educated, richer and had more highly-skilled 
occupations were more tolerant. The rich were also more tolerant. Besides, it was noted 
that intolerance in 1998 was being concentratedfrom Black, young, unskilled and lowly 
educated people. The target group remained the same as in other studies specifically 
conducted for this purpose. In general, the first objective for the consolidation of 
democracy, namely increased tolerance, seems to have been attained. 
After tolerance, trust was analysed following the same methods and dissecting it 
according to the same cleavages. Only 1995 data (for a period with a democratic 
government) and 1999 data were analysed for reasons of space. 
From 1994 to 1995, the main fmdings were that trust m the government had 
increased in general terms. In 1995, as expected, levels of trust were higher in Black 
population. Concretely, trust was concentrated in Blacks, who were young, with low 
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levels of education and skill. 
In 1999, the second measurement of trust took place and a general and significant 
decrease in the level of trust in all population groups was encountered, but this was most 
noticeable in the Black population, although they still stood out as the group that trusted 
the government the most. Now it is more difficult to locate the group that has trust in the 
government, although young, low-skilled and low-educated Black people still have 
more trust. However, even for this sector, the level of trust has dropped. 
5.10 Concluding remarks 
Against this background, the following conclusions can be reached. 
In general terms, the middle class has experienced a small growth in size in the 
democratic period and the indicators of democratic consolidation follow two different 
trends: Tolerance increases and trust decreases. 
Middle class enlargement is small and mainly due to the entrance of the Black 
population into the political scene and to being pushed up by affirmative action. It still 
comprises only a 10%, though. However, there is no acknowledged minimum or "pro-
democratic" growth pattern for the middle class. Thus, it can be stated that, in principle, 
middle class is growing in the correct direction, although its growth should be 
monitored further to ensure that it keeps growing and incorporates groups from all 
population groups. 
As stated, tolerance and trust, the indicators of democratic consolidation, follow 
different trajectories. Both political and social tolerance are increasing among all 
population groups, although Black, young and low-skilled people are rated the least 
tolerant, probably because the high level of unemployment affects them particularly. 
Besides this and in general terms, tolerance levels seem to bode well for the future 
stability of the South African democracy. This has been confirmed by other findings 
from research performed specifically on tolerance in South Africa (see Gouws, 1991, 
Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999). 
Trust, on the other hand, has done nothing but decrease since 1995. It only 
increased in 1999 but the level was still lower than in 1995. This increase (in 1999) is 
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probably due to the election effect. The government was to be elected soon and many 
promises were made. Besides, even the sector that used to trust the government the most 
was decreasing its trust (Black, low-skilled people). Thus, this indicator does not bode 
well for the stability of South African democracy. 
All this should lead to a reconsideration of the hypothesis of this study, which was 
the larger the middle class, the greater the chance for consolidating democracy. The 
two indicators of consolidation of democracy follow different trajectories. Thus, it can 
not simply be stated that democracy is consolidating or not consolidating (tolerance 
increases but trust decreases). Hence, this point needs further explanation. 
Tolerance seems to refer to the procedural dimension of democracy (see Chapter 
two). Without political tolerance (or acceptable levels of political tolerance), elections 
are difficult to run and the democratic election of government is impeded. In the 
absence of reasonable levels of political tolerance political violence may flourish. 
Hence, political tolerance is supposed to lubricate the democratic process. According to 
the findings of this study, democracy might be consolidating procedurally. People 
vote63 , reject political violence and more and more, tolerate their political opponents 
and, hence, government is democratically elected. 
Trust seems to refer to a more substantive part of democracy. Without trust in the 
institutions, minorities will not see their rights protected, their participation in politics is 
hampered and, civil society will not develop properly (Rose, 1994). In South Africa, 
trust in the institutions is decreasing even from the Black population. Even those Blacks 
who have low levels of skill and young people who trusted the government the most are 
now decreasing their levels of trust (although the Black population still trusts the 
government the most). As there is no known level of trust for democracy to run or break 
down, we can only show the trend over time and this indicates that it is decreasing. 
Further research will reveal whether the increase experienced in 1999 is due to elections 
or a real turning point and whether trust will again tum upward. In the mean time it is 
63 In 1994 elections, 87% of the voting age population cast their ballots, whereas in 1999, 80% of the 
voting age population did it, according to the IEC (Reynolds, 1999: 177). However, the 1996 Census 
revealed that the country was not as populated in 1994 as the projections from 1991 Census indicated. 
Thus, in this sense, this comparison is not very reliable. Besides this, there is a high level of participation. 
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only possible to state that, since 1995 (first data with democratic government) trust has 
decreased (the 1999 figure still is smaller than the 1995 one). Besides and up until now, 
it can only be said that South African democracy is not consolidating substantially. 
Trust is decreasing and the other indicators related to the substantive part of democracy, 
such as belief in the capacity to influence the government, closeness to parties or 
membership of organisation presented in Chapter 4 are also decreasing. 
Against this background, this study's hypothesis can be reformulated as follows: A 
small increase in the middle class in the first years of democracy may indicate that 
democracy is consolidating ''procedurally". 
As said in Chapter 3, democratic consolidation is a lengthy process that may take up 
to a generation. Thus, interpersonal relations may lead to interpersonal trust and this 
may lead, in tum, to higher levels of trust in the institutions. Then, democracy might be 
considered as consolidated substantively. On the other hand, if trust keeps decreasing, 
especially in the population sector that is supposed to trust the government the most, the 
poorest sector of the society (most of the South African society) might become fertile 
soil for populist and extremist leaders, which might pressurise daily political life (more 
radical reforms might be requested, etc). In this sense South African democracy may 
follow the same trend that Latin American or Russian democracies followed where the 
lack of trust was considered to be one of the most important obstacles to consolidation. 
In this context, the ANC may lose the control of the "collective memory" and its 
integrity as a single party might also be affected64, opening, in this way, a new 
uncertainty on the political horizon. This may be helped by the new class cleavage that 
is dissecting the Black population. 
64 This was one of the main reasons why Solidarity in Poland broke up into so many parties (Smolar, 
1994: 73-74) 
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Chapter 6. Concluding remarks 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter, the last one, will attempt to synthesise the complete study. A brief 
recapitulation of every Chapter will be offered to the reader, including the most 
important findings of every Chapter. Special emphasis will be focused on Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. This is because the major results and fmdings are drawn 
from them. The Chapter will conclude with some prospects for the future 
consolidation of the South African democracy. 
6.2 The study: A recapitulation 
The intention of this study was to monitor the possibilities of survival of the new 
South African democracy. Chapter 1 offered a general description of the aim of this 
research and the methodology to undertake in such an enterprise. A general overview 
to the scope of the study was offered. The process of democratisation or "waves" of 
democratisation were presented. The factors (economic development, political 
institutions, political attitudes, elites, social structures and external influences) that 
help democracy to be established and consolidated were also presented. According to 
that, the hypothesis was introduced to the reader, namely: The larger the middle class, 
the greater the chance for consolidating democracy. 
The second Chapter attempted to explain the different approaches to the concept 
of democracy, consolidated democracy, class and middle class. Final definitions were 
adopted and motivated. After that, and in the same Chapter, it was explained that a 
link existed between the middle class and democracy. The relevant literature 
suggested that it was an important factor to take into account when studying 
democratisation. The different theoretical and empirical studies on this link were 
presented and explained. A fmal justification supporting the theoretical background 
was found, backing up, the theoretical foundation on which this study is based. 
The third Chapter was concerned with the operationalisation of the concept 
middle class. The previously given definition of middle class (a social group mainly 
comprised of professionals, businessmen and clerks, - white collar workers - both in 
262 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the public and private sectors, and civil service plus those individuals running their 
own business, with similar incomes) was operationalised. Different approaches were 
offered and the final approach was selected and justified according to the theoretical 
description of the middle class presented in the previous Chapter. Two main models 
were offered. The first one was the Psychologist - Marxist - and the second one was 
the Functionalist - Weberian model. The former is based on the awareness of class 
and the class conflict in a society as a whole. It is embedded in ideological aspects 
and political propaganda. Different social classes are to be understood in their 
relations to the others. The latter conceives a society as a decomposable group of 
people, without any ideological contamination. This model allows the 
operationalisation of a single social class, as classes are not necessarily related (i.e. in 
conflict) to one another. These two models have been developed significantly by 
many scholars. Wright's and Goldthorpe's work were presented as the main 
contributions in the field in each methodology - psychologist and functionalist 
respectively. 
The Marxist method was discarded due to the flaws and shortcomings from which 
it suffered. Marxism is based on a psychological background - class awareness and 
class conflict. Contemporary Marxists assume that, awareness is automatically 
produced by the work location, but they have not yet been able to demonstrate such a 
relation. Another important flaw encountered in Marxism is the treatment of the 
middle class. Marxist treatment of the middle classes (members of the middle class 
simultaneously are located in two different classes) only reveals the incapacity of this 
school of thought to find a firm foothold in contemporary societies for which that 
theory was not created. In other words, Marxists were not ready for the contemporary 
evolution of the middle classes, although it was foreseen by Marx, but not to such an 
extent. On the other hand, functionalism is not politically embedded and permits the 
operationalisation of only one class (the middle class). Accordingly, it was finally 
decided to operationalise the middle class in terms of occupation, thereby, following 
the Weberian approach, mainly developed by Goldthorpe. 
The data used for this was explained. A final picture of the middle class in South 
Africa was offered to the reader. The Chapter concluded with an explanation of those 
results. The middle class had increased from 1970 to 1994. After 1994, the middle 
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class remained stable until 1997. Since then, up until1999, it seemed to start growing. 
Further research will reveal whether that increase is fictitious and, therefore, due to 
statistical error of the survey or is a real growth. The data from 1994 to 1997 were 
double-checked with the OHS to increase its reliability. 
In Chapter 4, the same process was applied to the consolidation of democracy in 
South Africa. The idea of democratic consolidation rested on the belief of the citizens 
that democracy was the best and only form of rule. This discarded all other defmitions 
of democracy based on election-counting systems, or any other institutional features. 
Ecuador, Mexico and Japan were clear examples for the rejection these definitions. 
These citizens' support for democracy had to be found in their political culture. Thus, 
the operationalisation of the "consolidation of democracy" was performed according 
to those indicators of political culture most related to democratic consolidation. 
The main indicators of democratic consolidation, according to the propositions 
from the relevant literature were Political tolerance and Trust. Consequently, these 
were selected as the main indicators. In order to provide a wider picture of the 
political culture of the South African society, other indicators were added to these 
two, namely Acceptance of political violence; Interest in politics (measured in terms 
of talking about politics to people); Membership of independent organisations; Belief 
in one's personal capacity to influence government decisions; Political participation 
(vote) and Closeness to political parties. 
The data used for this aspect were presented and explained. The analysis of these 
indicators was presented chronologically from 1983, the first year for which data on 
political culture were available for this research, until 1999. The results gathered were 
presented. Both social and political tolerance had increased since 1983, although, in 
1994, probably due to the uncertainty of the future, the "uncertain" rating was higher. 
Refusal of political violence also increased. At the same time, trust in the government 
had decreased since 1995. In 1999 it increased, compared to 1998, probably because 
of the election effect. The belief in the capacity of influence on the government and 
closeness to parties was also decreasing. As expected, interest in politics increased in 
election time. 
In other words, the main indicators of the consolidation of democracy, political 
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tolerance and trust, were double-oriented. A proper analysis of this was to be made in 
Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 commenced with an explanation of the work to be done. The concepts 
of middle class and political culture were reintroduced for further analysis. Out of all 
the political culture indicators analysed in Chapter 4 only two were selected for 
further analysis: tolerance and trust, because they are the most important. This was 
motivated according to the existing literature in the field. Other indicators were added 
to these two in Chapter 4, in order to provide the reader with a wider picture of the 
political culture of South Africa. There is no general agreement on the strength of 
these arguments when measuring democratic consolidation. 
In Chapter 3 it was explained that there is no data available for "old" middle class 
in the pre-94 period (either the data is not comparable -"independent homelands" not 
included) or there is no income information for certain population groups (for Blacks 
in Census 1970, the last before the homelands became independent). Thus only new 
middle class was analysed for that period. This did not generate any limitation in the 
study as most South African labour legislation affected the enskilling process, on 
which the "new" middle class relies (from Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924 to 
affirmative action, 70 years later). 
The analysis of the middle class revealed that the new middle class had grown 
since 1970. Since 1994, in the democratic period, this enlargement was mainly due to 
the effect of having the ANC in government and being pushed up by "affirmative 
action". This occurred mainly in the public and finance sectors. This (affirmative 
action and Blacks into politics) seems to be the responsible for the important advance 
(doubled since 1994) of the Black middle class (mainly located at the top 
(professionals)). Besides, the White middle class was still progressing the most, 
especially since 1997. 
After the analysis of the middle class, the evolution of the labour and education 
policies that configured the social structure, in general, and the middle class, in 
particular, was presented. These revealed that, even before the first comprehensive 
labour legislation was passed (Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924), Black, Coloured 
and Indian population were excluded politically and economically, and this was so 
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until democracy was installed in South Africa in 1994. After this, the so-called 
"affirmative action" intended to introduce the previously excluded people (mainly 
Black people) into those positions historically reserved for Whites (skilled 
occupations). 
Parallel to this there was an increase in unemployment of 2% on average in the 
country since 1994 - although this tendency began much earlier - affecting mainly 
low-skilled occupations and Blacks. Only public and finance sectors were creating 
jobs. At the same time, wages were increasing at 10% per year on average. 
Inequality analysis showed that, as a result of this increase in salaries and 
unemployment, the "gap" between the richer and the poorer is growing within all 
population groups (except for White population), although the general inequality level 
seemed to decrease (measured by the Gini index). This confirmed that the increase in 
the middle class- although very small- implied an increase in equality. After that the 
study turned to analyse the "consolidation of democracy". 
As said before, only tolerance and trust were analysed. For testing tolerance two 
indicators were offered in Chapter 4: "Allow disliked person to live in your 
neighbourhood'' (indicative of social tolerance) and "Allow least-liked group to give 
political speech in your neighbourhood" (indicative of political tolerance). The results 
were analysed by race, age, income, education and occupation. These cleavages were 
selected according to propositions from earlier studies in the field and aspects peculiar 
to South Africa. The results were chronologically presented. It was explained that 
mature democracies (i.e. USA) also operate with high levels of intolerance. Thus, a 
zero-intolerance level was not a must. Consequently, the main aspect to monitor is the 
evolution over time. 
The main fmdings were that, in 1983, tolerance in the South African society 
ranked very low. South Africa was, according to the survey, a very intolerant society. 
All population groups were intolerant and there was no clear target group. The fact 
that there was no clear target group is called "pluralistic" (Sullivan et al. 1982: 83-
1 09). This, according to previous studies, makes repression difficult. 
• 
In 1994, the first democratic elections were held and the country had been 
involved in political negotiations for democracy for four years. The main findings 
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were that the White population had increased their level of tolerance. Education, 
again, was seen as making people more tolerant. The target group for intolerance was 
the ANC, for the non-Black population, and, the IFP for the Black population. 
The data for 1998 showed that tolerance had increased significantly. In 1998 
however, older sectors seemed to show lower levels of tolerance - probably because 
they are more embedded in the past - than those encountered in younger sectors. 
Again, those who were educated, richer and more high-skilled occupations were more 
tolerant. Besides, it was noted that the most intolerant group in 1998 was Black, 
young, unskilled and lowly educated people. The target group remained the same, 
according to other studies specifically conducted for this. 
In general, the first condition for the consolidation of democracy, namely political 
tolerance, seemed to be attained. 
After tolerance, trust was analysed according to the same cleavages. Only 1995 
(data for a period with a democratic government) and 1999 data were used to show 
the evolution through the years. 
In 1995, the main findings were that trust in the government had decreased in 
general terms. As expected, trust levels were higher in the Black population. 
Concretely, trust was concentrated in Black, young, lowly educated and lowly skilled 
people. 
In 1999, a general and important decrease in the level of trust in all population 
groups was encountered, but this was most notable in Blacks - although they still 
stand out as the group showing the highest level of trust. Besides, it is more difficult 
to locate the trustful group, although still young, Black people with low levels of skill 
and low levels of education still trust the most. However, for this sector the level of 
trust has also dropped. 
Against this background, the following conclusions could be drawn: 
6.3 Final remarks 
If democracy, as shown in Chapter 2, can function in two different dimensions, 
namely procedural and substantive, it might be possible that democracy can also 
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consolidate procedurally and substantively. 
Procedural democracy seems to refer to those mechanisms that permit democracy 
to function, namely elections, political campaigns, configuration of demo·cratic 
institutions such as government, parliament, etc. Tolerance is a very important 
component for that. If opposition is not allowed, political disputes are not sorted out 
peacefully and democratic institutions do not work properly. 
Substantive democracy refers to minority rights, active participation in politics, 
rule of law and the like. It does not seem possible that this dimension of democracy 
can develop with lack of trust, or in a context of decreasing trust. If minorities do not 
trust the institutions their participation in politics will be minimal or non-existent. 
This implies that the development of civil society is handicapped. 
All this should lead to a reconsideration of the hypothesis of this study, which 
was the larger the middle class, the greater the chance for consolidating democracy. 
It should have to be reformulated, according to the fmdings encountered as: A small 
increase in the middle class in the first years of democracy may indicate that 
democracy is consolidating ''procedurally"1. 
As already stated, democratic consolidation is a lengthy process that may take up 
to a generation. Higher levels of trust in the institutions may lead to substantive 
democratic consolidation. On the other hand, if trust does not increase, the society 
might provide a fertile soil for extremist leaders that might bring tension into daily 
political life with the excuse of "cleaning" the polity of corruption, inefficacy, 
unemployment and the like. Latin American democracies, in general, and Ecuador 
and Venezuela recently, in particular, have shown that this is certainly possible. In 
this sense South African democracy may follow the same trend as Latin American or 
Russian democracies where the lack of trust is considered to be one of the most 
important obstacles to consolidation. In this context, the ANC may lose the control of 
the "collective memory" and its integrity as a single party might also be affected 2, 
opening, like this, fresh uncertainty on the political horizon. This may be helped on by 
1 For details on the difference between procedural and substantive democracy see, Chapter 2. 
2 This was one of the main reasons why Solidarity in Poland broke up into so many parties (Smolar, 
I 994: 73-74). 
268 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the new class cleavage that is dissecting the Black population. 
6.4 Future research 
The above discussion opens the door to further research in the following areas: 
1. Future analysis will reveal whether the enlargement of the middle class will 
continue or not. As said in Chapter 1, five years is a short period of time for 
the South African middle class to mature and reach the dimensions of other 
mature middle classes. 
2. Further research will provide information about whether the incipient and new 
class cleavage - affecting mainly the Black population - may be able to 
substitute race as the main cleavage in South Africa, even to split up the ANC 
or, on the other hand, whether race will be strong enough to bind together 
what class is separating and to keep more than 70 % of the total population 
and more than 60 % of the total vote loyal to the same party (ANC), 
regardless of their social and economical situations. The ability of the ANC in 
the latter period of the legislature and its success in the polls indicate that this 
is fairly possible. 
3. In the same way, future research will reveal whether it is possible for 
democracies, in general, and for South African democracy, in particular, to 
consolidate only procedurally or if the substantial dimension of democracy is 
an indispensable ingredient in the consolidation of democracy 
Along the same line, some recommendations seem to be important: 
1. As many researchers from Lipset (1959) to Przeworski frzeworski et al. 
1996) have pointed out, economic development promotes democracy, 
especially in a country where democracy is "related to jobs and houses" for 
most of the population. The economic crisis is affecting the democratic values 
in an important way. South Africans understand democracy as an instrument 
(procedural - see Chapter 4) to obtain improvements related to material 
wealth. In this regard neither the GEAR programme nor its predecessor (RDP) 
attained the desired goals. Unemployment is increasing at an alarming rate, 
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irrespective of the definition adopted, and is hitting the Black, lowly skilled 
population3 with greater force (at the same time a Black middle-upper class is 
appearing and benefiting from the system). Thus, economic development and 
job creation (especially for the low skilled) seem to be necessary for the future 
stabilisation of democracy in South Africa. 
2. The cleavage that seemed to most positively affect tolerance was education. 
Thus, education should be promoted as an instrument of democratic 
consolidation. In this regard, it is important to make South Africans realise 
that democracy is not a solution for their economic problems but a form of 
government, regardless of whether the decisions adopted by that government 
lead to economic progress or not. As soon as South African citizens become 
attached to democracy, even in the face of economic reversals, the 
expectations for democratic survival will increase. 
3 This sector, as said above, is becoming the intolerant group. Moreover, their trust in government is 
also beginning to fade. 
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